J> 




.3 



3S^ 



'"'•SES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING THE 
ARGONNE BATTLE 



HEARINGS 



M.S. (?„,,^,^is. |4^. 



BEFORE 



THE COMMITTEE ON RULES 



OF THE 



HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 



ON 



H. RES. 505 



FRIDAY, JANUARY 24, 1919 






WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1919 



:^ 










9. of D. 



JUN 6 



1919 



sa\;i>ii/- ^:a D-':T;iua i .x 10 t:M?::;:oj- 



NJ 



3:: 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING THE 
ARGONNE BATTLE. 



Committee on Rules, 
House of Representatives, 

Friday^ January 24, 1919, 
The committee this day met, the Hon. Edward W. Poii (chairman) 
presiding. 

The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Mr. Camp- 
bell will make a preliminary statement as to the introduction of the 
'resolution. '!" "" >'y^."- ;_,,,.-,. ,., j-.^j-i 

STATEMENT OF HON. PHILIP P. CAMPBELL, A REPRESENTATIVE 
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF KANSAS. 

Mr. Campbell. Mr. Chairman, the resolution upon which the in- 
quiry is made this morning- was introduced as the result, first, of all 
the rumors that were current with respect to the equipment furnished 
the Thirty-fifth Division, which rumors finally crystallized in a 
speech by the governor of Kansas, in which he made rather specific 
charges with respect to the lack of equipment that was furnished this 
division. The day I introduced the resolution I received in a paper 
widely circulated in Kansas the following, under a Topeka date line : 
" Topeka, Kansas, January 13 

Mr. RoDENBERG. Is this an Associated Press dispatch ? 

Mr. Campbell. It appears to be. 

Kansas officially will demand n congressional investigation of the cause of 
the enormous losses sustained by the Thirty-fifth Division during the Argonne 
Battle. A resolution of this character will he introduced in the legislature at 
the opening session. That it will be immediately adopted goes without saying. 
Missouri will no doubt take similar action, as the Thirty-tiftii Division was made 
up of Kansas and Missouri troops, and the losses of the two States were about 
equal. 

He.e is what Kansas wants to know: Why the Thirty-fifth Division was not 
given proper artillery support; Avhy it was not supplied with ammunition and 
food; why it was not given iiropor support in the air; why its engineers had to 
be used as infantrymen ; why two of its general officers were assigned to other 
duties before the battle and their places given to subordinates ; why about 
1,200 wounded men had to lie on the wet ground without blankets or food for 
more than 36 hours before being taken to the hospitals for treatment? These 
are a few of the pertinent questions which Kansas wants cleared up, and no 
doubt there will be many others when the investigation opens. 

Information lias reached us that our liome company lost more than 50 men 
in that battle. 

This follows the Topeka dispatch and is published in the paper : 

The same ratio of losses was reported from many other Kansas localities. 
What the people want to know is whether such enormous losses were necessary. 
They are entitled to that information. Stories are afloat everywhere that the 

3 



4 LOSSES OF THIETY-FIFTH DIVISION DUKING AEGONNE BATTLE. 

battle could liave been won without such heavy losses. These stories are true 
or not true. If they are true, the public is entitled to know the facts and fix the 
responsibility whei'e it rightfully belongs. If untrue, then the othcers should be 
exonerated. ' Gov. H. J. Allen, in his war speech to-day, Will likely throw some 
light on the matter. He was with the Thirty-fifth in the Argonne fight. He 
knows how it suffered and whether it worked under disadvantages and handi- 
caps. His speech is expected to give information * * *. 

While no official figures have been given out by the AVar Department about 
the losses of the Thrity-fifth Division, information from several .sources indi- 
cates that the losses in five days' fighting were practically 50 per cent. The 
division, all told, was composed of 28,000 men. Of this number, 16,000 were 
infantrymen or combat troops, and of this number of combat troops it is re- 
ported that 7,000 were either killed or wounded. The parents of these boys and 
the people of the country in general have a feeling, based on letters from the 
front, that this was an unnecessary sacrifice, and that something was radically 
wrong in the handling of the troops. Reports from Washington indicate that 
the administration has information of that kind. In fact, there is so much talk 
everywhere that the only way to settle the matter is through a congressional 
investigation. 

After reading that I prepared the iiiforiiuil resohition that is desig- 
nated as House resohition 505, and introduced it. If an investigation 
is ordered by this committee, of course, a formal resolution will be 
prepared authorizing the committee to be appointed under the reso- 
lution to make such expenditures, to summon witnesses, call for per- 
sons and papers, and make such investigation as the facts may 
warrant. 

My idea is that this morning we can ascertain wdiether the War 
Department is in possession of the information called for in the 
resolution, and if not ascertain when the information could probably 
be obtained. I assume that the officers and the men in possession of 
the facts are, many of them, still overseas, although I am not sure, 
and the purpose of this investigation this morning is to ascertain 
from the War Department what information it has upon the matters 
covered by the resolution, and wdien the committee could get the in- 
formation called for by the resolution. 

The Chairman. Mr. Secretary, the committee decided that House 
resolution 505 raised an important question, and I believe it was 
almost the unanimous sense of the committee that before Ave felt 
disposed to act upon a resolution of this far-reaching nature we 
wanted to invite you to submit any observations that you might care 
to make. It was suggested by some members of the committee that 
that probably might not be the proper way to go about it. It was 
suggested that it might be infringing upon the province of a court- 
martial, but in any event it was desired that you might submit any 
observations that j^ou might care to make, and also an}' one or more of 
the officers that you cared to bring with you might give the committee 
such preliminary information as would put the conunittee in a posi- 
tion to pass on the resolution. We will thank you for anything you 
care to say. 

STATEMENT OF HON. NEWTON D. BAKER, SECRETARY OF WAR. 

Secretary Baker. If I understand the situation, Mr. Chairman, 
the sole question before the committee is whether a rule should be 
granted which would provide for an early or immediate considera- 
tion of this resolution. 

The Chairman. Really, if I may be permitted to say, the question 
i« whether or not the committee will order an investigation. 



LOSSES OP THIKTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING AEGONNE BATTLE. 5 

Secretary Baker. Exactly. I would like, in the first place, in the 
most positive phrase possible, to say that the War Department not 
only Avill Avelccme but "will facilitate every investigation which the 
Congress desires to make, either into the transactions of the War De- 
partment itself or into the conduct of military affairs, and if the com- 
mittee will be good enough to assume that attitude and hospitality 
as being the consistent attitude of the War Department, the only 
question that remains to be considered is whether the particular reso- 
lution provides the way, and is wisely conceived as to time for the 
business of the investigation. 

This resolution provides for the appointment of a committee of five 
Members of the House, who are to investigate and report before the 
20 of February upon the matters cited in the preamble. Prac- 
tically every matter recited in the preamble rests for its just deter- 
mination upon the testimony of persons who are now overseas. Gen. 
Pershing, of course, is the commander in chief of the American Expe- 
ditionary Forces, and while perhaps it may be that many things took 
place over there of wdiich he had no previous personal knowledge and 
which were matters of staff direction, still he is primarily the person 
responsible for the conduct of military operations over there, and if 
any inquiry into the operations is desired, it would seem that Gen. 
Pershing and the persons upon wdiom he relied for guidance and 
advice ought to be heard. 

In this particular case of the Thirty-fifth Division, the division 
commander. Gen. Traub, is a Regular Army officer of long years and 
of very high reputation in the Army, and I am not advised that 
even in the rumors which have been brought and been referred to by 
Mr. Campbell there has been any sort of criticism of Gen. Traub, who 
was the divisional commander. 

The corps commander of the corps of w^hicji this division was a 
part is overseas. The Army commander of which the corps was a part 
is overseas. The officers of the Thirty-fifth Division have returned, 
but whether enough to get a really comprehensive view of the nature 
of the action and of the difficulties they had to contend with and the 
way they were attempted to be met, I am not prepared to say. 

I call the committee's attention to the fact that at the close of the 
Civil War a committee was appointed to investigate the conduct of 
the war, generally, and, as I understand that situation — and I have 
not investigated it at all narrowly — all sorts of inquiries of every 
kind, which grew up out of personal information and out of rumor 
and out of apprehension, many of them perhaps founded upon facts, 
were pooled into the hands of the committee, so that a thorough- 
going inquiry was made by the committee of the conduct of the war, 
the report on which I am told covers some 30 or 40 volumes of printed 
matter. It has always seemed to me that when the majority- of the 
American Expeditionary Forces was returned to this country and all 
of the persons who had information, and all of the records which were 
indispensable to a thoroughgoing examination were here, that the 
Congress would desire to appoint some such committee as that, per- 
haps with subcommittees upon special features, and allow the investi- 
gation to cover the widest possible range and be safely based upon 
the actual records and the actual testimony of the responsible persons 
and all the responsible facts. I do not suggest that. I simply point 
that out as the only suggestion that I know of. 



6 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Now, as to the particular examination or inquiry which Mr. Camp- 
bell wants to make, with regard to the statement that the Thirty-fifth 
Division lost 7,000 men because the division was not given proper 
artillery support, I have here the record of the replacements of that 
division up to November 13, from the beginning of the history of 
the regiment. The total number of replacements appear to have been 
10,605. The number killed in action and died of Avounds up to 
November 1 was 827. I have not here the list of minor casualties, but 
apparently the number of 7,000 lost is an overestimate of the whole 
number. It is obvious that in order to have an answer to the inquiry 
complete records of the casualties of the division would have to be 
procured. 

Assuming, however, that there were losses in the division, as there 
certainly were, whether there were 7,000 or any other number of 
thousands, which was, of course, a matter of importance, this inquiry 
that is to be made is whether the losses, whatever they were, were 
due to the fact that proper artillery support was not given. I am 
not a military man, and Gen, March is here, and as soon as I have 
made this statement I would be glad to have the committee inquire 
of him, but that statement, of course, can only be answered by con- 
sulting, first, the Army commander, the corps commander, and the 
division commander as to the use made of the artillery. It is known 
to the members of the committee that each division has its own 
divisional artillery. 

In addition to that, there is some additional artillery, usually of 
heavier caliber, known as corps artillery. In addition to that, there 
is a reserve of still larger caliber, known as Army artillery. In plan- 
ning an engagement, or in carrying forward an action of any kind, 
the use of all three elements of artillery is a part of the measured 
strategy of the action. The fact is, I do not see how it would be pos- 
sible to arrive at a just conclusion as to whether a particular division 
had the proper artillery support, without having the officers present 
who were responsible for directing whatever artillery support was 
given. It seems to me that we would have to know, for instance, in 
this kind of a question, whether the corps commander deemed a par- 
ticular divisional artillery unnecessary at a particular place of the 
line and relied on the divisional artillery of some other division, or 
relied on the corps artillery to support the particular division, which 
might be a thing that would happen. 

The next question which it is desired to determine is whether these 
losses were clue in any part to the fact that a division was not sup- 
plied with ammunition and food. Now, that involves — I have to 
speculate about this, because I am in the unhappy situation which 
I think the committee would, of not being able to get the facts with- 
out going to Europe or sending for people to come from Europe, but 
the question here is, Was there enough food; second, if there was 
enough food, why did not the men have it, if they did not have it? 
Now, it might turn out that they had food, it might turn out that 
there was plenty of food there, but it could not be gotten to the front. 
The transportation of food to a division in action is often the object 
of enemy attack. 

Rolling kitchens are frequently detected by air raids, and fre- 
quently may be searched out by artillery fire and sometimes arc 



LOSSES OP THIETY-FIFTH DIVISION DUEING ARGONUE BATTLE. 7 

bldwn Up, and the difficulty of getting food into the front line 
where an action is going on is one of the serious problems of war- 
fare. In addition to that, condition of the roads is a thing that 
would have to be considered, and you would have to have the people 
who knew about that. These divisions were all of them advancing. 
They were not advancing or retiring upon roads for which they had 
by chance prepared in the rear, but they Avere advancing over No 
Man's Land, over ground which had perchance been subjected to 
heavy, raking artillery fire, in which their own efforts and those of 
the adversary had perchance been to destroy every road, so that their 
operations were necessarily entailed by their going into country 
where the roads were at their very worst in the matter of avail- 
ability for the transportation of munitions and food. 

I do not quite see how we can get an accurate picture of that. 
You may get an impression. You may get from some returning 
officer or soldier a picture what he saw personally, but no com- 
prehensive view of that, I think, can be obtained without getting 
those who were in responsible command and who formulated their 
opinions by collating all the opinions that were brought to them 
and collating all the information that was brought to them from all 
parts of the line which they occupied. Apparently the opinion of 
one officer as to some particular locality which seemed to promise 
this view. 

The same observations are true with regard to the air service. As 
to whether or not there were enough airplanes at that particular 
place, would open up a variety of questions. It may be that the 
airplanes were bunched and that we relied upon larger offensive 
operations against the Germans rather than defensive operations 
and a dispersed use of aircraft. 

It is said here that these losses were said to be few by reason of 
the fact that two general officers were assigned to other duties during 
the battle or before the battle. I do not see how anybody can form 
a judgment at all as to the wisdom of doing that, assuming that to 
have been done, without inquiring of Gen. Traub, who was the com- 
mander of the division, and perhaps of the corps commander, and 
perhaps even of the commander in chief, who may have had a series 
of reports with regard to those two officers and needed them in some 
other place, or needed somebody else in their places. 

Mr. Campbell. Gen. Traub was the corps commander? 

Secretary Baker. The division commander. 

Mr. Campbell. Who was the corps commander? 

Secretary Baker. I do not remember which corps he was in at 
that time. They were moving around from one corps to another. 

Mr. Campbell. Do you remember, or do you know, of Gen. Mar- 
tin, who went out with the Missouri and Kansas troops? 

Secretary Baker. I know Gen. Martin's name — Gen, Clarence R. 
Martin; I have his name, 

Mr. Campbell. Do you know when and why he was removed from 
his command? 

Secretary Baker. I do not. I know, as a matter of — yes ; I am not 
sure whether I know it as a matter of fact or a matter of hearsay 
that Gen, Martin, who was originally a National Guard officer, and 
Gen, McClure, who was a Regular Army officer, were the two brigade 
commanders, and both of them were brigaded at this time. 



8 LOSSES OF THIKTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING AKGONNE BATTLE. 

Mr. Campbell. You have no intimation in the department as to 
why ? 

Secretary Baker. None. 

Mr. Campbell. They were removed immediately before the battle 
and you have no information in the department as to why they were 
removed immediately before the battle? 

Secretary Baker. None. I have none, and so far as I know the 
military branch of the War Department has none. 

The Chairman. Mr, Secretary, may I be permitted to interject 
this? I think that history will show that in almost every instance 
where there was a terrible loss of life rumors of this character have 
been circulated about. Now, if any great criticism has been made 
there would not Gen. Pershing himself, upon his own initiative, 
have inaugurated plans as to fixing the responsibility? 

Secretary Baker. I think that is evidently so. Of course, Mr. 
Chairman, may I say this? The action in the Argonne forest was 
the most difficult military enterprise ever undertaken by American 
soldiers, and probably one of the most difficult military enterprises 
ever undertaken by anybody. What they were doing was not merely 
advancing over no man's land, but they were attacking the so-called 
Hindenburg or ultimate line of defense of the German Army, and 
the operations there were certainly larger than they Avere in the St. 
Mihiel fight, for instance, or in every engagement in which the 
Americans participated. 

Mr. Campbell. That condition, Mr. Secretary, was known before 
the men entered this battle. 

Secretary Baker. Perfectly well known. Of course while modem 
warfare has eliminated a great deal of the element of surprise, still 
there was a certain element of surprise to be taken into consideration. 

Mr, Campbell. Then every precaution should have been taken to 
provide them with artillery and air support? 

Secretary Baker. Obviously. 

Mr. Campbell. And if there was a failure in these respects some- 
body is at fault? 

Secretary Baker. I do not say that, Mr. Campbell, quite. After 
all human beings can only do what human beings can do. If every 
provision was made to supply artillery and aircraft and food and 
ammunition, there still was a lot of adjustment to be done as the fight 
proceeded. You were not moving over a checkerboard in which the 
squares were regular and your routes known, but you were moving 
over an unknown territory and through a forest which could not 
be mapped by reason of its being a forest. 

Mr. Campbell. But they were moving upon a sector that required 
artillery and airplane support for the iDctter protection of the army 
as it moved forward ? 

Secretary Baker. Obviously, and yet this is true, that they were 
moving in a sector where it was more dangerous to stand still and 
wait for artillery to be brought up than it was to go forward if there 
were unexpected failures to bring up artillery. The German mode 
of retreat — I deal with the obvious and the well known — but the 
German mode of retreat was rear-guard action by machine-gun con- 
centration. It was their mode of retreat. Now, impetuosity in 
attack was often the only salvation of an advancing force; and if 
the roads proved impassable, if the roads had been blasted to pieces, 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 9 

and the artillery could not be brought through for one reason or 
another, if they came to a morass or swamp where it was difficult to 
get the artillery through, the engineers had to be sent for to revamp 
the roads or provide improvise roads, it is perfectly conceivable to 
me, as a civilian — and I apologize to Gen. March here for discussing 
military questions — but it is perfectly conceivable to me as a civil- 
ian, that less losses would have been entailed upon the infantry by 
having them press forward and around these machine-gun nests and 
eradicate them than to have waited until the artillery could have 
been brought through a morass. 

Mr. Campbell. The airplane could have supplied the want of artil- 
lery in that respect. 

Secretary Baker. No. 

Mr. Campbell. Very largely? 

Secretary Baker. Oh, no. 

Mr. Camppell. Could it not? 

Secretary Baker. Oh, no. 

Mr. Campbell. Well, I am not a military man. 

Secretary Baker. I do not want to try to undervalue the use of 
the airplane, but we have not yet arrived at a place where the air- 
plane takes the place of artillery in the protection of an infantry 
attnck. 

Mr. CAisrpBELL. Not wholly, but it would have supplemented the 
lack of artillery? 

Secretary Baker. Not even measurably. 

Mr. Cainipbell. Would it not? 

Secretary Baker. Not even measurably. The difficulty with the 
airplane is that because of the antiaircraft devices and adversary air- 
planes they have to fly very high, and that makes their attack upon a 
particular mark very imcertain. 

Now, Mr. Chairman, if I may sum up what I have been trying to 
say, it is all in one sentence. The War Department is exceedingly 
anxious to have the people of the United States learn in the most 
authoritative and positive way the exact facts. The only thing that 
I have about the pending resolution is whether there is available in 
this country the documentary evidence or whether there are certain 
persons who ought to be heard before any sort of judgment could be 
rendered. I do not know whether it was intended by Mr. Campbell's 
resolution to suggest the possibilitv of the committee going abroad to 
<?omplete their inquiry, but I think that would be nn unhappy thing 
to do. Our Army is still 2,000,000 men abroad. We are bringing it 
home as rapidly as we can. The War Department is giving more 
attention to getting the men home than to any other subject. Every 
available means of transportation is being required and used to its 
capacity, and T think it would be an unhappy thing to have inquiries 
of this kind going on while the Army is still in use. 

Mr. Caimpbell. Of course I had not thought of or intended that 
the committee should go to the other side. May I ask whether or not 
it is the intention of the War Department to bring back the members 
of the Thirty-fifth Division officers and men within a reasonably 
short time? 

Secretary Baker. I will let Gen. March answer that, because I do 
not remember just what brigade that is. Gen. March is here and 
can tell you just what Gen. Pershing has decided about that. If the 



10 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

chairman would care to hear from Gen. March the militar}' phases of 
the matter, he will be glad to address yon. 

The Chairman. We will be very glad, indeed, to hear from Gen. 
March. 

Secretary Baker. I would be glad to answer any other questions. 
I will remain right here. 

STATEMENT OF GEN. PEYTON C. MARCH. 

The Chairman. General, will you kindly submit any observations 
that you think would throw any light on this resolution ? 

Gen. March. The resolution has been gone over by the War Depart- 
ment carefully, with the idea of submitting to this committee ail the 
information that we have, and the Secretary has told just what I 
would in his general comments upon the various arms of the service, 
I might add some exact facts to piece out the general statements he 
has made. 

For instance, on the artillery proposition. We had on the line there 
supporting this advance 4,000 guns. We had a large excess of Artil- 
lery during this fight. The reports indicate that at no time during the 
advance of our troops in the Argonne fight were the Infantry entirely 
beyond the support of the guns. The Secretary has indicated, and 
indicated correctly, that the artillery support of an infantry advance 
consists of three different types of guns. One is the divisional artil- 
lery, which is a part of the division proper, and has a relatively short 
range, say, 8,000 yards. Back of this is the corps artillery, which 
goes from 8,000 up to 16,000 yards, and back of that is the army artil- 
lery, which has a range up to 25,000 yards. At no time during this 
advance was the Infantry advance beyond the support of the corps 
or army artillery. 

The way an advance takes place is this: When the Infantry has 
gone forward so far that it has come to the limit of fire of its own. 
divisional artillery, the divisional artillery changes position and fol- 
lows the Infantry's advance up to new positions near their lines, from 
which the Infantry goes forward again. During that time the sup- 
port of the Infantry is the corps artillery and the army artillery, 
which is in the rear. 

That, doubtless, is what occurred over there. After the Infantry 
had gone forward the divisional artillery was sent forward for closer 
support, while the support of the corps and army artillery was going 
<m. At least 4.000 guns also were collected together for a definite 
and ver.y liard objective. They did not consist entirely of our guns; 
they were not all United States guns. A part of them were French 
guiis. They were loaned to us so as to get that enormous amount of 
artillery, because it was known that the Argonne Forest presented a 
very hard nut to crack. The losses were very small for such an ad- 
A^ance. The losses were 879 killed and died from wounds up to 
November 1, and this Argonne Forest attack, as you recall, was in the 
latter part of September and early in October. 

Mr. Campbell. Do you think, General, that embraces the casualties 
of the entire fight ? 

Gen. March. I know it does not. I am saying now the killed and 
died from wounds. The number of men that were gassed, for instance, 



£:OSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURIN-Q ARGONNE BATTLE. IV- 

the number of men who had slioht wounds and got back, etc., would 
bring that total up to considerably more than that. But the chart 
which shows the losses of each division per week, wdiich the Secretary 
had in front of him, is checked along by us, and not only gives us 
accurate information on the lost personnel but also the losses in guns, 
as they show the number of guns a division should have — I mean the 
rifles of the individual enlisted men or soldiers — and the state of 
equipment, and all that sort of thing. We get tabulated statements 
showing exactly the condition of the supplies, and, of course, we fur- 
nish the supplies from America. I am rather sur])rised that there 
are rumors of this kind, because all of the reports indicated that there 
was an excess of Artillery, and they had a tremendous number of 
guns there. ' 

Mr. KoDENBERG. How mauv American troops were engaged in the 
Argonne Poorest? 

Gen. March. The Argonne Forest fight took place with three corps. 
The Thirty-fifth Division was on the right of its corps. The attack 
itself was under the direction of Gen. Pershing. They had not yet 
given Gen. Liggett the First American Army, so the chain of respon- 
sibility would be Pershing, Liggett, Traub. 

Mr. RoDENBERG. How many men, General, were there engaged? 
How many does a corps comprise, approximately? 

Gen. March. One corps, theoretically, is composed of about 225.- 
000 men. But anything over two divisions that are grouped togethei- 
under a single commander is called a corps. In this case I think 
the leading corps had four divisions. I think the right corps had 
four divisions, and perhaps the center corps three, and the left corps 
three. So there Avere roughly 275.000 men in the attack. We can 
get that accurately for you if you want to have a formal hearing on it. 

The Chairmax, Before vou go further. General, am I clear that 
out of that 270,000 or 300.000 men, up to- the ]st of November, only 
800 and some odd were killed and died of wounds? 

Gen. March. No ; I am talking about the division, the Thirty-fifth 
Division, which comprised a force of 27,253. and that comprised not 
only the Infantry, which Mr. Campbell referred to. but the Artillery 
of the division, the Engineers, and certain auxiliary troops. The 
losses in that division, the Thirty-fifth Division, up to November 1 
were 879 men : that is, the number of men actually killed or died from 
wounds. The number of men, as far as we can estimate, including 
the men who were gassed, the men who went back from any cause, 
will be not to exceed 10,000 men. 

The Chairman. That is the total losses of all that were engaged in 
the battle ? 

Gen. March. The total number of leplacements, as far as we can 
learn, in that division, for the whole time that it has been over there, 
will not exceed 10,000 men. 

Mr. Campbell. That is, out of the 27,000 there will be 10,000 
casualties ? 

Gen. March. That number, approximately. 

Secretary Baker. But they have got to understand, General, that 
that does not mean 10,000 casualties in the battle of the Argonne, but 



12 LOSSES OF THIETY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING AEGONNE BATTLE. 

the whole history of that division, from the time they landed in 
France up until the 1st of November, shows that many replacements 
for sick men and everything else during that period. 

Mr. Cantrill. Wlien did that division land on the other side? 

Gen. March. I could not say that offliand. 

The Chairman. What I was seeking to bring out in a very true sort 
of way, that I wanted to know myself, if the general can give it, the 
approximate losses in the Battle of the Argonne of all the American 
forces engaged. 

Gen. March. Well, I have collected together here the losses for 
this particular division, because that was under investigation, but we 
have a similar chart for every similar organization, and that informa- 
tion is always at your disposal. 

Mr. Caktrill. May I ask, General, if you have information as to 
who succeeded Gen, Martin, of the Thirty-fifth Division? 

Gen. March. The colonel who was selected to command that divi- 
sion was Col. Walker. The two officere who were selected to. replace 
Gen. McClure and Gen. Martin were Col. Nutman and Col. Walker, 
both of them Regular Army officers. 

INIr. Campbell. Do you know when these colonels replaced these 
generals? 

Gen. March. Yes; I do. 

Mr. Caimpbell. How long before the battle ? 

Gen. March. Just immediately before it. 

IMr. Campbell, Do you know why it was done ? 

Gen. March. We do not. It was done, I suppose, by the officers 
responsible for it. 

ISIr. Campbell. Who made the order? 

Gen. March. Well, the system over there gives the division com- 
mander the power to remove officers summarily when he finds it nec- 
essary, and such officers are then the subjects of very careful inquiry 
by machinery which Gen. Pershing has evolved to show whether they 
have really been inefficient or should be restored, or whether they can 
be utilized for the service of supply, or whether they should come back 
to the United States, and that machinery is applied automatically, 
regardless of who the officer is. in the American Expeditionary 
Forces, under Gen. Pershing's orders. 

Mr. Campbell. Was it known at the time Gen. Martin and Gen, 
McClure were displaced b}^ the colonels 3'ou mentioned that they were 
going immediately into the Argonne fight ? 

Gen. March. Yes ; it was a preliminary to it. 

The Chairman. Will you proceed, General? You were taking up 
some other subject. 

Gen. March. I was going to say something about the airplane serv- 
ice. The command of the air, so far, is a very elusive thing. The 
air is a large space, of course, and a German airplane can come 
through nearly anywhere along that line; but an air raid means a 
number of machines together, a squadron formation of airplanes, 
which was largelj'^ introduced before the war was over, and a squadron 
that would come over for a definite military purpose was a develop- 
ment of the war; and without being personally familiar with what 
took place in the Argonne, we know that we had collected together 
for a similar attack on the German forces a large bombing squadron, 
accompanied by pursuit planes. As many as 120 of our planes were 



LOSSES OF THIRTY -FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 13 

gathered together in that very action there, for the purpose of going 
over and destroying sources of supply in the rear of the German 
lines and bombing their dumps where they had ammunition, and that 
sort of thing. A single, lone airplane in a battle of that magnitude 
does not mean anything. Any individual plane might very readily 
come over by itself and fire its machine guns into our lines until we 
fired back and drove it off, but it has no military bearing on the 
success of an advance in which thousands of men are engaged, 

Mr. Campbell. Have you a report of the airplanes supporting the 
Thirty-fifth Division during the Argonne fight? 

Gen. March. We have a report that indicates just what I am tell- 
ing you here, not with reference to any one of the units along that 
big line, but we did have this big squadron of airplanes, collected 
together, numbering 120, Avhich played a part in that Argonne game. 

Mr. Campbell. Would you regard 120 airplanes, covering the 
Argonne fight, embracing 300,000 men on our side, as a sufficient air- 
plane support? 

Gen. March. That is a large command. An airplane squadron, I 
might say, consists of about 15 planes. That means we had a large 
number of squadrons there, but with a definite military objective. ' 

Now, about food and ammunition, we have reports about them. 
We got together for the infantry advance over 3,000.000 rounds 
of artillery ammunition, which were in dumps along that line, in 
addition to the ammunition carried by the caissons themselves. They 
had a tremendous amount of ammunition there. The fact of the 
matter is that the thing was well done. The whole fight was well 
planned. It never would have gotten through if it had not been. 

Mr. Campbell. Do you know whether or not artillery and ammu- 
nition were supplied as the Army advanced? 

Gen. March. The statement is definitely made that at no time was 
our Infantry without the support of Artillery. 

Mr. Campbell. Or ammunition? 

Gen. March. Or ammunition, of course. That is what it means, 
the firing ; not that the Artillery was there, but was actually shooting. 

Mr. Campbell. That is in a report of the battle? 

Gen. March. A report of the battle. 

Mr. Campbell. To the department? 

Gen. March. Yes. 

Mr. Campbell. Who made that report? 

Gen. March. The report concerning the Artillery was made by 
the artillery chief of staff, Col. Gulich, who was responsible for the 
Artillery end of it, under the Artillery commander. 

Mr. Campbell. That report would be available to the committee 
investigating the question? 

Gen. March. Entirely so, and everything else. 

Mr. Garrett. Have you referred to the shelter and the blanket 
proposition, stated in the resolution? 

Gen. March. I do not recall the exact language of the resolution, 
but, of course, they have no shelter at all while they are going for- 
ward in a fight like that. If they come to a place at night, if they 
can do it, they sleep where they are. 

Mr. Garrett. It says that 1,200 men were left lying on the wet 
ground, without shelter or blankets. 



14 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING AKGONNE BATTLE. 

Gen. March. That, of course, is u definite statement that does not 
correspond to anything that we know about. I would say to the 
committee that after this resohition was introduced I was very 
anxious to get hold of somebody from the Thirty-fifth Division who 
was not in command, and not giving strictly the view of the staff 
officers or the heads of it, but somebody who was serving with the 
men, and I have telephoned up to the port of debarkation in New 
York to see if they could not find some officers who had actually 
been in that fight of the xirgonne with the Thirty-fifth Division and 
had come back, being wounded, etc., and they found three of them, 
one a major, another a captain, and the other a lieutenant, who were 
coming back to go back to civil life, very fine types of American men, 
all three of them. One of them came into my office on crutches and 
another man had been gassed. One was a major, as I say, one was a 
captain, and one a lieutenant. The major was hit before the first 24 
hours, and he described how they got him out. The captain was 
wounded during the next three days, and he described how they got 
him out. The lieutenant was gassed the fourth day, and they got 
him out, too, so the particular experiences of those three men are 
illuminating. The first man was gotten out within six hours, or 
something like that, I think — the major. That was in the early 
stages, before they had gone far forward across no man's land through 
this very difficult terrain. The captain was gotten out somewhere 
within 12 hours, and the lieutenant was gotten out perhaps within 24 
hours, showing evidently the difficulties of the terrain and the diffi- 
culty of going out there as they went forward. They gave a very in- 
teresting description of what the Secretary has already told you, of 
the advance and of the roads. The roads had been bloAvn up and 
destroyed by the great artillery projectiles of the Germans, making it 
impossible for ambulances to get across there, and when they got up 
to those points they had to be lifted out and carried across. 

The Chairman. I happened to be talking with a young officer who 
was in this fight, and he said that instead of investigating the matter 
with a view to criticizing the action, that every American ought to be 
proud of it. But he says that it was the knock-out blow and that it 
had to be dojie, and that while it was deplorable that Ave lost these 
men, that really the result of the battle, the ultimate result, was the 
saving of probably thousands and ending the war very much sooner. 

Gen. March. That is no exaggeration. 

The Chairman. I was very much struck with his statement. 

Mr. Campbell. I am very sure that neither Gov. Allen nor tlie 
movers of the resolution in the Kansas Legislature or anybody in 
Kansas or any mother or father who lost a son out of the Thirty- 
fifth Division Avould feel any other way about it if their boys had the 
proper artillery and airplane support and were properly supported 
in the fight. They were willing to make the sacrifice ; they knew that 
the war meant sacrifice when they went into it. 

Gen. March. Exactly. 

Mr. Campbell. And the only question I raise before this committee 
is whether these boys did have the kind of support that soldiers 
should have, under the circumstances. That is the matter that I was 
calling for in this investigation. 

Gen. IMarc'h. The operation, of course, was planned in advance. 
You can not throw in 300,000 men, without the most minute prepara- 



LOSSES OF THIETY-FIFTH DIVISION DUEING AEGONNE BATTLE. 15 

tions going on ^veeks beforehand, getting up supplies that will keep 
the Ann}' regularly going after it gets going, bringing up large 
duni])S of artillei'v annnunition, Avhich can be readily fed into tlie 
guns. All those things are carefully thought out in advance, and 
the movement of troops prepared. Of course 300,000 men require 
a large area, and a movement like that has to be concealed, more 
or less, from the Germans, so that in bringing up the troops for the 
attack they sleep and hide by day and move forward by night. No 
operation of that magnitude can go on without the most careful plan- 
ning, which was done in this case, and the results were perfectly fine. 
Of course, there were losses, but that is one of the features of war 
that can not be avoided. 

Mr. Camphell. I want to ask you if it would disrupt the organ- 
ization of a diA'ision to remove two of its general officers immediately 
before a fight — general officers who had been with the division since 
its organization ? 

(len. jMarcii. It would not disrupt the organization of the division. 
Mr. Ca:mpbi:ll. Would it show to the troops, through the promo- 
tion of subordinate officers, that theie had been an ambition, or a 
policy, or a disposition, to put forward men for opportunities just 
:is the fight was on? 

Gen. March. I do not think that is so; and I will tell you, Mr. 
Campbell, in a modern organization the machinery that runs the 
fight is the statf. The removal of one individual commanding gen- 
eral, say, of a division or smaller command like a brigade or regi- 
ment, and another man coming in and taking it over with all its 
movements and everything all worked out, could not possibly disrupt 
the division. It could not be done. 
\^ Mr. Cami'bell. During the preparation for this battle, which evi- 

"dently would have covered several days 

Gen. ]Marcii. And did. 
, Mr. Campbell. And did ; doubtless Gen. Martin and Gen. McClure 
^.were in charge and had the details of this preparation, and their 
subordinates, of course, were not familiar with the details that had 
been placed in their hands, and naturally would not be. Now. imme- 
diately before the fight these generals, who had prepared to move 
forward with their troops, were displaced, and two of subordinate 
rank, who evidently had not been familiar with the preparations 
that these officers had made, were put in charge. Would not that 
have a bad effect upon the protection of the troops? 
Gen. March. Upon the protection of them ? 
Mr. Campbell. Yes. 
Gen. March. No. 
Mr. Campbell. In the fight? 

Gen. March. No. What these officers found w'as a plan which had 
been communicated to Gen, Traub, the division commander, who 
still was in active control of the whole thing. What they found 
was this plan, all worked out, shoAving practically every move, show- 
ing exactly Avhere they were to go, when they were to go, the time 
to start and arrive, where they would find artillery placed, and 
everything. That is all worked out in a modern fight. The element 
of personal leadership does not play any part any more in a modern 
fight. Sometimes a fight is planned over four months in advance, 
all the terrain is studied, the thing is gone over by inches, and the 



16 LOSSES OP THIETY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

proper ways of getting up are marked out on these maps, and th& 
position of everything is stated — for instance, where you will get 
your ammunition and your supplies; and everything. All tliis is 
worked out. 

Mr. Campbell. Then it is your opinion, as a military officer, Gen- 
eral, that a man who had no familiarity whatever with these men 
until the evening before the battle could do as well as a man who 
had been in charge of the plans from the beginning of the prepara- 
tions? 

Gen. March. That brings up an entirely different proposition. 
Gen. Pershing is responsible over there and held responsible by the 
War Department and by the country for the successful prosecution 
of the war : and Avhcn he sees fit to remove a man, the War Depart- 
ment approves it. Pershing is on the ground and is held respon- 
sible, and he must be backed up. If he thinks, after watching a 
man work there four or five months, that instead of conducting the 
fight that the fight could be better handled by somebody else who has 
handled other units of a similar kind under fire, he is replaced, and 
we must back his judgment. 

Mr. Campbell, I am not placing responsibility myself; I am 
simply inquiring the result of such a method immediately before a 
battle upon the battle itself. 

The Chairman. That is based upon the assumption that the men 
and the officers who took the place of the other officers 

Gen. March, Were the best that we could find. 

The Chatriman (continuing). Were the best that you could find, 
and the further assumption that they did not know anything about 
the details; whereas, if I may be permitted to suggest, it might 
have been that Gen. Pershing substituted them because they did 
have this knowledge, 

Mr. Campbell. Because they did have this knowledge? 

The Chairman, That is purely speculative. I was suggesting that 
Mr, Campbell's question involved the assumption there that is 
purely an assumption, I have not seen any evidence to support it. 

Mr, Campbell, It does involve the assumption, but I think it is 
a fair one, that the generals were in command up to the eve of the 
battle and did know what the plans of the battle were. 

Gen, March, Of course all that is worked out. 

Mr. Campbell. And that the men put in charge immediately upon 
the eve of the battle would not be as well informed as to what the 
plans were as those who had been studying them for weeks. 

Secretary Baker. I was in France at the time this battle was 
started. I landed in France, as I recall it, two or three days before 
the Battle of St. Mihiel. Gen. Pershing telephoned to me to come to 
headquarters at once, giving no reason for it. I went down to his 
headquarters, and he said to me, in a room where nobody could hear, 
that the Battle of St. Mihiel was on the next morning, and he wanted 
me to have the opportunity of being, present. I was present. The 
Battle of St. Mihiel, as I recall it, started at 4 o'clock in the morning, 
and at 9 o'clock in the morning a stream of prisoners was coming 
back. The artillery concentration was the greatest artillery concen- 
tration that had ever been made, and at 9 o'clock in the morning it 
was obvious that the operation was a great success. I recall this inci- 
dent : At 9 o'clock I went from Gen. Pershing's office past the French 



LOSSES or THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 17 

liaison officer, aa ho was Avith Gen. Pershing, from Gen. Petain's 
headquarters, and he called me in and said. " Mr, Secretary, we are 
already moving our artillery out — the P\ench artillery that was 
loaned to Gen. Pershing for this engagement — to get ready for the 
big one that is coming next." 

So between the hours of 4 and 9 o'clock it was apparent that the 
action was a success, and the big artillery was being moved out, and 
this Argonne fight took place approximately two weeks later than 
the St. Mihiel fight, so that within four hours or five hours after the 
St. Mihiel action they were moving the artillery by night over along 
the line for the Argonne fight. Gen. Pershing told me personally, 
with no one present, about the plans for the Argonne fight. It was 
very necessary to keep it secret, and it Avas successfully prevented 
from becoming public by a leak of anything. I suppose only half a 
dozen people in France knew anything about the time or character 
of this proposed action. I happened to be one of them. I saw Gen. 
Pershing leave his headquarters to have a meeting with his corps 
commanders, and he explained to 'me in his own private office just 
how he was going to go over the Avhole matter with his corps com- 
manders; how^ after that meeting with all his corps commanders each 
would call his division commanders and go over with them similarly 
the steps and maps and layout of the whole action, as to time, place, 
and sequence; and the division commanders would each have to go 
and take his own part of it, and take it up with his staff; and the 
arrangements would be made. It occurred to me this might interest 
the committee, because I happened to know the whole layout for this 
particular battle. 

Gen, March. The Thirty-fifth Division, I might say as a matter of 
interest to Mr, Campbell, in that St. Mihiel fight, Avas in the reserve 
that day and was not in. Their first actual firing on the firing line 
was in this Argonne fight, so that they had graduated up from'the 
training camp to the reserve of the army that was fighting, and they 
Avent forAvard step by step into the first great fight of the Argonne 
Avliich you are talking about, and they did Avell. 

Mr, Campbell, Everybody concedes that, 

Mr. Harrison, Has there been any criticism from any other source 
except from Gov. Allen about this? 

Gen, March. We have not heard any. I read that thing in the 
papers, and I Avas very much interested, and I have been sending out 
and trying to get all the information Ave could about it. The War 
Department is more interested in this than anybody else, Avithout 
exception. We Avant the facts to be knoAvn, and we are going to have 
them knoAvn. 

Mr, Harrisox. Was Gov. Allen in the Avar, or the Y. M. C. A. 
service? 

Mr. (\\MFBELL, He Avas first in the Red Cross and then in the 
Y. M, C. A, He Avas with the Y, M. C. A. at the Argonne Battle. 

Gen. March, Yes: I know. 

Mr. Garrett. These commanders. General, Avere brigade com- 
manders who were remoA'ed? 

Gen. March, Yes, But the division commander and his staff, who 
handled the fight, were still there. 

102177—19 2 



18 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Mr. Garrett. I assume, of course, that they would know no more ai 
the plans than such as included what their brigades were to do. 

Gen. March. They have a minor sector in which they are told to do 
somethine;. The division commander is responsible for the handling 
of the division. Gen. Traub is a very high-grade man. 

Mr. Campbell. Did they not have their orders on which they Avere 
working personallv mapped out and digested for two weeks before 
the battle '( 

Gen. March. Well, of course. I do not know how long before that. 
Tut? chances are that he was such a subordinate coirmander 

Mr. Campbell. I understood the Secretary to sav 

Secretary Baker. No information went to the division commanuers 
until probably the day before the battle. 

Gen. March. I should say you are wrong about that. The divi- 
sion commander unquestionably knew at the time the Secretary was 
telling about, perhaps two weeks beforehand, because he wns the man 
that had to work this out. but I. should not think that the brigade 
commander would know until the last minu.te possible. beeau.->e they 
can not have a leak of what is happening. With the German system 
of intelligence they get wind of everything right from the start. 

Mr. Campbell. But the brigade commander 

Gen. March. He knew it before, certainly. 

Mr. Campbell. The brigade commander would have consultations 
with his subordinates, the division commanders, and the otliers 
under him, would he not, for weeks'? 

Gen. March. The division commander will, before a fight like 
that, give his orders in writing, with the whole thing worked out. 
with a map of the place you are going to go. the exact direction, 
and that the attack will be launched at 10 o'clock in the morning, or 
at J.0.05, or at 10.10, and all the other details. All that is given in a 
formal written order that is handed to the brigade commanders. 

Mr. Campbell. Are orders covering minute details of this kind 
given at the time of a battle such as that wa.s fought at the Argonne, 
in modern warfare? 

Gen. March. In modern \vnrfare. When I first went over to 
France T had the good fortune to go over in the very early days, and 
T went up to the British headquarters. They showed nie one of the 
first orders for the advance of a British Army vrhich contained 
?'fi pages, and the minuteness of it Avas a ])erfect revelation to me. 
Nothing was left to chance. They told me they had been working 
on the order for four months. You can not handle millions of mon, 
of course, in the same way as you would handle a small unit. 

Mr. Campbell. Summing: it up. then, the War Departmr>nt is not 
now in possession of the information, nnd the men who have the 
information are not here, that would know about the matters cov- 
ered in this resolution, aside from the report that there was nrtillerv 
and food? 

Gen. March. I might tell about the food a little more, too. 
When a command goe^ into a fight like that, they move or bring up 
-•^ood when they can. For instance, n i-olling kitchen supplies hot 
food to the men. When that kind of transportation is used, they 
take it for .granted that it is going to be shelled, and Gevn^an air 



LOSSES OP THIBTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 19 

})lanes, if they are around there, are going to fire at it, so each man 
carries what is called an iron ration. That is a compressed meal, 
three meals for a da,y, which is put up and which a man always car- 
ries on his person as he carries his ammunition. If he gets to a point 
\y\\en they can not supply food to him by the regular system, he 
opens his little tin and uses it. This "will tide him over between the 
times he can get it at night and the troops can move forward. 

JNIr. Kelly. How much does he carry ? 

(ren. March. Three compi'essed meals, enough of that compressed 
footl to last for three meals. 

Mr. Campbell. THis battle lasted six days, I understand. 

Gen. March. It lasted a little more than that, seven, I think. 

Mr. Cainipbell. How far did the men move forward during that 
i:even days' fighting? 

Gen. March. Well, they took the forest; they cleaned up. 

Mr. Campp-ell. I was asking for the information as to the 

Gen. March. I do not ha^e the kilometers that the}' moved. 

Mr. Campbell. I was asking as to the miles or rods or kilometers. 

Gen. March. I can take that off the map. I have all that in detail 
on the map. I can take the exact distance off the map if you want 
to go into that, and will be glad to. 

The Chairman, Has the War Department, General, had any inti- 
mation from abroad that there was any blunder made in the Ar- 
gonne Battle? Has there been any intimation that has reached the 
War Department from abroad that things went wrong? 

Gen. ^Tarch. Why, no: it was a great success. That Argonne 
fight is a thing Americans can be proud of. 

Mr. Campbell. There is no question about that. The only ques- 
tion that has been raised is whether or not the men who so gloriously 
won that fight had the proper support of artillery, food, and air- 
planes, and were properly cared for when they were wounded. 

Mr. Cantrill. Is it not self-evident that they could not have won 
the fight if they did not have the proper support ? 

Mr. Harrison. I think that statement of Gov. Allen ought to go 
in the rocorcl, and that resolution of the Kansas Legislature. 

Mr. Campbell. I do not have the press reports of Gov, Allen's 
speeciL I have not put that in the record, 

Mr. Foster. Where w-asGov, Allen when this battle was taking 
place? How did he get his information, from talking with the sol- 
diers, or how? . 

Mr. Caimpbell. I do not know how close the men in the Y. M, C, A. 
get to a fight. 

Secretary Baker. I saw tliem in the front-line trenches very often. 

Mr. Campbell. Gov. Allen was over there, I think, over a year 
altogether, and he has told me about being in the front-line trenches 
on other occasions. He did not mention this particular occasion, 

Mr, Foster. He does not say in his article or speech ? 

Mr. Cantrill. He could not have been in the front-line trenches 
in this fight, because this was not a trench fight, 

Mr. Foster. He does not say wdiether he was up at the front or 
not? 

Mr. Campbell. I understand from press reports that he had ]ier- 
sonal information. He was not giving hearsay about what he said. 



20 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Mr. Foster. That is what I wanted. 

Mr. Harrison. Are those two generals who were removed still irk 
the service ? 

Gen. March. I think Gen. Martin has come back to the United 
States. 

Mr. Harrison. You think he is in the United States now. 

Gen. March. I think he is here now. In fact, I am sure he is. 
Gen. McClure was a Regular Army Officer, and he is still in the 
service, of course. 

The Chairman. Are there any further questions, gentlemen? If 
not, we thank you, Mr. Secretary and Gen. March, for your state- 
ments. 

(Whereupon the committee adjourned.) 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING THE 
ARGONNE BATTLE 



HEARINGS 

BEFORE 

THE COMMITTEE ON RULES 



OF THE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ON 

H. RES. 505 



FEBRUARY 17 and 20, 1919 



PART 2 






WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1919 



COMMITTEE ON RULES. 

House of Representatives. 

sixty-fifth congress. 

EDWARD W. POU, North Carolina, Chairman. 
FINIS J. GARRETT, Tennessee. PHILIP P. CAMPBELL, Kansas. 

MARTIN D. FOSTER, Illinois. BERTRAND H. SNELL, New York. 

JAMES C. CANTRILL, Kentucky. WILLIAM A. RODENBERG, Illinois. 

PAT HARRISON, Mississippi. S. D. FESS, Ohio. 

DANIEL J. RIORDAN, New York. 
M. CLYDE KELLY, Pennsylvania. 
THOMAS D. SCHALL, Minnesota. 

Geo. Ross Pou^ Clerk. 
II 



LOSSES OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING THE 
ARGOiNNE BATTLE. 



COMMITI'EE ON RuLES, 

House of Representatives, 

Monday^ Fehruwry 17 ^ 1919. 

The committee this da}' met the Hon. Ed-ward W. Poii (chair- 
man) presiding. 

The Chairman. The committee will be in order. ^Ir. Campbell,, 
will you present these gentlemen? 

Mr. Campbell., I would like to be permitted to state that -we have^ 
(lov. Allen here and I believe all the membership of the committee 
desire to hear the facts regarding the Thirty-hfth Division, regard- 
less of who it helps or who it may hurt. We have no desire on the 
part of anybody to do anything but present the facts. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY J. ALLEN, GOVERNOR OF KANSAS. 

Gov. Allen. On the afternoon following my inauguration as gov- 
ernor I was asked by the friends and next of kin of members of the 
Thirt^^-fifth Division if I would not address a public meeting, and in 
that public meeting in Topeka I described the conditions under 
which the Thirty-fifth Division was during its campaigns in France, 
and closed with a statement in relation to the shortage of war ma- 
terials, including the declaration that we sufferered unnecessary losses 
in the Argonne through lack of protection in the air, through very 
grave lack of artillery support, Avhich was due in the main to the 
shortage of horses, giving the statement of one of the remount officers 
of the division Avho explained that we w^ent into the battle of the 
Argonne P"'orest "^,800 horses short. I set forth also the fact that the 
(rermans had un(iuestionable domination of the air from the moment 
the battle opened, and that it was my opinion, gathered from con- 
versations with officers whose duty it was to know the situation, that 
Ave did not have any American made fast fighting planes, that most 
of such planes as we had we had purchased from the French, and 
those we had were wholh' inadequate to meet the situation; that the 
domination of the Germans in the air was so absolute that their 
airships had descended to an altitude so low that they could fire with 
frightful accuracy with their machine guns, dropping their bombs 
also from a low altitude. These planes attacked advancing columns 
before they deployed ; they attacked wounded men as they lay upon 
the ground in the forest, and wounded men and wounded officers 
sought to protect themselves from the attacks of German planes by 
firing with their rifles and with their revolvers. 

21 



22 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DUEING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Occurrences of this sort were constantly in evidence, where 
wounded men would turn over and get hold of their guns to fire at 
sonic airplane that was sweeping above them. These planes were 
allowed to come so far back that they attacked our artillery batteries.* 
I have in mind one of my secretaries who was at a field artillery post 
nearly 6 miles behind the lines, on the fourth day of the battle, a 
German airplane came so low that this secretary, as well as all the 
other noncombatants who were there, and the officers took rifles to 
fight him olf. This secretary was Dr. Talmadge. a Presbyterian 
preacher of New York. He was shot through the head and through 
the thigh by the machine-gun fire of the German. 

The Chairman. Was he killed? 

Gov, Allen. No. He is living and may be summoned as a witness 
if you wish. You can get him by addressing the Overseas Service 
of the Y. M. C. A. in New York.^ 

A printed memorandum provided that each battalion should take 
with it into combat French seventy-fives for the purpose of reducing 
thfe machine-gun nests and other small massed resistance. For some 
reason this plan was not carried out in any "particular. During a,ll 
of tlie six days and five nights of the battle the German avions did 
whatever they wished to do, practically without molestation on our 
part. We had some airplanes and it was apparent occasionally when 
they would fly over that they were doing the best they could, and I 
do not wish that any statement that I make to-day to be taken as a 
reflection on those splendid men we had, because they had a great 
spirit and a great capacity, but they did not have machines. 

Mr. Garrett. You are referring specificallv to the situation of 
the Thirty-fifth Division? 

Gov. .Vllex. Yes: I am referring to the Thirty-fifth Division, 
because that was the Division with which I was acquainted. There 
is evidence that the same condition prevailed throughout all the 
divisions on the front line. I wish to say that I am making just a 
brief statement of which I can prove by the testimony I have here, 
of men and officers. 

The artillery opened about 2 o'clock in the moruing of September 
26, with a heavy barrage, lasting four and a half hours — a barrage 
which proved tlie full capacity of our divisional and Army Artillery. 
Then our Infantry went forward and soon passed beyond the range 
of this divisional artillery, reaching a point where it was neessary 
to send Infantry arms forward to meet German machine guns, Ger- 
man artillery, ijrerman tanks, and to meet them with nothing but 
Infantry arms. The explanation of the failure of the Artillery to 
protect the Infantry most often given to me by officers who were 
there was that it was due to the lack of horses with which to move 
the guns forward. 

I will be able to prove by official reports of the Inspector General 
of the Corps to which this Division belonged just what the shortage 
was. I will be able to prove by numerous letters and statements of 
men and offic ers that the air craft we had was not able to protect 
us or to direct Artillery fire. I will be able to prove by one of the 
intelligence officers whose business it was to send back every few 
moments reports from the front line to the P. C. that our Artillery 
barraffe frequently fell in our own lines killing many men and 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 23 

wounding: others, because there was no air craft with which to direct 
Artillery fire. 

I will be able to i)rove on the question of casualties from the 
American officer who had charire of the triage of the Thirty-fifth 
Division, the casualtv-clearino- station of the Division, just what the 
casualties were and the condition of the Avounded: that they laid, 
some of them -18 hours in the forest before they could be given any 
attention; that they lacked litters and blankets; that they lacked 
ambulances ; that many of them did not go to the casualty-clearing 
station but were taken directly from the field-dressing station to 
the evacuation hospital in trucks, many of Avhich were borrowed 
from the French. That wounded could not be evacuated from the 
casualty-clearing station for hours because of lack of transportation 
and the blocking of the roads, because transportation could not 
move, I think, with this brief statement of what is contained in 
this evidence. I will present, if I may, by reading excerpts from 
various portions of this testimony, the statements of these men and 
officers, and as I read these statements, if anyone wishes to interrupt 
with questions, I will, of course, be very glacl to answer. 

Mr. Smell. Were the conditions, as far as the Thirty-fifth Divi- 
sion was concerned, the same as to the other divisions in that locality, 
at that time? 

Gov. Allex. I can not speak with accuracy, but I should judge, 
from the fact that the Thirty-fifth fought forward, leading the at- 
tack at this part of the line, that its condition was exactly the same, 
so far as the question of war material is concerned, as that of other 
divisions in the line. 
. Mr. Snell. The same short nge of airplanes in the whole sector? 

Gov. Allen. I have a great m.any statements from the officers and 
men of other divisions which would indicates the condition of the 
Thirty-fifth Division as typical of the entire \hy\ 

Here is a statement from two or three of these letters of men whose 
names I will have to give in confidence; I will be glad to give them 
to the committee in confidence as the men are still in service over 
there. 

One is from a major of a machine-gun battalion, who says: 

T think I am conservative when I say that the Infantry and the machine-gun 
units came out with at least .50 per cent casualties for the six days the division 
was in. I know my own losses were 40 per cent and they were far lower than 
the Infantry. 

Here is a statement from a lieutenant colonel of one of our Infantry 
regiments, a man who was mentioned four times for splendid courage 
in the general orders of the divisional commander. He was finally 
promoted from major to lieutenant colonel for daring in the field. 
Writing a letter to friend, he says> 

My counnaud was always in tlie front and I know from bitter experience 
what that artillery fire meant. You see it had heen reported that the divisions on 
our thinks were ahead of us, and we were told to " push on " ; yet if one of the 
high command had asked me I 'could have told him that they were far behind 
us. As a result we were compelled to retire after capturing advanced ground. 
Again our Artillery failed us. It did not support us after the tirst few hours. 
No counter battery work ; we were left to the mercy of the tlank fire of German 
artillery without reply from our artillery. This was the chief failure. Then 
our special units, such as trench mortars, machine guns, and 87 mm. guns were 
not trained to work with the fighting battalions. 



24 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Here is another confidential statement from a top sergeant. He 
says : 

I wish to state that I entered the Argoune battle on the 26th day of Septenilier. 
?ind was in this battle until October 1, when I was wounded and obliged to 
go to the hospital, and that my observations were that in regard to the Artilk'ry: 
that the support for the first four and a half hours was excellent and after 
that it was no use to the Infantry. The explanation I would give to this was 
the deficiency in the number of horses, also of the deplorable condition that 
our horseflesh were in ; many were blinded or had been gassed, but the 
great proportion of these horses were horses that had been supposedly tested 
by the American Army from somewhere i!i the liattle fields, and were not in 
condition to do the work put upon them,- and it was impossible for them to 
cai-ry the loads and burdens, and they were unfit for service expected of them, 
and many of these horses could be seen dropping l»y the wayside and <lying 
along the roads. 

The time that I was in this battle, my obseiwation was that the Germans 
absolutely predominated the air. 

I have here a statement which I must also give in confidence, from 
a colonel of the division belonging to the Regular Army, and T 
think I will read just a paragraph or two. which will give a descrip- 
tion of the manner in which he suffered. He is describing the bat- 
tle just south of Cheppy. 

Plere, it seems to me, every officer and man did things during a three hours' 
heroic stand under constant high-explosive shelling and a murderous, direct 
machine-gun hailstorm from the front and both flanks, that is deserving of 
the highest recognition. It was a horrible scene, men handless, legless, arndess, 
others perforated through and through, strewn over the field, in the road, in 
the ditches. And, in spite of ail this, the living held out gloriously for over 
three hours to conquer the enemy in the end with the aid of the tanks — after 
all had seemed lost. Oh, it was glorious, but so costly. 

Here I have the official orders issued by Gen. Peter E, Traub, in 
conmiendation of the various officers. I will not detain you to read 
them all, but I will read various sentences in which he commended 
men. Infantrymen, for capturing with their infantry arms, German 
artillery. He is commencling Col. Harry S. Howland, commanding 
the One hundred and thirty-eighth Infantry. He says : 

For courage, skill, intrepidity, and steadfastness, resulting in the capture of 
the enemy's stronghold, Ohe])py. With his left hand shattered by hostile shell 
fire, he continued in command of a mere handful of men and held bis ground 
subjected to heavy ai'tillery juid machine-gun tire from front and both flanks 
initil about noon, when the arrival of French and American tanks enabled 
lum with his Infanti'y to attack and capture or destroy many machine-gun nests 
on liotli flanks, resulting in securing some 300 prisoners and the stronghold 
of ('hep]»y. He gave an example of ccmrage under suffering and intrepidity and 
steadfastness of pur])o^e in action, that will make the taking of Cheppy a never- 
to-be-forgotten exploit by our troops. 

Here is another in which he commends Capt. Joe W. McQueen, of 
the One hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry. He says: 

Led his compfiny on the front line in the attack on the enemy artillery and 
machine gun positions between Charpentry and IJanlmy. resulting in the capture 
of prisoners, artillery, and machine guns; this, after the ailvance of other 
troops liad been checked by the enemy fire. (Sept. 27.) 

Led his company in the attack on Exermont. reaching that village and was 
there w(mnden while directing his company. This advance was made against 
artillery and machine-gun fire and after other troops had fallen ])ack. 
(Sept. 29.) 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 25 

He conimends Sergt. Russel E. Strange, Company C, One hundred 
and tenth Field Signal Battalion. He says: 

Realizing that every available man was needed during a counter attack by 
the enemy, he secured a rifle and went into the line and greatly assisted in 
repelling the attack. 

Here is something from Gen. Traiib, which is a side light on 
casualties : 

Sergt. Stephen Lake, Company E, One hunderd and tliirty-ninth Infantry : After 
all the otticers of his company had been either killed or wounded, he assumed 
command of his company, advanced, and captured several German machine 
guns. (Sept. 28.) Commanded his company in the attack on Exermont and, 
while leading his company, he was severely wounded. 

All throughout these general orders you will find repeated instances 
of where noncommissioned officers were commended because they 
led their men after all of the connnissioned officers of their battalion 
or companies had become casualties. 

In reading the report of one of the other hearings before this com- 
mittee I noticed that the question as to whether the One hundred and 
tenth Engineers were in reality called upon to serve as Infantry, and 
here is a counnendation of Col. T. C. Clarke, of the One hundred and 
tenth Engineers. It says: 

At Baulmy, September 29, 1918, his regiment being division reserves, he 
executed the order to establish and construct a line of resistance and to hold 
same, which he did for several days, until released. He established his com- 
mand post in the forward line of our posts and set an example of courage and 
fearlessness to his officers and men, who l)roke up two counter attacks and 
inflicted serious losses on the enemy. 

Col. Clarke was in command of the One hundred and tenth Engi- 
neers, which was not supposed to be organized for Infantry reserves. 

He commends Maj. Dwight F. Davis, adjutant, Sixty-ninth In- 
fantry Brigade, and says: 

Carried out the orders of his brigade commander in a manner utterly devoid 
of fear, under the most intense artillery and machine-gun fire. At Baulmy on 
Septeiaber 29 and 30 he recklessly exposed himself to the enemy fire in order 
to obtain information of great value to his brigade and division commander. 

This is the tone that runs through Gen. Traub's and many special 
ordei'S — a tone commending men for going forward, and it is alto- 
gether devoted to infantry arms, to capture artillery Avith Infantry. 
Tie was the divisional conimand^er of the Thirty-fifth Division. 

Mr. Garrett. By the capture of artillery, you do not mean the 
charge upon machine-gun nests, but upon heavier artillery ? 

Mr. Allen. Later we will get to that, in one instance where Gen. 
Traub refers to the capture of field artillery; not the artillery that 
was far back, belonging, if they had the same type of organization 
that W'C had, belonging to the army artillery, but the division artillery 
of the Germans. At all times when they refer to our men going for- 
ward against artillery they mean they were going forward against 
heavy artillery and light artillery and hand grenades and machine 
guns, because all of the German artillery was reaching the American 
fighters; none of it Avas falling short. 

He commends Capt. John W. Armour, of the One hundred and 
fortieth Infantry. He says: 

His company having been disorganized by enemy artillery and machine-gun 
fire, gathered together a portion of his men and resolutely pushed forward and 



26 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

remained in position nntil ordered to retire. This advance was under heavy 
artillery and niachine-gnn fire and required great courage and resolution to 
cause a forward movement. 

He commends Sergt. John C. Gooch, Company G, One hundred 
and thirty-seventh Infantry, Sergt. Irvin L. Cowger, Company G, 
One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry, and Corpl. Leon A. Thog- 
martin, saying: 

Successfully, after three attempts, rescued under extremely heavy machine 
gun fire from both flanks and artillery fire from the left, a wounded comrade 
who was lying severely wounded in the open. 

He also commends Corpl. Thomas A. Johnson, Company C, One 
hundred and tenth Field Signal Battalion, who, realizing that the 
manpower of the Infantry was dwindling rapidly, took a rifle and 
went into the front lines and ably assisted in the defense then being 
organized. 

He commends First Lieut. A. R. Seamon, and he commends a great 
man}' others, but I am merely pointing to those cases which show 
the relation of Infantry to Artillery in this engagement. He says in 
regard to Lieut. Seam.on : 

Lieut. Seamon and his platoon was given the mission of pushing the combat 
patrol well to the front of the corps objective. In the face of a fierce machine 
gun barrage from the front and heavy artillery fire from the left rear, he fear- 
lessly advanced upon his mission at the head of his men. The mission seemed 
to insure certain death to all, but with most admirable bravery he inspired. his 
men to follow him and led them skilfully to the attack on the machine gun 
nests. It was while advancing toward a machine gun nest that he was killed 
by a high explosive shell. 

He gives the instance of First Sergt. Fred L. West, machine gun 
company, One hundred and thirty-eighth Infantry. He says : 

Attached himself and gun crew to an advancing Infantry battalion and ad- 
vanced his gun to the foremost point of the line for the purpose of securing a 
field for direct fire. He was under direct observation from the air and the 
enemy lines, and although he was singled out by the enemy as an artillery 
target he refused to withdraw. 

I have here the report of Capt. Ralph E. Truman, who w^as intel- 
ligence officer of the One lumdred and fortieth Infantry Regiment. 
In justice to Capt. Truman I want to say that he did not send this 
home for the purpose of having it used in this fashion ; he sent it to 
Mrs. Truman. It is the report of the messages he constantly sent 
back from the front lines to the P. C. in the rear. 

Mr. Campbell. What do you mean by the " P. C"? 

Gov. Allen. The post commander. This relates the whole history 
of the battle, as stated by an officer whose duty it was to report the 
progress of his men. He sent it to his wife, and his wife thought 
it w^as a history of the Argonne battle, and when a friend called upon 
her she gave it out, and some portions of it got into the papers. I 
am merely saying this because I want it understood that Capt. Tru- 
man did not volunteer this statement. This reports the battle from 
hour to hour. We find that the first day was an easy one, and then 
he gets to September 27, and at 9.30 a. m. he says : 

Both One hundred and fortieth and One hundred and thirty-nineth Infantry 
held up by enemy machine gun fire. Troops can not advance without artillery 
support. Tank commander has been notified. A few casualties in the One 
hundred and fortieth Infantry machine gun fire. 



LOSSES OF TPIIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING AEGONNE BATTLE. 27 

Then, at 10.30 a. m. he says : 

Our line Is still held up by M. G. fire. Three cusiuiltios in first hattaliim. De- 
gree of wounds sliylit. M. G.'s positively located at • — , 

and then he gives some figures designating the locality. He says : 

Enemy slielling hill north of regiment, P. C. About 50 H. E. l.'lO's in the 
last 45 minutes. No casualties from shelling. Three casualties from M. G. fire 
in the First Battalion. One hundred and fortieth Infantry. Will advance as soon 
as M. G. nests are cleaned out. 

Then, at 12.20 he says : 

Am sending to you for j'our information maps and tracings that will be of 
value to you. After they have answered your purpose forward to G-2, 35th. 
Heavy shelling of our troops all along the flanks. 

At 1.00 p. m. he says : 

Am sending sketch of a point in front of our line. Three men killed by sliell 
fire. Enemy still shelling our troops heavily and are not able to advance. 

At 1.10 p. m. he sends another dispatch saying: 

The attack began at 6 a. m. Our regiment passed through the One hundred 
and thirty-eighth Infantry, and is now occupying a line running east and west, 
and south of Charpentry. about 1,000 yards. Column halted by heavy machine- 
gun fire from works near Charpentry, and hea\'j' artillery fire from the north of 
Charpentry. The riglit of our line is resting near tlie Charpentry- Very road. 
Tanks have been asked for to clear out machine-gun nests. Advance will start 
as soon as they arrive. 

The next report is at 5 p. m. and says : 

Boche are moving out of Cliarpentry in large bodies of wliat looks to be 75 
or 80 men in each group. Also moving along road at points near. 

And he gives some figures. 

Men moving along road can be seen to be carrying machine guns. Our lines 
have advanced slightly. 

At 5.50 p. m. he says: 

The entire regiment is now advancing \mder barrage. 

But makes no comments. 

At 7. 30 a. m., of September 28, he says : 

Our lines held up by M. G. fire. One hundred casualties in regiment during 
pa.st 24 hours. Our front lines are about 200 meters in advance above point. 
Strong machine-gun fire from our front. Also some artillery fire, but not doing 
any damage. Enemy planes active. Advance started at 5 a. m. 

Then, at 8.20 a. iti. : 

Our troops started the advance at 5 a. m. Have met with strong machine- 
gun fire, which is holding up the lines. Line about 200 meters in advance of 
this point. Tanks have arrived and are ready to go into action. One hundred 
casualties in regiment during the past 24 hours. ^ 

At 2.30 p. m., of September 28, he says: 

Regiment halted by terrific artillery shelling and concentrated machine-gun 
fire. See drawing showing approximately our front line. There may be a little 
change made during the night. We are flanked by artillery fire on every side 
but our rear. Our own artillery has given no support during the attack. 
Enemy planes very active during the day. One squadron of enemy planes over 
our position at 1 p. m. They turned their m. g.'s on the men, causing some 
losses. Fifteen planes in the party. Also one enemy plane flew low over our 
troops all during the forenoon directing the fire of the artillery. We have suf- 
fered heavy losses in killed and wounded. Men are still at dressing stations 
that were wounded yesterday. Numbers of men who are wounded have had 
no attention and are still lying on the ground where they fell. We are short 



28 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

of ammunition, wliicli is verj' badly needed in case of a counterattack by the 
enemy. The adjutant of the regiment has been gassed and the C. O. has not 
been seen since the attack started. Kunners unable to find any trace of him. 

He refers to the fact that men were still lying upon the ground; 
that is at a time 24 hours after some of them had been wounded. 
He had sent that message by runner at 2.30 of the 28th of Septem- 
ber, and he had repeatedly sent the same message for 24 hours before. 

At 3 p. m. he made the following report : 

Regiment halted by terrific artillery shelling and concentrated M. G. fire. 
See drawing forwarded by 70th Brig. We are flnaked by artillery fire from 
every side but our rear. Our own artillery gave no support during the attack. 
Enemy planes over our lines during attack, flying low, directing artillery fire 
on our troops. At 1 p. m. 15 enemy planes flew over our lines firing on our 
troops with their M. G.'s. causing losses. We have suffered heavy losses in 
killed and wounded. Men are now in dressing stations that were wounded yes- 
terday. Numbers of wounded men have not been carried off the field. We 
are short of ammunition, which is very badly needed in case of a counterattack 
by the enemy. The adjutant has been gassed and the C. O. has not been 
seen since the attack started. Runners unable to find any trace of him. 

He then says, at 12.30 p. m., September 29 : 

Our troops started advance on time set. They had not the proper time to 
reorganize, with the result that the organizations were split up and confused. 
Our artillery fell short in many cases, causing losses to our troops. Enemy 
artillery very active as well as M. G. Numerous losses in the regiment in killed 
and wounded. Our troops now occupy Exermont. 

Mr. Campbell. What does he mean by saying " Our artillery fell 
short"? 

Gov. Allen. That means that he had no way of signaling nor 
American planes to direct the fire of our artillery. 

He also says in another message, sent at 12.30 p. in. : 

Our troops now occupy Exermont. It was taken under a fierce artillery and 
M. G. fire. Our losses were heavy in killed and wounded. Our ai-tillei-y gave 
little support, and on several occasions fired short as much as 1 kilometer, 
causing losses to our troops. Weather very bad. Muddy ground. 

Then, at 9.15 a. m., of September 30, he says — and the last state- 
ment about the artillery falling short was on the 29th. At 9.15 he 
sent back by runner the message, on the 30th : 

The enemy is coming over skirmish formation. Have reached hedge this side 
of Montrebeau woods. Unable to ascertain exact number. Our artillery and 
M. G. have opened fire. Our artillery falling short on our front and support 
trenches. Barrage should be raised from 3 to 500 yards. 

Instead of being able to signal that very important information 
at the most poignant hour of the conflict he had to send it back by a 
runner, and a half hour later he sends back a runner in the same 
fashion, in the hope that he may get the barrage lifted. 

Here are some of the miscellaneous comments in what he calls 
"Intelligence Sununarv, 140th Infantrv, from noon September 29 to 
noon September 30, 1918." 

Mr. Snell. You mean that is what he sent to his commanding 
officer? 

Uov. Allen. Tliis is a copy of a summary of the reports he sent; 
this is what he submitted later, and it is signed finally by Lieut. Col. 
Delaplane, who Avas in command of the One hundrd and fortieth. 

Mr. Snell. This would be the same information that would 
eventuallv come to the War Depatrment in Washington in regard 
to that? " 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 29 

Gov. Allen. 1 see no reason why it should not have come to 
Washington. 

Mr. Hakiuson. These copies Avere sent by Capt. Truman to his 
wife; was lie viohiting any rules of the department in doing that? 

Gov. Allen. He may have been imprudent; I do not know 
whetlier he was violating any rule. I do not know as to the Army 
Regulations. 

Mr. Hakuison. I understand part of it was printed in the papers? 

Gov. Allen. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. All of it ? 

Gov. Allen. Not all of it. 

Mr. Harrison. But j'ou have all of it? 

Gov. Allen. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. She gave all of it to you? 

Gov. Allen. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. Was Capt. Truman from Kansas City? 

Gov. Allen. He was orginally from Missouri, I believe. He is a 
Regular Army officer. 

Mr. Rodenberg. He is still in the service? 

Gov. xIllen. He is still in the service, and he was in the service 
when I met him. I only met him casually. 

Mr. Harrison. I understood you to say he gave permission for 
you to use this. 

Gov. xVllen. No; he does not know that I have it. He sent it to 
his wife. She told a friend of her husband that she had a history of 
the Argonne battle. This friend, who was a news reporter, submits 
an affidavit in order that she may be cleared of any intention of vio- 
lating the rules. She thought it was merely a history of the engage- 
ment. She did not realize that it was the official report of the One 
hundred and fortieth Infantry. 

Mr. Harrison. You say this friend is a reporter. 

Gov. Allen. He is a newspaper reporter, but was a former com- 
rade of Capt. Truman in the I*hillipine Islands. 

Mr. Harrison. What paper? 

Gov. Allen. The Kansas City Star. 

Mr, Harrison. Did this information come to you recently? 

Gov, Allen. It came to me recently. 

Mr. Harrison. How recently? 

Gov. Allen, Since the article Avas published. 

Mr. Harrison. Did it cor/ie to you since this resolution was intro- 
duced or before? 

Gov, Allen. Since the resolution vras introduced. 

The Chairman. Why is it considered proper to give the name of 
this officer and withhold the names of other officers ? 

Gov, Allen. The reason is that this information with his name 
attached had already been printed in the ne\yspapers. If it had not, 
of course I would withhold it. The publication of the article I 
had nothing to do with. I read it in the new^spapers, and I natur- 
ally sought the source of the report, got it, and brought it here, as 
it has an important place in this inquiry. 

In the sunnnary tliere are a number of paragraphs as to the dis- 
tribution of troops, etc., and under " Enemy aeronautics " he says : 

Enemy planes very active, continuaUy flying over our lines during tlie entire 
day, tiring at our troops with machine guns, and directing artillery fire on our 
front lines. 



30 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING AEGONNE BATTLE. 

Capt. Truman says, under "Miscellaneous": 

Duriiis the entire day our troops were continually pelted with fire of our 
own Artillery, as well as the fire of the enniy. The fire of our own guns was 
much more destructive of our troops than tlie hi-e of the Boche. That condi- 
tion still exists to-day. Our Artillery laid down a heavy barrage on our front 
and rear lines at al)out 9.10 a. ni. to-day. llepeated messengers and runners 
have been sent to notify the Artillery that their range was short, I myself going 
to see the major in command of one battalion of Artillery of the One hundred 
and twenty-ninth Field Artillery, and asked him to see that the word was 
passed to the other commanders. I also showed him where our lines are now 
located. Our airplanes have been of little use to us in combating enemy planes. 
So far as the good they have done in that respect, we had just as well not had 
them. In the subject of reports will state that I have done the best that I pos- 
sibly could under the circumstances. 

Further describing the engagement, he says : 

As soon as they caught up with the men in front of the rush and stojiped 
them we organized them in a line of trenches, as shown in the sketch sub- 
mitted to you last night. We now have the situation well in hand and can 
withstand most any kind of an attack the enemy might put over, provided 
we can get the Ai'tillery to put the barrage on the Boche and not on our 
own lines. I have sent five different messages to the Artillery this morning 
to lengthen their range, it being five separate occasions on which they have 
shelled our men. It is doing more to decrease the morale of our troops than 
if they knew the entire German Army was attacking them. The situation is 
simply this : There is not a telephone in any organization I know of. There are 
no signal rockets left, no flares to shoot in the Very pistols. What signal lights 
were" in the organization are either lost or broken, and have practically no 
way of communicating with anyone except by runner. Our losses have been 
extremely heavy. Our regiment, the One hundred and fortieth Infantry, on 
going into action on the 29th, had not to exceed 1.000 men. 

It had gone in with full strength, in the neighborhood of 3,000 
men. 

I have here also a memorandum of messages sent by Maj. Mabrey. 
I did not bring the actual messages with me, but in the newspaper 
report it says that at 11.15 a. m. of September 26 Maj. Mabrey sent 
a message asking for Artillery in which he says : " Can not advance 
withoutArtillery support." 

Then, I have a chronological statement of the events made by Capt. 
Truman, and signed finally by Lieut. Col. Delaplane and all through 
this there are statements of lack of Artiller3\ 

Touching on the shortage of horses I have a report of Lieut. Col. 
Arthur G. Peck, inspector general of the corps, to Avhich the Thirty- 
fifth Division belonged, and this is the report to the commanding 
general Thirty-fifth Division. The subject is, " Irregularities and 
deficiencies noted at recent inspection." The report is dated October 
18 and inspection was made on the 2d of October. I merely call this 
to your attention, as I have said, to show shortage in artillery brigade 
horses. He shows the following in two columns : 



On hand. 



Shortage . 



One hundred and twenty-eighth Field Artillery. 
One hundred and twenty-ninth Field Artillery . 

One hundred and thirtieth T^ield Artillery 

One hundred and tenth Ammunition Train 



583 
375 

328 



641 
799 
977 
286 



Total shortage. 



2,703 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 31 

lie says under the heading of animals: 

The animals of all units except, the Artillery and llOtli Aniiminition Train 
■were in fair condition considering tlie hard wurk tlioy liad iHM'fonned durinj; 
the recent operations. 

Then in rehition to eciuipment he says the company vras well 
equipped prior to the recent operations, with the exception of trans- 
portation. He also says: 

The division needs practically an entire reissue of clothing. There has heen 
no issue of clothing in tliis division since it left the Vosges sector about Sep- 
tember 1. 

I am giving this because later in an official report of the triage 
officer it will be disclosed that these men went into combat with their 
summer underwear and with their shoes badly worn. This is Octo- 
ber, just after battle. He also speaks of such deficiencies as this, 
that may be of interest : " There is practically no gun oil in the divi- 
sion. All units reported that they had been without it for some 
time. There is also great shortage of saddle soap," etc. Under 
"Ambulances " he says : " The division has only 12 mule ambulances, 
8 motor ambulances, G. M. C, and 3 motor ambulances, Ford." 

That was for a division of 27,000 and more men. 

Mr. SxELL. How many ambulances would naturally be needed for 
a division of that size? 

Gov. Allen. I do not know what would be a complement, but it 
is apparent upon the face of it that for 27,000 men these 20 ambu- 
lances, which carry from six to eight wounded men, were not suffi- 
cient to haul the casualties. 

Mr. Garrett. How close up did the ambulances get? 

Gov. Allex. The ambulances went to the triage and field stations, 
and the men Avere brought from the first-aid stations. This report 
I have read is Col. Pack's official report as inspector general of the 
division. 

Mr. SxELL. Is this a public report? 

Gov. Allen. No. This report came to me from an officer. 

Mr. Harrison. May I ask who that officer was? 

Gov. Allen. I think I had better not tell you what officer it was, 
because he may have been violating some Army rule in giving it to 
me. 

Mr. Harrison. The trouble I see about giving this in executive 
session is that it would be very difficult for us to connect it up with 
the records. 

Gov. Allen. As I say, I will be very glad to give you the names 
of this officer or others in executive session, but I do not wish to 
have the names appear in open meetings. 

The Chairman. Does that mean we are expected to hold the 
names in confidence if they are given to us in exe :utive session ? 

Gov. Allen. I am willing to give the names, if you are going to 
pursue an investigation. 

The Chairman. I imagine that this is but the forerunner of a 
very comprehensive investigation that is sure to come. But what I 
wanted to observe was this : It is only fair that there should be op- 
portunities for those who may have any explanation of these matters 
that are being dis ussed, that they may be put in possession of the 
facts so that they can, if possible, explain away these apparently 



32 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

unfortunate things that occurred there. If these names are to be 
held in confidence, of course you can readily see that there can be no 
facilities for those who are in authorily to answer the things that 
are stated by these, so far as the public is concerned, anonymous 
charges. 

Gov. Allex. I think I have been unfortunate in not making my- 
self clearly understood in reference to the limitations of confidence 
that I shall place upon these names. I am perfectly willing to give 
these names to on investigating committee; but I presumed, as you 
have just said, this was a forerunner of a general investigation and in 
this preliminary hearing I merely ask that I may be allowed to keep 
the names from publication, although I am willing to give them to 
you or to any conunittee that they may have this information ; but I 
do not wish them published at this time. The officer who gave me 
this statement was in a position to know all about his regiment, which 
was the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantr3% and he had. on 
the day he gave me this report. ]ust sununed up the entire casualties 
of his regiment. That was about the middle of October, so that by 
the middle of October he knew the entire casualties of his regiment, 
and he said, "My regiment went in with 2,645 men and 89 officers; it 
came out with 1.425 men and 16 officers. 

ISIr. SxELL. Is that the Argonne fight? 

Gov. Allen. Yes. It might be a good place to explain that the 
Argonne battle was the only heavy engageuient in which the Thirty- 
fifth Division participated. I noted in the statement issued some 
time ago by the Secretary that he had said the Thirty-fifth had not 
suffered any more than some of the other divisions and gave a com- 
parative report. What should be added to this statement is that these 
divisions who had suffered as much as the Thirty-fifth had been en- 
gaged in a number of fights. The Thirty-fifth Division was engaged 
in the Argonne battle for five nights and six daj^s, and that was the 
only heavy fight it engaged in. Up until we entered the Argonne 
battle our total losses during the months we had been in the Vosge-, 
Mountains would not exceed possibly 500. 

Mr. GARRE'n\ Gen. March stated that the losses from the Thirty- 
fifth Division up to November 1 were 879 men — the number of men 
actually killed or d;ed from wounds. 

Gov. Allen. Yes. 

Mr. Garrett. And subsequently he stated that the total number of 
replacements, '"as far as we can learn, in that division for the Avhole 
time that it has been over there, will not exceed 10.000 men." 

Gov. Allen. Of course, it is readily apparent that the replacements 
and casualties do not necessarily have a direct relation to each other. 
If a man leaves a division for any purpose there is a replacement. 
So I think we will get more nearly to the exact truth if we deal with, 
the evidence I have touching who were killed and wounded. 

Mr. Snell. You have got definite evidence on the number of men 
killed and wounded? 

Gov. Allen. I have. Before I go into that I merely wish to ex- 
plain that 98 per cent of our casualties were in the Infantry Arm. and 
the best evidence that we had over there was our casualties were 7,000 
and; a trifle over, which meant a very large per cent of the Infantry 
Arm eneaffed. 



LOSSES OF THIETY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 33 

Mr. Garrett. That incant killed, wounded and gassed? 

(jov. Allen. From every cause. Some of these men came back and 
were not replacements. If we took the replacements of the 10,000 and 
adc'ed to that the men who came back and were wounded, it would 
look as though the entire Infantry were wiped out. 

Mr. Harrison. This report from Lieut. Col. Peck came to you 
through some other officer? 

Gov. Allen. It was handed to me by an officer of the division while 
I was in France, and I will be glad to give the officer's name in 
confidence. 

Mr. PIarrison. Would you object to telling the committee the cir- 
cumstances under Avhich it was given to you — why he gave it to you? 

Gov. Allen. I had called at the headquarters of this regiment, 
which was a regiment from my own State, to say good-bv, and I 
found these officers swearing about this part of tliis report. These 
men had just come out of the Argonne Forest, in which they had been 
engaged in the battle for six days and five nights. The Iju'ttons were 
off their uniforms; they Avere muddy: their condition was not as 
presentable as the Inspector General thought it should be. So in 
writing his report he saidjy' 

The division as a whole has none of the outward siuiis of a wel]-disci])]in(Hl 
orgauizatioii. Saluting throii.uhout Is very poor. Individuals and ,iii"ouj)s of 
men pay no attention to passing- ofiicers, and in many eases fail to ixet up wlu>n 
spoken to. It was very noticeable tliat the junior oflicei's made no attempt to 
enforce discipline. Hundreds of men were noted out of billets on the street in 
improper uniform and with blouses unbuttoned and no attempt made to be neat 
or orderly. Passin.i; ofiicers paid no attention to them and made no effort to 
correct these irregularities. IMost of tlie organizations inspected showed all the 
earmarks of National Guard units, which they are. Captains and lieutenants 
were contiiuially noticed on most fannliar terms with enlisted men. 

And that is what angered the officer who gave me this report. The 
injustice of it w^as tliat the men had come back with the onlv clothes 
they had left after the battle was over. They went in with their feet 
badly shod, and they found their shoes had not imin-oved during the 
six clays and five nights they lived in shell holes and trenches. Many 
uniforms were bad when they went in; they were w^orse wdien they 
came out. 
. Mr. Harrison. Who was the highest commanding officer? 

Gov. Allen. Maj. Gen. Peter E. Traub. I want to say this: I 
am not seeking to reflect upon the management of this battle."^ I knoAv 
nothing about that. I am not seeking to reflect upon Gen. Traub or 
upon the artillery or upon the aircraft. I am merely telling what 
any man not a military man might have known. 

I am now going to read to you from the report of Capt. Harry K. 
Hoffman, of the Medical Corps of the United States Army, the divi- 
sion psychiatrist of the Thirty-fifth Division, being the ranking officer 
w^ho was in charge of the triage of the Thirty-fifth Division. This is 
a copy of his official report. He sent me the report from Chicago not 
long ago, with this letter : 

January 24. 1919. 

My Deak Govkrnok : Probably you will not recall who I am so I will in- 
troduce my.self. I am Dr. (ex-Capt. ) Harry R. Hoffman, Division Psychiatrist, 
Thirty-fifth Division. I was with the Division from the time it was formed 
imtil November 13, 1918. I was mustered out a few days ago and am a private 
citizen again, so I am in a position to talk. 



34 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Since being back in the United States I have read with a great deal of in- 
terest and pleasnre your true account of wiiat our boys went through. After 
being with the Division so long I feel as though I am an adopted son of both 
Kansas and Missouri. It is with pleasure and honor that I recall the days at 
Cheppy, Very, and Charpentry. The newspapers may want to know how far a 
" Y " man got — send them to me, I will tell them. I am the first of the Thirty-- 
fifth to arrive. Our mutual friend, Gen. Martin, whom I met in Orleans, 
France, will tell you. 

Now, as to conditions and number of casualties, I will say you are absolutely 
correct. I wish I could tell the mothers of Kansas and Missouri the same as 
you have told them. They shoidd feel proud, and justly so, every one of them. 

I am Inclosing two reports which may be of use to you ; kindly return when 
you are through with them. 

Kindest regards to Gen. Martin, and heartiest congratulations and good 
wishes in your new office, I am. 
Very cordially, yours, 

Dr. Hakry R. Hoffman, 
550 Roscoe Street, Chicago, III. 

This is the report which it was his duty to make to the division 
surgeon of tlie Thirty-fifth Division. He makes this report under 
date of October 11. 

Mr. Snell. What was the date of tlie Argonne battle? 

Gov. AlIjEN. Tlie battle started on September 26, and the Division 
came out of it on October 2. Capt. Hoffman says : 

The first day of the offensive the rest hospital, i. e., one of the field hospitals 
of the Division was not yet established. This was due to the intense congestion 
of traffic, the roads being blocked for over 24 hours, hence our sanitary troops, 
with tentage, could not reach the triage. So many cases came through the 
triage that it was necessary to evacuate all psychiatric cases, as the triage was 
filled to more than capacity. It was raining and cold, and it would be necessary 
to keep the men in the mud without litters or blankets if they remained at 
the triage. 

He says: 

A total of 6,301 cases of all kinds passed through the triage of the Thirty- 
fifth Division. These came from many divisions, as follows: 

Thirty-fifth Division, 4,G23; Thirty-seventh Division, 87; Twenty-eighth 
Division, 443 ; Ninety-first Division. 798 ; miscellaneous, 350 ; total. 6.301. 

From the second day. only cases which I thought would not be fit for duty in 
a very short time, were evacuated, the others being sent to our rest hospital. 

In the great rush of cases during the next few days the rest hospital was 
constantly filled to capacity, and it was absolutely necessary to evacuate 
everything; hence, many cases wlilch would liave cleared up in a few days 
were sent to the rear. At one time there were 1.4C0 cases in the triage, 800 in 
the advance dressing station, and all transportation at a standstill. 

Many foreign trucks, i. e., trucks from corps, army and other divisions 
evacuated cases from tlie front. Many of these went direct from the truck to 
the avacuation hospitals, the cases not being triaged. No doubt many of 
these cases were of this division. 

He also says : 

It has come to my attention that the chief surgeon of the First Army ren- 
dered a complaint to the division surgeon of the Thirty-fifth Division, concern- 
ing the large amount of psychiatric cases evacuated to the rear. The foregoing 
is my explanation, i. e., the blocking of all transportation, the lack of transpor- 
tation on the first day, the inclement weather, and the large amount of casu- 
alties. 

He signs it, " Harry R. Hoffman, Captain, Medical Corps, United 
States Army, Division Psychiatrist." 

On the 25th clay of October it is forwarded, approved, and Lieut. 
Col. R. C. Turck says that Capt. Harry R. Hoffman did most excel- 
lent work, not only in the main triage, but in the main dressing sta- 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION" DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 35 

tions, under fire, as well. In relation to Capt. Hoffman's departure 
for home. Col. Turck, the division surgeon of the Thirty-fifth Divi- 
sion, says : 

The division surspon regrets Capt. Hoffman's departure from tlie division, 
and desires to say tliat Capt. Hoffman's services liave been at all times satis- 
factory and efficient, and that he has been roconnnended for a promotion to tlie 
jrrade of major, Medical Corps, for meritorious service, in action. 

In commenting upon the report. Col. Turck says : 

The ditliculties of evacuation were great, on account of the blocked roads ; 
therefore every possible means of transportation was utilized, including trucks 
belonging to the corps, other divisions, and to the Frencli. I feel sure that 
some of these foreign trucks went straight through from the advanced dres.sing 
stations to the evacuation hospitals without passing through the Thirty-fifth 
Division triage. Of such trucks, it is reported that tive loads of walking, 
wounded, slightly gassed, shell shock, and exhaustion, which were down in an 
ammunition train which was moving rapidly to the rear, to replenish, never 
arrived at the triage at Nauvilly to which they had been directed. It is 
probable that this accounts for some of the apparent faults in triaging. 

Touching this report, Capt. Hoffman desired, to give the following 
comments, and I will give his address in Chicago. 

Mr. Garrett. 'Did he receive his promotion to a majority? 

Gov. Allen. No; his promotion died aborning, with the signing of 
the armistice. He was recommended for promotion to a majority. 
He explained to me the conditions on the 26th. 

Comments of Capt. Hoffman, in Charge of Casualty Clearing Station. 

There were seven divisions on the line, seven in support, seven in reserve. On 
the morning of September 26, on account of congestion of traffic and lack of 
transportation, no triage was established. 

Noon of September 26, one large tent of the One hundred and thirty-sixth 
Ambulance Company reached Neuvilly to open triage. Word was received that 
many wounded were coming. They did not reach us until night of the 26th. It 
was raining, cold. We could use no lights because the airplanes of the enemy 
were busy. The wounded came in trucks. There were no ambulances, no lit- 
ters, no blankets. They were put on the muddy, sloppy ground. Our tent was 
I)acked, so many of the men laid outside with no shelter. Hospital personnel 
took off their coats to cover the wounded, so far as they could. 

On the 27th, Maj. W. L. Gist, director of the Sanitary train, consisting of the 
ambulance companies, sent a runner to Col. Turck, the divisional surgeon, say- 
ing, " For God's sake send us something — blankets, litters, food." Col. Turck 
sent back word, " Received your report. Can't do anything ; roads blocked." 

Gist was going mad. He had 800 men at the dressing stations, with no accomo- 
dations. They were out of splints. The chief surgeons had ordered all divisions 
in the Argonne to use the Thomas hip splints for fracture. All cases were to be 
splinted where they fell, and external heat was to be applied. They might just 
as well have ordered a Turkish bath and a Swedish massage. There was no 
Iieat and no Thomas splints. 

So the wounded piled up in the forest without litters. We did not have over 
75 litters to an ambulance company, and we had only 4 ambulance companies for 
the entire division. 

The fire from German planes became so severe in the dressing stations near 
Charpentry that Maj. Gist armed his sanitary troops with guns taken from the 
wounded soldiers to protect themselves against enemy airplanes. Capt. Hoffman 
states that he saw wounded men lying at the dressing stations killed by aii'plane 
fire. Maj. Gist armed himself with an automatic rifle which he took from the 
hands of a wounded man who had just been killed by fire from an airplane. 

FOOD and water. 

A division order came out as we were going into battle that all enlisted per- 
sonnel should carry not more than two canteens of water. This was soon 
exhausted. One 2-pound can of bully beef was taken for four men. The man 

101727— 19— PT 2 2 



36 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

who carried it liad the rations for three of his comrades, as well as for himself.. 
When he became separated from his comrades, one man ate and three starved. 
Strewn over the field were these 2-pound cans, which had been opened by one 
man, who ate what he wished and left them partly filled on the ground because 
he was out of touch with the men who were to share the rations. The resistance 
of the wounded was reduced 50 per cent by lack of water, lack of food, inclement 
weather, summer underwear, no overcoats, no blankets. Tlie mental cases were 
increased by this tremendous exposure. Some of our men lay in the forest 
unattended for 48 hours. 

WOUNDED IN PLIGHT. 

At his ofllce, 1856 West North Avenue, to which he has just returned from 
France, Capt. Hoffman said: 

" Imagine the plight of our wounded. There v/ere 800 at the advanced dress- 
ing station; 1,400 more at the triage, just back of the fighting lines.- Some were 
legless ; others armless ; many with sides torn out by shrapnel. All, practically, 
were in direst pain. It was bitter cold. The mud was knee-deep. A half sleet, 
haif rain was beating down mercilessly. And for 36 hours those 2,400 men 
were compelled to lie there in the nuid, unsheltered. We had neither litters on 
which to lay them, nor blankets to wrap around them. 

" That was not all. Although winter practically had set in the men had not 
been issued their heavy clothing." 

IN SUMMER CLOTHING. ' • 

" These wounded men lying unsheltered there in the mud and rain wore 
summer underwear and summer uniforms.'' 

If his official report, incorporating substantially "tlie above, is to be con- 
strued as criticism, Capt. Hoffman declared he presented it as constructive 
criticism. He added : 

" It may be the means of avoiding another such blunder if this country is 
ever unfortunate enough to become involved in anotiier war. For without doubt 
there was a blunder — a ghastly one. 

" This drive had been planned many weeks. That there would be a tre- 
mendous casualty list could not be doubted. Yet v.dien we went over the top 
we had but 75 stretchers. These were to bear in the wounded from the entire 
division of 30,000 men. This was inipossilile, of course. Our men carried in most 
of the wounded on their backs. Other wounded men, able to walk, assisted. 
Many more wounded probably laid on the battlefield much longer." 

• POWEKLESS TO MOVE THEM. 

"And having got them to the advanced dressing station, we found ourselves 
powerless to move tlieni. We were equipped only, to give the wounded first aid. 

" They then were to be sent back to be sorted out. Those who had lost limbs 
were to be sent from there to hosi^itals especially prepared to handle their cases 
farther back. The shell shocked were to be segregated for otluu- disposition, etc. 

" But there were no transportation facilities either at my station or the sort- 
ing post. There was but one road to our sector of the action. That was already 
congested by movements of ammunition and food to the men in action. 

" I saw Gen. Pershing in the middle of that road at Yerennes directing the 
traffic — pushing it on forward." 

KUNNER BEARS APPEAL. 

" Realizing the impending calamity, I .sent a runner back to Lieut. Col. Ray- 
mond C. Turck, division surgeon, with an appeal for transportation. He re- 
plied he could do nothing. And thus we lay for 36 hours after the division 
charged. I'll never forget the groans of those men and the pitiable picture 
they made. 

" Toward the last few of those hours we were gassed. I again appealed to the 
division surgeon. He ordered all who were able to walk or crawl to move to 
the rear. Those unable to do either were placed in ammunition and food 
trucks and sent back, bumping over shell craters and ruts." 

Many of these never reached the triage for further attention before their long 
and arduous trip to the rear, Capt. Hoffman said, and such additional hardship 
must have augmented the death rate. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 37 

The officer exhibited a paragraph from Col. Turek's official report to this 
effect. It read : 

" The difficulties of evacuation were great on account of the blocked roads, 
therefore every possible means of transportation were utilized, including trucks. 

" I feel sure some of these trucks — French — went straight through to the 
evacuation hospitals without passing through the Thirty-fifth Division triage." 

Continuing, Capt. Hoffman said : " I am convinced there was a great blunder 
committed. I do not attribute it, however, to any intlividuid. It was the sys- 
tem. The American Army was not prepared to cope with such tremendous casu- 
alties heaped up all at once." 

Mr. (taerett. Gen. March said before the committee that each 
man was supplied with emergency rations which he carried. 

Gov. Allen. I read that. They did not have them in the Thirty- 
fifth Division. Tliey had this one 2-pound can of bullj' beef for 
every four men, and at the front they had no rolling kitchens the 
first four days of the fight. It ma}" be, of course, as one man who 
seeks to answer these charges said : " The men did not need food, 
they lived on excitement." 

Mr. Garrett. Were the conditions such that they could have got- 
ten rolling kitchens up to the lines? 

Gov. Allen. Yes ; if the}' had had transportation, they could. 
The roads were not shut off, though the Germans did their best to 
hit them; but only a small percentage of the big shells fell in the 
roads. I drove over the roads repeatedly, and on all the days of the 
combat you could get far enough forward so that tlie supply com- 
panies could have taken hot food to the men if they had had the 
transportation to take the rolling kitchens that far forward. 

The Chairman. I think all these facts that you have been relating 
here should be known. Any man who is in possession of those facts 
is performing a public service by letting the world know. What I 
would like to inquire from you is, Do you care to go any further than 
make a mere recital of the facts ? Do jou care to submit any obser- 
vations as to the responsibility for these conditions? 

Gov. Allen. I thought I would recite the facts and they would 
speak for themselves. I take it, Mr. Chairman, that you do not care 
to have me go any further with the evidence? 

The Chairman. Oh. no. indeed. What I wanted to draw you out 
on was. Do you care to make any comments. It would be interesting, 
I think, in addition to the facts, to have your views as to the whys 
and wherefores and the responsibility for these conditions that you 
have been reciting here. 

Gov. Allen. The responsibility for the lack of material, of course, 
was due to whatever source Avas under obligation to supply the raw 
material. The shortage of aeroplanes belongs to the myster}- of the 
Aeroplane Service. We had thousands of ijien, great chaps, with a 
spirit sufficient to be the corps d'elite of the Army, waiting for aero- 
planes and willing to go into the air to help out their comrades, and 
they had no planes. We had been reading for months over there of 
the tremendous production of aeroplanes and of the approaching 
domination of the air. 

We knew that we had a few aeroplanes at Chateau Thierry and at 
Cantigny and at other places where we fought earlier. This was be- 
fore the Thirty-fifth Division came. Those of us in France at that 
time excused it. Every American tliere said, '' Wait until we get our 
own battle sector," and then the Araonne Forest battle was the battle 



38 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

for which we had been preparing all the months, for which we had 
been spending our money all the months, and when we came to that 
battle we found that, although we were the most mechanical nation 
in the world, we fought with less machinery of war than the troops 
of Hindu China would have had had they been in the forest. 

The CiiAiRMAX. That is to say, knowing of the opportunity for 
preparation for this battle, having been planned for four or five 
months ahead, why was it that these conditions existed? Yet in spite 
of all that, it is said we won a victory that will go down through the 
ages as the most brilliant in the history of the world. 

Gov. Allen. It seems to belong to that highly organized ineffi- 
ciency that characterized every department of the Army activity over 
there. Everything you touched fell, down somewhere, except one great 
thing, and that was the raw man power; that wag all right every min- 
ute. It did things it was told to do, and if it were necessary that men 
go forward and fight artillery with their infantry, they did that ; but 
it ought not to have been necessary, and the blame most certainly does 
attach to those whose duty is was to supply ordnance for the 
money we spent for ordnance; to supply aircraft for the money we 
spent for aircraft ; and the gloomy thing was that the aircraft did not 
arrive and we fought with French ordnance. None of the elaborate 
2)lans we had been reading about were fulfilled at the hour when we 
needed this equipment. We all read of a controversy that has been 
going on for months to get a machine gun that would be specially 
adapted to the brilliancy of our soldiery — we fought with the ma- 
chine guns of other nations. 

Mr. Harrison. How many planes were at the battle of Argonne ? 
Gov. Allen. I see Gen. March says 120 in all, bombing planes. I 
had accepted the general belief over there that there were of all kinds 
something like a thousand planes. A statement that came through 
rather confidential sources Avas that at the time of the Argonne we 
had something over a thousand planes, 850 of which were planes pur- 
chased from the French, not altogether the best planes. Naturally, 
they did not sell us their best planes, any more than they sold their 
best, horses, and I doubt if there was any considerable number of the 
fast fighting planes, and if there were 120 used at the time of the bat- 
tle of the Argonne Forest, along a battle line of 22 miles, half of them 
would be on the ground, and some would have to be used at night and 
some in the daytime, and at no particular time of the battle were 
there enough planes to render efficient service. 

Mr. Harrison. As a military expert, I understood from his testi- 
mony that he thought there were enough there. 

Mr. S:nell. Gen. March said in his testimony that the statement 
was denied that they were without sufficient supplies of artillery. 

Gov. Allen. My understanding of that remarkable statement was 
that he referred to the heavy artillery, which belonged to the Army 
and the corps, and as these men say, this artillery was at that time in 
touch with the division, very fatal touch with the division, when its 
shells fell within our own lines, but Gen. March surely could not have 
been referring to divisional artillery, because if he did, he is very 
much mistaken. 

Mr. Snell. The general artillery would be in support of the in- 
fantry. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 39 

Gov. Allen. That Avoiild be the corps and Army artilleiy, heavy 
ordnance capable of firing 1,800 yards; very heavy artillery, motor- 
ized, but not meant for front-line service. The artillery which 
failed ns was the divisonal artillery, of which, in the Thirty-fifth 
Division, there was one brigade of three regiments. 

Mr. Fess. Col. McKay said the other day that we lost one man in 
four that Avent in, while France lost one in seven. If that statement 
is correct, would there be an explanation of that in our lack of 
artillery service? 

Gov. Allen. Exactlj^ All the French officers that were w^ith us 
and who observed the manner in Avhich we carried on this battle were 
open in their criticism of it, and one French officer said to me that 
if the French had fought like this they would have had no army 
left at the end of the first year. 

Mr. Campbell. They sacrificed men for want of materials? 
Gov. Allen. It w^as the wastefulness of sending infantry forward 
to capture artillery. 

Mr, Snell. Hoav many men do you think were killed in this 
division ? 

Gov. Allen. I think killed and missing there were something like 
1,700. I know that some of our best officers were killed by German 
aeroplanes. 

Maj. Murray Davis was a victim of machine-gun fire from an 
aviator who was flying so low that he could take deliberate aim. 

Mr. Kelley. Have you ever heard' the number of our airplanes 
really at the front ? 
Gov. Allen. No. 

Mr. Kelley. I talked with an officer of a division and he said 641. 
Gov. Allen. It was the impression of all in a position to know 
the actual situation that w^e never had of all kinds more than a 
thousand. 

It was Capt. Hoffman's opinion that the resistance of the men 
who laid, many of them, for 48 hours without attention was reduced 
50 per cent, and that the number of mental cases was very greatly 
increased because we had not transportation or ambulances to get 
men to a place where they could be. given attention. 

Mr. Campbell. You mean those who became deranged? 
Gov. Allen. Yes; as a result of the exposure. It was raining all 
the time, and the men had their summer underwear on. and they 
went into the battle without their overcoats, and they had no blank- 
ets, and the terrible suffering which the Avounded endured, laying 
Avithout litters upon the muddy ground, reduced the resistance prac- 
tically 50 per cent, and thereby increased the dead among the 
wounded. 

Mr. ScHALL. It Avas a Avell-known fact in France that Ave had 
about one-third enough doctors and nurses. I talked Avith doctors 
Avhen I was over there and they told me they had about one-third 
the number they should have had? 

Gov. Allen. Yes; that Avas Avell known. 

Mr. Schall. That they had sought to get nurses and medicines, 
but that the commanding poAver had shoved them aside for fighting 
men, and the^" were not being brought up, and they Avere making 
no provision for them, and that the theory upon Avhich the heads 



40 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

were running tilings was to the effect that a wounded man was useless 
anyway, and to Ijring out a wounded man to care tor him ^as 

not warfare to win. i, ^ t 

Gov. Allex. Of course, that charge was made over there, but i 
would not wish to give my opinion on it, but I would say that that ■ 
is the way it worked out. 

Ca])t. Hoffman calls attention to the fact— we are speaking ot the 
fact that had the ambulance trains been prepared, there would have 
been a redaction among the casualty lists, but he says that — 

When we went over the top we had about 75 stretchers which were to bring 
in the wounded of the entire division of 30,000 men. 

Mr. Garrett. I was wondering how those men got gassed there. 
They were in the rear of their own lines. Were they being gassed 
by airplanes? 

Gov. Allen. The Germans might have dropped gas shells, or fired 
on them Avith their long-distance artillery. We w-ere constantly put- 
ting on and taking otf the gas masks. The fields were full of gas, 
and the atmosphere was very heavy with it. That was not a thing 
which anyone could have prevented, of course; it was only a case 
where me"n were allowed to lie so many hours unattended, and that 
could have been prevented if we had had sufficient transport to meet 
the exigencies of the battle. 

Mr. Snell. Were you there all the time during the six days? 

Gov. Allen. Yes; I w^as in charge of the Y. M. C. A. activities 
in the Thirty-fifth Division. I had secretaries in the various units. 
We were doing what we could to get our stuff to the front, where 
they were keep the men. We had a secretary in forward dressing 
stations who made hot chocolate for wounded men, others worked 
on burial squads or drove trucks of supplies. It was my duty to 
watch those places and keep in touch as far as possible with the 
secretaries. 

Mr. Harrison. I understood you to say this condition would not 
have prevailed if we had had the necessary transportation there. 
Do you know whether we had it in France, or whether it had not been 
sent to France? 

Gov. Allen. Men who visited the places wiiere our stores were 
held at St. Lazaire and Bordeaux tell me that we had much auto- 
mobile transportation that did not get to the front ; that we had be- 
gun to receive airplanes that did not get to the front. I think we 
used possibly all the horses that were available, because we were con- 
stantly buying these broken-down horses from the French and pay- 
ing $-100 each for them and losing them the next day, because they 
were horses that had been gassed, that had been evacuated from the 
French and gone to an assembly corral and come back to us. Many 
of them died the dnj we started to use them. 

Mr. Harrison. You state that they were not at the battle of Ar- 
gonne, though they maye have been in France? 

Gov. Allen. Yes. 

Here is a letter from Capt. Odell. I am merely using it to show 
that the Thirty-fifth Division was a type more or less of all the 
divisions that went into the battle of the Argonne Forest. Capt. 
Odell is of the One hundred and forty-ninth Field Artillery. That is 
in the Rainbow Division. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 41 

Here is a letter from Lieut. C. B. Allen, of the One hundred 
and thirty-seventh Infantry, giving a long, detailed account of the 
battle, and he continues to relate the fact that they were short of 
artillery and planes, just as Capt. Truman says. I will not take the 
time to read it. 

Mr. Snell. Is that an official report? 

Gov. Allen. No. It says "A true account of the Kansas City, 
Kans., boys in the Argonne fight. 

Mr. Harrison. That was turned over to you? 

Gov. Allen. That was turned over to me by his father, I believe. 

Mr. Harrison. That was since the resolution was introduced, or 
before ? 

Gov. Allen. I do not remember just what date. I think it was 
before the resolution was introduced, but after I made my original 
statement. 

Here is a report of John P. Myers, of Company L, One hundred 
and fortieth Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division, which appejired in the 
Parsons Daily Sun on January 22, 1919. It is a newsj)aper account, 
and it says: 

In describing tlie advance, Pvt. Myers supported everything Gov. Allen 
has said about the lack of equipment, but he hesitated to appear in a complain- 
ing attitude. He said it was a matter of common kno\¥ledge to the men in his 
battalion that they lacked equipment, but there was little complaint among 
them on account, of it. 

Although in the automatic squad. Pvt. John Myers didn't have a revolver. 
He asked for one just before going into the drive, he said, as did others, but 
was told that they were not to be had. Only a few were fortunate enough to 
get revolvers, he said. 

" I saw one airplane and - three observation balloons shot down," Pvt. 
Myer.s said, "but we did not have enough airplanes to help us through. We 
had white cloths to wave at them as signals, but the airplanes were not there 
to be waved at. As the result we advanced far ahead of our Artillery and the 
Germans mowed us do.wn." 

Pvt. :Myers said the losses to the Thirty-fifth on the first and third da.vs 
of the drive were far in excess of the German casualties. He was wounded 
on the third day, September 28, and said that out of his company of 239 or 
249, only 30 v.-ere saved. The others were either killed or v/ounded. Other 
companies in the same battalion, occupying the front line as he did, suffered as 
heavily, he was told after the drive. He said the scarcity of revolvers was 
general throughout the battalion and he presumed it extended to the entire 
division. 

"I am not sure," Pvt. Myers said, "but I think we may have had suffi- 
cient Artillery equijinient when we started in aside from revolvers, but the lack 
of airplanes made it impossible for the Artillery to keep pace with us. We 
wei-e told that the sooner we reached our objective the sooner we would be 
permitted to come back and rest." 

Pvt. IMyers continued : " The big drive began on the morning of September 
26. We did not go far that day, being held up by Artillery and machine-gun 
fire, but by the tliird day, when I was hit, we had advanced sojue 20 or 30 
kilometers. We were in the front line and on the third day we particularly 
noticed that the airplanes were shy and that we lacked Artillery aid. We had 
gone about 3 Icilometers on that day, when about 10 a. m. I got hit. I lay 
on the field until about 1 o'clock the next day, when members of my company 
came back and saw me, picked me up in a raincoat and carried me to first aid." 

I have a few extracts from a letter of Mr. Lee Love, of Brooke 
field, Mo., in which he says: 

I have a son in the Thirty-fifth Division, Company I, One hundred and 
thirty-ninth Infantry. He enli.sted June 5, 1917. at Chillicothe, Mo., and has 
been promoted from the ranks, first to corporal, then to sergeant. 

He gave us a description of the battle and it tallies exactly with your state- 
ment which we saw in the Kansas City Times of this date. 



42 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

He states that the power to move the Artillery was not equal to the emer- 
gency to keep up with the Infantry and out of his platoon of 60 men there was 
only 12 returned. 

He further states that the silver in his pockets wa;; turned black from the 
gas * * *. 

Here is a statement made by Lieut. Alfred T. Barr, of the Three 
hundred and forty-seventh Machine Gun Battalion of the Ninety- 
first Division. This statement appeared in a letter dated Mayer, 
France, December 11, 1918, appearing in the Belle Fourche (S. 
Dak.) Bee, on January 7, 1919. Lieut. Barr says: 

* * * Our division was one of the nine that went over the top in the bat- 
tle of the Argonne on September 25. * * * 

We could see our observation balloons spaced about a half a kilometer or 
so apart, back of our lines. They didn't stay there long for the boche got 
busy, sent his planes over and managed to burn a number of them. Our planes 
didn't seem very active, in fact it was that way during the whole four days 
that I was in the fight ; the boghe seemed to have superiority of the air. 

The first day we had very little resistance ; met some machine gunners and 
snipers, but not much artillery firing. However, we captured a good number 
of prissoners *that day. The second day, however, was different and we ran 
into a stiff resistance at Epenonville, which was in our brigade sector. There 
I lost one gunner killed and four wounded from snipers and machine-gun fire. 
It was foggy and rainy and the d n boche had it on us. He was every- 
where with hi? machine guns and snipei's and we had lost touch with our Ai*- 
tillery, having gone so far the previous day. Our front line was in the village 
of Epenonville and his strong point was in an orchard just beyond and also 
in a thick wood stretching all along our front. We had to withdraw from the 
village and let what artillery we had shell the orchard and wood. However, 
we couldn't go ahead any that day and so consolidated our position this side 
of the town. The division on our right was held up back of us, so that we 
were sticking out like a sore thumb. I had my platoon on the right flank that 
night with nothing between my guns and Germany but the boche. * * * 

The fourth day was the worst of all. We now ran up against the enemy 
artillery in force and they seemed determined to blast us out. * * * 

I have here also a statement of Corp. Arthur Kennedy, of the 
Thirty-fifth Division, which appeared in the Atchison (Ivans.) 
Globe, under date of February 6, 1919, in which he says : 

It is a fact that we fought three days in the Argonne without the slightest 
artillery support. Those days were September 26, 27, and 28, and they were 
terrible days. Our boys were mowed down by Hun machine-gun fire, shrapnel, 
and airplanes, which operated above us with considerfvble freedom. 

After I was wounded I laid for 30 hours on the field — 30 hours before I 
was picked up by stretcher bearers. I don't remember much about my ex- 
periences in the field dressing station, as I came into an evacuation hos- 
pital. * * * 

I don't know the reason for the failure of the Artillery to back us up, unless 
it was because we went too fast for them. 

I have also a statement of LeRoy Anderson, of the One hundred 
and tenth Engineers, Thirty-fifth Division, in regard to the lack of 
artillery support in the battle of the Argonne Forest. This state- 
ment appeared in the Topeka State Journal, of Thursday, February 
6,1919. He says: 

I saw only a few American airplanes while I was in France. The Hun 
planes would sweep down within 100 yards of us and open up with their ma- 
chine guns, but I do not believe we lost many men this way. When an obser- 
vation plane would come, however, it was only a short time until German shells 
would begin to light among us. Their air supremacy gave them great ad- 
vantage, enabling them to get the range and the location of our men. * * * 

We started from the town of Vauquois and went over the top in three waves, 
about 120 yards apart. I was in the second wave, and the smoke and mist 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 43 

were so thick that we could hardly see the men ahead of us. We were preceded 
with a creeping barrage from our artillery and French tanks, which cleaned 
up the machine gun nests, but on the second day most of the tanks were crippled 
or stuck in the mud, and thereafter the Infantry cleaned up the nests alone. 
* * * 

On the third day the One hundred and fortieth and One hundred and thirty- 
eigth Regiments ran into their own barrage. I do not know whether this was 
the fault of the Artillery or Infantry officers, but if we had had airplanes it 
probably never would hav« happened. 

I have also a statement of Sergt. Maj. E. D. Harrison, of the One 
hundred and fortieth Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division, which ap- 
peared in the Topeka State Journal of February 8, 1919, under a New 
York date line, in which he says : 

The Thirty-fifth Division opened the Argonne push on September 26, being 
one of the units heading the drive and one of the ones suffering the heaviest 
losses. * * * 

When the Thirty-fifth went in it hit hard and quick and formed a salient of 
its own, being flanked therefore on two sides, as the divisions to the right 
and left were outdistanced. 

Our Artillery support failed after the first. We started the drive behind a 
barrage, and a creeping barrage was kept up for about 12 hours, but after that 
the Artillery fell behind and we had no protection. When I was wounded on 
the 28th I understood that they were just getting their guns into position 
again. * * * 

We didn't seem to have any air support, either. The men could look away 
up and behind and see big formations that looked like allied planes, but when 
our troops were ready to advance the Hun machines swept down without oppo- 
sition, and we were met with the heavy artillery fire they directed. 

At one time the men were in mass formation, sheltered from sight by a rise 
while waiting to go into action. The German planes flew low, spotted them, and 
the shelling that resulted was a disastrous affair. * * * 

I have also an extract from a statement of Will Shaner, of Com- 
pany C, One hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry, Thirty-fifth Divi- 
sion. This statement appeared in the Parsons Daily Sun of Feb- 
ruary 1, 1919, He says: 

Gov. Allen is entirely correct about the heavy losses to the Thirty-fifth in 
that drive being due largely to lack of artillery and equipment. We started 
into the battle seemingly well equipped, but as day after day rolled by it was 
apparent that the Artillery lacked horses and other supplies sufficiently to 
keep up with the Infantry advance. I don't know much about the airplane 
equipment, except that the boys all talked about how scarce they seemed to be ; 
when we wanted to signal a plane there was none around to take the signal. 

I have here also an extract from a letter of Sergt. John R. Strat- 
ford, of Company F, One hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry, Thirty- 
fifth Division, written to his father, Judge E. D. Stratford, of Eldo- 
rado. Ivans. This letter was written before I came home. It says : 

I will give vou some idea of a part of the battle of the Argonne, where I was 
woundecfon September 28. On the second day of the battle our company lay 
all day on the side of a hill where we had dug little holes to protect ourselves to 
some extent from machine-gun bullets. We could look across a little valley to 
tlie rifrht and watch the advance of the One hundred and thirty-eighth Regiment. 
Thev were advancing behind tanks and the boche artillery was firing from our 
left and the shells just cleared the hill where we lay. As they whistled over our 
heads we could see the shells burst on the other hill were the One hundred and 
Thirtv-eiahth was advancing. They were out on the top of that hill with abso- 
lutelv no protection and the Germans could not help hitting them. A shell 
would strike in the center of the squad or platoon and you could see the men 
blown to pieces in all directions. Those v/ho were knocked down by the shock 
would get up. reform their squads, and go on as if nothing had happened. 

I was v^'ounded at the beginning of our first battle. That is where our com- 
pany led the fiaht, and I never expected to see such bravery as they showed. 



x> 



44 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

The machine-gun bullets were as thick as hailstones during a hailstorm and 
the fellows would just turn their heads sideways, as if they were facing a hard 
rainstorm, and go right into them. 

I haA^e also an extract from a letter of Corpl. J. W. Otterstatter, 
Company K, One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry, Thirty-fifth 
Division, in which he says: 

I was wounded the first day of the Argonne battle (Sept. 26) near the 
town of Cheppy. To fight machine-gun nests, you having been there realize 
the absolute necessity of hand grenades. AVe were without this protection en- 
tirely. I know for a positive fact that there wasn't one in the battalion, my 
position being at battalion headquarters as personnel clerk, so I would be 
familiar with the circumstances. This being the case the first day, I don't see 
how they could have been supplied any during the remainder of the battle. 

As to artillery support, naturally the first day it was good, because we hadn't 
gotten out of range, but we experienced considerable ditticulty in getting signals 
to aeroplanes on account of the weather conditions and fog. After being 
wounded the first day, I was out of the fighting, so am not familiar with con- 
ditions after that time — namely, whether the artillery advanced as they should 
or not. * * * 

I have also some extracts from a statement of First Lieut. S. O. 
Slauofliter, Company L, One hundred and fortieth Infantry, Thirty- 
fifth Division. This statement appeared in the Kansas City Star 
of February 5, 1919. It says : 

There can be no harm in telling some of the hardships under which our 
division fought, the lack of proper care of the wounded, the lack of protection 
in the air, and of the fighting qualities of the men who overcame these handi- 
caps. 

The first two days of the fight, when we took Viaqua Hill, we had few 
casualties, because we were under the protection of our artillery. But as we 
left them, when we got near I^lxermont, we found ourselves face to face with 
Boche artillery and machine-gun nests. I clearly saw two German batteries, 
one on either side of us, sending an enfilading fire across our position. They 
were outside our sector, but were in plain view and were decimating our ranks. 

Saturday, the fourth diiy of the battle, was the worst. We were almost 
unprotected from the German artillery, and their airplanes played over us so 
low you could almost hit them with stones. We fought them off with automatic 
pistols and rifles. Our own observation balloons tried to go up, but were 
sunk as fast as they arse. Occasionally protecting airplanes showed up, but 
they were not sufficient to keep the Huns off our heads. 

That night our wounded were all about us. We could get no litters, because 
transportation was nil. We improvised litters from overcoats and carried our 
wounded back to the triage, but the situation there was little better, as men 
were lying in the nuid with no blankets to go over them. 

I have also a statement in recrard to Capt. Luther Tillotson, Com- 
pany A, One hundred and tenth Engineers, Thirty-fifth Division. 
This is a newspaper statement, which appeared in the Topeka State 
Journal of January 18, 1919. This statement says: 

Capt. Tillotson has received his honorable discharge from the Army and is 
now a civili;in. He comes to Kansas with a message which will l3e given 
credence by the highest military authorities of the State, and his report sub- 
stantiates the main statement ' made by Gov. Henry Allen. 

C-ipt. Tillotson is bringing first-hand news, and h<» reiterates the statement 
of the horrible losses in the Infantry of the Thirty-fifth Division. The state- 
ment made b.v the War Departmi-nt he brands as absolutely misleading, in 
that the losses as reported by them are based on replacements. He gives as 
his autl'ority for the actual casualties suffered the official stat-nnent of the 
Paris edition of the New 'York Herald of .October 1, which places the casualties 
among the Thirty-fifth Infantry at 42 per cent. 

" The Artillery loss was barely 2 per cent," Capt. Tillotson explained. " We 
went into the fight behind a good barrage. After our first advance we had 
absolutely no Artillery protection for our men. The boys responded to their 



LOSSES or THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE, 45 

orders to advance, and* they were nio\A'ed down like wheat. Our orders were 
to so on. The artillery was there at first, but there were no horses, and it 
( ould not be moved to keep up with the men. There is some confusion between 
casualties and replacements in tlie layman's mind. If 100 of your men are 
hurt, you order, perhaps, 20 for replacement, because you know that perhaps 
two-thirds of .the men hurt will be back for work in a few hours. The War 
Department bases the report of casualties on the replacements ordered, but 
this is not a fair showing, for many of those men come back to fight again 
who will go through the rest of their lives bearing the scars of those 'slight' 
casualties." 

' I have here also an extract from a letter of INIr. F. P. Hawthorne, 
of McPherson, Kans., in which he says: 

My son Cal, who was with Company C, One hundred and thirtieth Machine 
Gun Battalion, in the Argonne I'.attle, in a letter of ()(;tober 23, complains very 
seriously of poor support from the Artillery. Also complains of change of all 
the National Guard oflicers. 

I have also a statement of Pvt. Reynolds, of the Infantry, of the 
Thirty-fifth Division. This statement appeared in the Warrensburg 
(Mo.) Herald of January 24, 1919. It says: 

After a night of hard tramping, many of the men in a half starved condition, 
the order to go over the top came at daybreak of Septeml)er 29, and under the 
command of Capt. Jack ArniDur, the successful attack was made, a success the 
more remarkable because at the critical moment auxiliary support failed. The 
airplanes, of immeasurable value at the time of attack, were absent,' and the 
artillery was too far in the rear to give the protection of a barrage, according 
to Pvt. Reynolds. 

I thought you might be interested, if you had not seen it in an 
article which appeared in the Saturday Evening Post written by 
P^lizabeth Frazer. I happen to know that Miss Frazer made a very 
careful investigation of the Argonne Forest Battle. She was mak- 
ing it when I left Paris. She was interviewing men and officers, 
and she is a writer of reliability. She says : 

* * * For it is a fixed rule of warfare that if the rear fails the front 
must still carry on. * * * There vras an acute shortage of horses. There 
were not enough to begin with, and those in use were second rate, broken down 
by the brutal strain. * * * And horses died by hundreds and thousands. 
The woods were filled with their carcasses. 

* * * Again and again the.se vital necessities were missing' at the outset 
of an attack, and the men went forward without them. They went forward 
with no artillery to prepare the way, with no amnuniition, sometimes even 
with no rifles, * * * with no food for two and three days at a time, sleep- 
ing in the woods in a sodden downpour of rain * * *. 

Thus passed five desperate nightmare weeks of unimaginable horror. But 
the chief point to remember is that, in spite of the agony and the handicaps, 
the men took their objectives, often without food, without artillery support, 
without air support. They took their objectives with nothing but their in- 
vincible courage and their bare hands. It cost like hell ; but they took them-^ 
by maneuver on flank or rear, when they could, or by bold sanguinary frontal 
attack when they must * * *. 

As a matter of fact, gentlemen, if you drove any place along the 
road 25 miles back, j^ou could trace the advance of the Army b}' the 
dead horses that lay along the road, skinny old horses and worn out, 
who had died within a few hours after they had been put to work. 

Mr. Garrett. Do you remember how far the troops advanced from 
where they started until they reached their objective? 

Gov. Allen. I believe I have a battle map which shows the dis- 
tance. We started at Neuvilly and went to Exermont, and going on 
a line straight north the distance was perhaps 12 kilometers. The 
headquarters of the Germans at this point were in Cheppy, the 



46 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

center of the Hindenburg line on the Verdun sector, and were off to 
one side a mile and a half, but the distance which we covered during 
the six days and five nights w^as, I believe something like to 12 kilo- 
meters which would be between eight and nine miles. 

Mr. Snell. It can not be very great distance ? 

Gov. Allen. It Avould be possible to haul artillery that far if you 
had horses. 

Mr. Snell. That would have been considered a slight advance? 

Gov. Allen. That would have been considered a slight advance. 
There Avere advances after that, when the situation was better ar- 
ranged Avhere the Americans Avent 12 miles a day, frequently, and 
took all of our playthings with us. 

Mr. Harrison. You mean when they got the Infantry wdiere it 
was? 

Gov. After they got through wath the Argonne Forest they were 
following the retreating Germans up in the Sedan drive, and were 
better organized, with more horses, and a line was more concen- 
trated, and used less artillery. 

Mr. Garrett. That was advancing, following a retreating arm}' 
of the enemy, and the other advance was an advance through one of 
the hardest fights the world had ever witnessed ? 

Gov. Allen. We must realize that these men of ours took the Hin- 
denburg line at a point as well defended and as nearly impregnable 
as any part of the Hinderburg line on the western front, and they 
took it because they kept going on; they did not know how to go 
back. They had been taught no system of defensive. They found 
at Cheppy the Germans had dugouts reinforced with concrete, and 
tliey went 40 or 50 feet below the surface 6i the ground. Our men 
captured the dugouts and went forward. I talked with a general 
officer of the French Army, who witnessed this, and I was bragging 
about our men, and I asked him if he did not think tliey were good 
soldiers. This officer said. " I would not say they were good sol- 
diers; but they Avere magnificent fighters." In the French mind 
there is quite a distinction in those terms. The good soldier, in the 
I'rench mind, saves his life. 

Mr. Campbell. Would not a basket full of hand grenades be a 
good thing to use in one of those deep holes ? 

Gov. Allen. They would be. Here is the opinion of Col. W. H. 
Carpenter, of Marion, Kans., who served with the xlmerican Eed 
Cross in France. This is, an extract from an article appeai^ing in 
the Topeka State Journal on January 31, 1919. It says : 

,Col. Carpenter's attention AA-as called by Representative Little to the state- 
ment of Chief of Staff ]\Iarch, that at no time during the battle did any Ameri- 
can troops get beyond range of artillery support. The Kansan said in the most 
emphatic Avay possible that the statement was not correct. He said that the 
Kansans had fought the last few days of the battle against the massed German 
artillery, machine guns, airplanes, gas, and with little artillery support. 
* * * He also told of the Kansans being forced to defend theinselA'es by 
rifle and pistol fire against German airplanes swooping dOAvu on them, but he 
said he did not care to go into the air phase of the battle at all, as he AA-as not 
a military man. He s;ii 1 rlic '\ansas soldiers \v()uld give their folks the truth of 
the battle once they got home. 

Here is an extract from Ivan Angell, of Company L, Three hun- 
dred and fifty-third (All-Kansas) Regiment. This 'appeared in the 
Tonganoxie (Kans.) Mirror, on Januai-y 23, 1919. It says: 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISIOI^ DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 47 

The Germans weiv suprtMiie in the ;iir in tlie sector where he was iuul proved 
expert niiirksnien in their artillery * * *. 

Ivan W!is in the hospital when the Eighty-ninth made its fifiht in the Argonne 
Forests, Imt he says (iov. Henry Allen is <-orre<r in his statements. The boys 
fought four days without artillery support. 

This regiment was in the Eighty-ninth Division, which entered 
the battle of the Argonne Forest, at a place called Romaigne, in Octo- 
ber, and then was in the battle on toward Sedan. I read it to show 
that the Eighty-ninth Division was also suffering from shortages of 
material. 

I have here the statements of 25 or more other men and officers, 
all of which is corroborative testimony and, if the committee prefers, 
I will not read them all. but I will put them in the record. 

Mr, Harrison. After you made your speech in Kansas you received 
a great many letters from the boys who had been in the battle of the 
Argonne Forest? 

Gov. Allen. Very many. 

Mr. Harrison. Agreeing with your conclusions? 

Gov. Allen. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. Did you receive any letters from those boys who 
took issue with you on the proposition? 

Gov. Allen. Not a letter. I have read five letters from boys who 
were in this division, printed in Democratic newspapers, which 
generally start with a statement that everything I am saying is, of 
course, absolutely false; that the reason why the artillery was not 
used was because the infantry outran it, and the artillery was not 
to blame. Statements of that kind, which conceded everything I 
have said, but which give an entirely different interpretation as to 
the causes. 

Mr. Eodenberg. Woidd it not be a good idea for the governor to 
incorporate these statements which he has not read in the record ? 

Gov. Allen. These are merely repetitions, some stronger and some 
weaker. I would like to give you a list of the witnesses whom I 
know to be in possession of these facts. With the presentation of 
the names of the witnesses and with the incorporation of these other 
statements and letters in the record, that might well conclude the 
hearing. These are the witnesses I refer to : 

Second Lieut. W. F. Manning. You will find him in the House of 
Eepresentatives of the Missouri Legislature at Jefferson City, Mo. 
He was formerly of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry. 
I b&lieve he is a member of the Hou.se of Representatives of the 
Missouri Legislature. 

Col. Ristine, of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry; 
Mai. Comfort, of the One hundred and thiity-seventh Infantry; 
Lieut. Col. Bennett Clark, son of Speaker Clark: First Lieut. Gar- 
diner; Lieut. Col. Rieger. 

Mr. SxVELL. Was Lieut. Col. Bennett Clark in this division in the 
fight? 

Gov. Allen. Not in the fight. He was with the division up to 
about the time of the fight, and then was sent to another division. 
But he knows about the fight. I would also like to submit the name 
of Lieut. Col. Frank M. Rumboldt. You will find him in Washing- 
ton at the Militia Bureau in the AVar Department. Then I would 
also like to submit the name of Chaplain Edwards, of the One hun- 



48 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

dred and fortieth Infantry, who can be found at Lawrence, Kans; 
Maj. Jones, of the One hundred and tenth Sanitary Train, who. if 
he is back, will be at Olathe. Kans. ; Capt'. Barr, of the One hundred 
and thirty-seventh Supply Train, who, if he is back, can be found at 
Wichita, Kans. : Col. Rowan, who was the provost marshal of the 
division; Maj. Going, who was at the head of the military police of 
the division. There were officers in charge of the various activities 
who must necessarily have been acquainted with all these matters I 
am talking to you about. 

I would like to give you also the name of a very important witness, 
Lieut. Col. Charles McCoy, whom you can find in New York. He 
was in command of one of the evacuation hospitals at Finery. He 
would be a very important witness, and I think he is back in the 
country to-day. 

Mr. Garrett. May I ask, if you do not mind especially, as to the 
matter of policy in regard to the question of this investigation ? Do 
you think it would be wise to have a congressional committee go 
abroad to investigate? 

Gov. Allen. I do not think it would be necessar^^, since so many 
of the officers are coming home, and also so many of the men. I think 
you can get to-day a preponderance of evidence which would prove 
the case beyond a doubt from officers and men who are in this country 
now. 

Mr. Garrett. I assume, however, that in order to make a complete 
investigation any committee that might be appointed would necessa- 
rily have to have before it these high officers, such as Gen. Pershing, 
Gen. Liggett, and Gen. Traub? 

Gov. Allen. Gen. Traub is now in this country. 

Mr. Garrett. Those officers constitute the responsible high officers 
according to the statement of Gen. March? 

Gov. Allen. Yes. 

Mr. Garrett. And I should assume that a complete investigation 
would require their presence before such a committee? 

Gov. Allen. I should think if you determined to make an inves- 
tigation from the material in this country, at least there should be 
presented to those officers over there the testimony so that their 
statements might be added to the evidence you have. 

Mr. Rodenbeeg. In your opening statement you said you had some 
statistics bearing on the actual casualties? 

Gov. Allen. I gave that in Capt. Hoffman's report, in which he 
stated that there passed through his triage over 6,000. In addi- 
tion to these you must remember the War Department has admitted 
1,733 as dead and missing. 

Mr. RoDENBERG. Geu. March said the killed and lost were only 879 
up to November 1 ? 

Gov. Allen. These 17,333 were admitted in a subsequent state- 
ment, a very pettifogging document was issued from the War De- 
partment, a statement which, at first glance, would appear to be a 
report of casualities, stating that the casualities were 56.000, and 
some people immediately took that report to mean, as, no doubt, the 
War Department intended, the total number of casualities. As a mat- 
ter of fact, it referred to the major casualities, to those who were 
dead and missing. The papers in my neighborhood took it to mean 



LOSSES OF THIKTY-FIFTH DIVISION DUKING AKGONNE BATTLE. 49 

that and said the casualities are not so bad, " only 56,000 dead and 
missing." As a matter of fact, that statement had relation to the 
dead and missing. Then, in addition to the 1,733 admitted to the 
dead and missing by the Secretary's statement, there must be added 
the statistics given by the man who had charge of the triage, who 
says he triaged 5,000, and he believed that in addition to these sev-, 
eral hundred went through other triages or were evacuated directly 
from the field to the evacuation hospital. 

Mr. RoDEXBERG. There is certainly a remarkable discrepancy be- 
tween those figures. 

The Chairman. Before you conclude your statement. Governor, 
I would like to inquire where the representatives of the Red Cross 
were during all this period of slaughter? 

Gov, Allex. The Red Cross service was given mainly, as it was 
intended it should be given, in the base hospitals, and in the evacu- 
ation hospitals. Their personnel was reduced to about four men to 
a division, outside of the hospital service. They were doing the very 
best they could, but it was not the intent of the Army that the Red 
Cross should provide any very great ser\ ice in the field, but that that 
service should be given very largely to the established hospitals. 

Mr. Harrison. You were in the Red Cross at this time? 

Gov. Allen. In the Y. M. C. A. 

Mr. Harrison. How long had you been in the Y. M. C. A. ? 

Gov. Allen. I was in the Y. M. C. A. from the 1st of July until I 
left France. 

Mr. Harrison. How long were you in the Red Cross? 

Gov. Allen. I was there over the greater pai't of six months in 
1917, and then came home to accompany Mr. Davidson, the chairman 
of the War Council, on a speaking engagement, and went back in 
JanuarA', and was with the Red Cross from January until the 1st of 
July. 

Mr. Harrison. Mav I ask why did you change from the Red Cross 
to the Y. M. C. A. ? ■ 

Gov. Allen. I changed because the Thirty-fifth Division, having 
arrived in France, had no Y. M. C. A. organization with it. It was 
going into the Vosges Mountains, where it was to become a combat 
division, and the Y. M. C. A. asked if I would organize that division. 
I wanted to be with the boys from home, and I had completed the 
organization of the Home Communication Service of the Red Cross, 
and that had become very largely an oiRce job, and I wanted to go to 
the field. 

Mr. Harrison. Do you know where Gen. McClure is now? 

Gov. Allen. I do not know. 
• Mr. Harrison. Is he in this country? 

Gov. Allen. I do not think he is. 

Mr. Harrison. Gen. McClure and Gen. Martin were turned out just 
before this battle? 

Gov. Allen. Just before this battle. 

Mr. Harrison. Gen. Martin is here now ? 

Gov. Allen. Yes. 

Mr. Harrison. I think we ought to hear Gen. Martin, if he is going 
to be here to-morrow. 

Mr. Campbell. Gen. Martin is at the service of the committee. 



50 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION UURIN^G AKGONNE BATTLE. 

The Chair:man. I am sure Ave Avill be glad to hear anything Gen. 
Martin may care to say, to-morrow morning. 

Gov. Allen. In accordance with the suggestion of the committee, 
I will insert in the record the remainder of the letters and statements 
I have in regard to this matter. 

(The matter referred to is as follows:) 

CHRONOLOGICAL STATEMEiNT OF EVENTS, ONE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH INFANTRY, 
FROM SEPTEMBER 2G TO OCTOBER 2, 191S. 

^eptewher 26, J918.— The 140th Infiintry. Licnitenaiit-Colonel ('. E. Dolaplane, 
commandin.s, " lumped off" from along Nenvilly-Aubreville Road. 06.2-64.8, 
Vauquois 1/10000, at 5.45 a. m. 

The regiment was deployed in column of battalions in order first, second, and 
third battalions. The battalions were in platoon columns, staggered. The 
Stokes mortars and one-pounders followed the third battalion. The regi- 
mental headqu;irters' command group wont with the second battalion. The 
route was about geographical north to right of Hill 263. through valley to 
Vauquois Hill, crossing at 05.5-70.7, Vauquois 1/10. 

In the fog and smoke screen encounlored within ;>0 minutes of leaving some 
confusion was caused by loss of contact between organizations. With a little 
delay as possible contact was reestablished, and with the exception of a few 
platoons the organizations wei'e in proper place after passing Vauquois Hill. 

At noon the regiment halted. Commanding officer of 1st battalion of 138th 
Infantry, directly in our front, sent message he was held up by machine-gim 
nest in woods south of Cheppy at 05.9-72.5. Vauquois 1/10000. After a recon- 
noissance the 2d and 3d battalions were deployed to attack this strong point 
when it was evacuated. 

At about 1 p. m. liaison was established for the first time with .364th Infantry 
(91st Division) on our right. 

At 05.9-71.7, Vauquois l/lOOOO, direction was changed from north to north- 
west, passing to the north of Varennes Avocourt Road, through La Forge Min, 
crossing trench " du Scorpion " to west of Cheppy and crossing Cheppy- 
Varenues to road at 04..5-73.5, Verdun A, 1/20, where a halt \\as made because 
of the 69th Brigade being stopped. 

Late in the afternoon 1st and 2d battalions crossed Buanthe Ran at 04.8- 

74.3. At 6.30 p. m. the regiment stopped with our 1st battalion deployed behind 
the 138th Infantry, with left resting at 04.3-75.3 and right resting on Char- 
pentry-Very Road at 05.3-75.7, Verdun A, 1/20000. The 2d battalion left resting 
on 04.7-74.7 and right at 05.3-75.2, Verdun A, 1/20000. The 3d battalion acting 
as divisional reserve remained on slope west of stream, with reserve and 
regimental headquarters at Vieux Moulin. 

September 27, 1918. — At about 5.05 a. m. orders were received to advance at 
5.30 a. m. after a five-minuLe barrage on machine-gun nests. The artilleiy 
failed to give barrage at appointed time and the 1st and 2d battalions could 
make but short gains. The most of tlie day was spent under a very heavy 
artillery and machine-gun fire. About the middle of the afternoon nine tanks 
reported along the Very-Charpentry Road and were disposed of along our 
front for an attack on the machine-gun nests and Boche artillery. The 
attack was launched at 5.30 p. m. The enemy machine guns were abandoned 
and the artillery captured. 

Contact with the 1st battalion was lost and not regained until next morning. 
It advanced beyond Chapentry and dug in for the night. Tlie 2nd Battalion 
stopped for night with left at 03.4-77.2, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20. right at 04.2- 

77.4. Verdun A 1/20: Third Battnlioi' left at (l3.^>-76.9. right at 04.9-77.5. 
Verdun A 1/20. 

fscptonhcr 28., 1!)I8. — .-\t aliout 3 3(t a. ni. orders were received from in-igade 
ad.iiitant to push forward with nil speed and protect the right Ihink of tlie 
troops on our left. We advanced at 5.30 a. m. in order, 2nd Battalion, with 
M. a. Co. from 130th jNI. G. Bn. 3rd liattalion. with. il. F. Co. from 180th 
M. G. Bn. Hq. Command Group with 3d Battalion. 

At about 8 a. m. the movement was stopped on a line northwest from Baulny 
by machine-gun fire from Montrebeau Wood and artillery fire from the direr-tiorj 
of Apremont, Exermont, and Les Fontaine. 



LOSSES or THIRrY-FFFTH DIVISION DURING AEGONNE BATTLE. 51 

A patrt)! of Aniericau Cavalvy reported rcuiiiuMital P. ('. (()2.9-TS.7, Forel 
('.•Arwniie. V20) at al)out S.20 a. in. 

rnalilo to advaiu'o further because of artillery tire. A eaptain of tanks 
rejiorted at HMO a. ni., statinir he was startin.u' into action with 20 tanks, but 
did not kn()W how many would arrive He was oi-dered to divide tlie tanks 
between the 2nd and 3rd Hattalions, which were ordered t(» follow the tanks 
at about !.")(» meters, with lOxerniont as the ol).jective. Attack was launched at 
9.4.") a. m. under terrific artillerj- and machine-iiun tire. The ndvance was made 
over rollinji" terrain and casualties were heavy. Our lines advanced to crest of 
hill east of Montrebeau Wood at a point 02.1-79.5 (l<\)ret d'Argonne, 1/20), 
exten(lin,u- in semicircle to 02.9-79.(5 (Foret d'Argonne 1/20). The 1st and 3rd 
I'.atialioii intrenched along this line; 2nd Battalion held m reserve ba<'k of 
center of line. , 

Scptciiiber 29, 1918. — Orders from brigiide were r(>ceived at 5.25 a. m. to 
attack at 5.30 a. m. The order stated that the 13Slli Infantry, which was in 
snp[»ort, would pass through us and continue tlie attack on Exermont, the 140th 
forming the support. Orders were i.ssued to form in colunms of battalions — 
3(1, 2nd, and 1st with staggered columns — scouts and coimecting tiles to be in 
front of leading columns of 3d Battalion. While this formation was being 
taken up peremptory orders \\ere received from ("olonel Nutman and Colonel 
Hawkins to advance. The brigade commander, Colonel Walker was approached 
by tlie conunanding othcer of the 140th Infantry at this time and informed that 
the loSth was then moving up and asked if if it was the intention for tlie 
140tli to go ahead or allow the 13Stli to comply with the original order. Reply 
was to go ahead, and the orders were issued to complete the formation and 
advance at once. Before the formation and deployment of the 3d Battalion 
was completed either Colonel Nutman or Colonel Hawkins ordered the battalion 
commander to advance without delay, which he did. in column. The advance 
was under htavy artillery tire from three directions and machine-gmi tire from 
all ravines and woods. The 1st Battalion was immediately deployed in rear 
and instructed to bear to the west. In this forniiition we proceeded on Exer- 
mont, where parts of the 2nil and 3rd B.attalions were consolidated in the line; 
road on the south edge of road runiung through the northern extremity of 
Exermont. This consolidation was accomijlished at 9.30 a. m., troops were seen 
to the west of Exei-niont but owing to the severity of the action no contact 
was made. 

iNlajor Kieger, of the 139tli. with a few men arrived about 10 o'clock and ex- 
tended the Exermont line slightly to the east. This position was maintained 
under heavy fire until 1 p. m., when an order was received from the Brigade 
Commander to retire. This retirement took place immediately, with instruc- 
tions to hold on the ridge in rear. As tlie forward detached returned it was 
observed that men wei-e drifting to the rear from the Montrebeau Woods, and 
vicinity. This prevented the forward detachment holding on the ridge im- 
mediately to the south of Exermont, and they continued the retirement until 
the outpost position of the morning was reached. Information was then re- 
ceived that the Engineers had intrenched the position running northeast from 
Baulny to the I^es Fontaine-Apremont road to the south and east of Chaudron 
farm, to which line they were ordered to retire. This retirement was far from 
satisfactory, and the commanding otiicer, 14()th Infantry, ordered Capt. Tru- 
man, with a headquarters organization, to hold men at any cost on the position 
that the Engineers were then constructing. This he succeeded in doing, in 
some cases at the point of a gun. Upon arrival of the commanding officer of 
the 140th it was found that these lines were organized in a position to hold, 
though the trenches were manned by men from all organizations of the divi- 
sion. Carrying parties had been organized by Capt. Truman, and ammunition 
was being carried up and supplied to the men in both front and rear reserve 
trenches. At this time there were very few ofiicers and noncommissioned officers 
present. Among those present were : First Lieutenant John Pleasant, Lieu- 
tenant Keefner, Lieutenant George Smith, Lieutenant Han, Captain Ralph 
Campbell. 

The above officers were the ones that were put in charge and maintained 
this line. This line was then reinforced by others who had retreated further 
to the south. A portion of the 138th Infantry connected to this position on 
the right and some on the left intermingled with a portion of the 137th In- 
fantry, commanded by Ma.ior O'Connor and Major Kalloch. This position was 
strengthened by collecting stragglers from the rear who were sent forward to 
the line. 

101727— 19— PT 2- 



52 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

MESSAGES WRITTEN BY CAPT. E. TRUMAN, K. I. O., ONE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH 
INFANTRY, DURING THE ARGON NE DKIVE. FROM SEPTEMBER 2 5 TO OCTOBER 1. 191S. 

From RIO, 140. 

At— 

Date, Sept. 26, 1918. Hour, 5.30 a. m. No. 1. How sent— By ruimer. 

To Ad.i. TOtli Brig. 

Regt. started into action on time, 5.30 a. m. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO, 140 Inf. 
At 05.7-71.4, Vauquois, 1/10000. 

Date Sept. 26tli. Hour 6 a. m. No. 2. How sent — By runner. 
To Brig. Adj. 70tli Brig. 
At Marae leu Blanc, Hill 267. 

Regt. moving forward from tlie aliove point. No casualties reported. No 
opposition met with up to ttiis liour. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO, 140th Inf. 
At 05.7-71.4, Vauquois, 1/10000. 

Date Sept. 26/18. Hour 10 a. m. No. 3. How sent — By runner. 
To Div. Intelligence Officer, 25tli Div. 

Regt. moving forward from the ahove point. No casualities reported up to 
this hour. We have met witli no oppostion so far. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO, 140th Inf. 

At 05.9-71.7, Vauquois 1/10000. 

Date Sept. 2Gtli. Hour 1.10 p. m. No. 4. How sent — By runner. 

To Brigade Adj. 70th Brig. 

We are close behind 69th Brig. Strong machine gTin N.E. of this point. 
Evacuated when we deployed to attaclf. Slove north continued. No casualties 
reported. M. G. position was at 0%.9-71.S. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO, i40th Inf. 

At 05.9-71.7 Vauquois 1/10000. 

Date Sept. 26. Hour 1.10 p. m. No. 5. How sent — By runner. 

To Division Intelligence Officer, 35th Div. 

Have gained contact with 09th Brigade, are following closely. No casualties 
reported to this liour in 140th Inf. Moving in N.W. direction from this point. 
30 boclie surrendered to Lt. Otto Hine, 139th Inf. Lt. Hine reported to C O. 
]40th Inf., having lost his way. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO, 140. 

At 04.8-75.1 Verdun A, 1/20000. 

Date Sept. 26. Hour 6.30 p. m. No. 6. How sent — By runner. 

To Adj. 70th Brig. 

Regimental P. C. temporarily established at the above point. 138 Inf, not to 
exceed 30 meters in advance of this Ret5. Wliere will your next P. G. be es- 
tablished. No casualties up to this liour. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO, 140th. 

At 04.8-75.1, Verdun A, 1/20000. 

Date, Sept. 26. Hour G.30 p. m. No. 7. How sent — By runner. 

To G-2, 35th Div. 

Regt. advancing in good order, keeping close contact with 138th Inf. No 
casualties reported up to this liour in this regt. Temporary P. C. of regt. es- 
tablished at the above point. Truman, RIO. \ 

From RIO, 140th Inf. 

At 04.8-75.1, Verdun A, 1/20000. 

Date, Sept. 27. Hour 7 a. m. No. 8. How sent — By runner. 

To Brig. Adj. 70th Brig. 

140tli Inf. Began the advance at time set. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO, 140th Inf. 
At 04.8-75.1, Verdun A. 1/20000. 

Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 7 a. m. How sent — Bv runner No. 9. 
To G-2, 35th Division. 

140th Inf. began the advance to-day at 6.30 a. m., passing through the 138th, 
now in support. No casualties on the 26th in the 140tli Inf. Truman, RIO. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 53 

From KU), UOtli. 

At 200 yards north of 1'. (i. of the 2(1111. 

Date. Sept. 27. Hour. 9.30 a. in. No. 10. How sent — P>.v runner. 

To Brig. Adj. 70th Brig. 

Both 140th and 139th Inf. held up by enemy M. G. fire. Troops can not ad- 
vance without artillery support. Tank commander has been notified. A few 
casualties in the l-40th Inf. M. G. fir(\ Truman, RIO. 

From RIO. 140th Inf. 

At point as given in last message. 

Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 10.30 a. m. No. 11. How sent — By I'unner. 

To Brigade Adj. 70th Brigade. 

Our line is still held up by M. G. fire. Three casualties in 1st Battalion. 
Degree of wounds, slight. M. G.'s positively located on 03.8-76.6. One at 
04.6-^76.7. Very map. Enemy slielling hill north (jf regt. P. C possibly 50 HE 
in the last 45 minutes. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO. ]40th Inf. 

At 04.8-75.1, Verdun A. 1/20(X)0. 

Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 10.50 a. m. No. 12. How sent — By runner. 

To G-2, 35th Division. 

Our advance lines held up by M. G. fire from the direction of 03.8-76.6, one 
at 04.6-76.6. Very map. The location given is correctly reported so my I. O. 
of the 1st Battalion reports. Enemy shelling hill north of regt. P. C. — about 
50 HE 105's in last 45 minutes. No casualties from shelling. Three casualties 
from M. G. fire in the 1st Bn. 140th Inf. Will advance as soon as M. G. nests 
are cleaned out. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO, 140th Inf. 

At 04.8-75.1, A'erdun A. 1/20000. 

Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 12.20 p. m. No. 13. How sent — By runner. 

To Adj. 70th Brig. 

Am sending to you, for your information, maps and tracings that will be of 
value to you. After they have answered your purpose, foi'ward to G-2, 
35th. Heavy shelling of our troops all along our flanks. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO 140tli Inf. 

At 04.8-75.1, Verdun A, 1/20000. 

Date, Sept. 27. Hour 1.10 p. m. No. 14. How sent — By rnuiier. 

To Adj. 70th Brig. 

Am sending sketcli of a point in front of our line. Three men killed by shell 
fire. P^nemy still shelling our troops heavily and are not able to advance. 
Truman, RIO. 

From RIO 140th Inf. 
. At 04.8-75.1. Verdun A, 1/20000. 

Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 1.10 p. m. No. 15. How sent — By runner. 

To G-2, 35th Div. 

The attack began at 6 p. m. Our regiment passed through the 138th Infantry 
and is now occupying a line running east and west, and south of Charpentry, 
about 1,000 yards. Column halted by heavy machine-gun fire from woods near 
Charpentry, and heavy artillery fire from the north of Charpentry. The right 
of our line is resting near the Charpentry- Very road. Tanks have been asked 
for to clear out machine-gun nests. Advance will start as soon as they arrive. 
Truman, RIO. 

From RIO 140th Inf. 

At 04.8-76.1. Verdun A. 1/20000. 

Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 5 p. m. No. 16. How sent — By runner. 

To G-2, 35th Div. 

Boche are moving out of Charpentry in large bodies of what looks to be 75 
or 80 men in each group. Also moving along road at point near 04.2-77-2, 
Verdun A, 1/20000. Men moving along road can be seen to be carrying ma- 
chine guns. Our lines have advanced slightly. See map of our line at 3 p. m. 
Truman, RIO. 

From RIO 140th Infantry. 

At 04..5-76.1, Verdun A. 1/20000. 

Date, Sept. 27. Hour, 5.50 p. m. No. 17. How sent — By runner. 

To Adj. 70th Brig. 



54 LOSSES OF THIBTY-FIFTH DIYISION DURING AEGONITB BATTLE. 

Letters taken from wounded Boche. 2n(i Bn. 140 has advanced one kilo- 
meter, witli assistance of French tanks. Entire regiment now advancing 
under barrage. Forward pajiers t(> G-2, 8r)11i Division. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO 140. 

At 02.9-78.7, Foret d'Argonne. 1/20000. 

Date, S(>)it. 28. Hour 7.30 a. ni. No. 18. How sent — By runner. 

To Ad.i. 70 Brig. 

Our lines held up by M. G. fire. 100 casualties in regiment during past 24 
hours. Our front lines are about 200 meters in advance of above point. Strong 
M. G. fire from our front. Also some artillery 'fire but not doing any damage. 
Enemy planes active. Advance started at 5 a. m. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO 140th. 

At 02.9-78.7, Foret d'Ai-gonn.>. r''20()00. 

Date. Sept. 28. Hour, 8.20 a. m. No. 19. How sent — By runner. 

To G-2, 35th Div. ' 

Our troops started the advance at 5 a. m. Have met with strong M. G. tire, 
which is holding up the lines. Line about 200 meters in advance of this point. 
Tanks have arrived and are ready to go into action; 100 casualties in regiment 
during the past 24 hours. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO 140 Inf. 

At 02.3-78.9, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20000. 

Date, Se)»t. 28. Hour. 2.30 p. m. No. 20. How sent — By runner. 

To Adj. 70th Brig. 

Regiment halted by ten-ific artillery shelling and concentrated machine-gun 
fire. See drawing showing approximately our front line. There may be a 
little change made during the night. We are flanked by ai'tillery fire on every 
side but our rear. Our own artillery has given no support during the attack. 
Enemy planes very active during the day. One squadron of enemy iilant-s over 
otir position at 1 p. m. They trained their IM. G.'s on the men. <-ausing some 
losses ; 15 planes in the party. Also, one enemy plane flew low over oui- troops 
all during the forenoon directing the fire of artillery. We have suffered heavy 
losses in killed and wounded. Men are now at dressing stations that were 
wounded yesterday. Numbers of men who are wounded have had no attention 
and are still laying on tlie ground where they fell. We are short of aunnuni- 
tion, which is very badly needed in case of a counterattack by the enemy. The 
adjutant of the regiment has been gassed and the C. O. has not been seen 
since the attack started. Runners unable to find any trace of him. Truman, 
RIO. 

From RIO 140 Inf. 

At 02..3-7S.9, Foi-et d'Argonne. 1/20000. 

Date, Seiit. 28. Hour, 3 p. m. No. 21. How sent — Bv runuer. 

To G-2, 35th Div. 

Regiment halted by terrific artillery shelling and concentrated M. G. fire. 
See drawing for^^•arded by 70th Brig. We are flanked by artillery fire from every 
side but our rear. Our own artillery gave no support during the attack. Enemy 
planes over our lines during attack, flying low, directing artillery fire on our 
troops. At 1 p. m. 15 enemy planes flew over our lines, firing on our tri>ops 
with their M. G.'s, causing losses. We have suffered heavy losses in killed 
and wounded. Men are now in dressing stations that were wounded yesterday. 
Numbers of wounded men have not been carried off the field. We are short 
of ammunition, which is very badly needed in case of a coimterattack by the 
enemy. The adjutant has been gassed and the C. O. has not l)een seen since 
the attack started. Runners unable to find any trace of him. Truman, RIO. 

From Rio 140 Inf. 

At kilometer north of 02.3-78.9, Foret d'Argonne, 1/20000. 

Date, Sept. 29. Hour. 12.30 p. m. No. 22. How sent— Bv runner. 

To Adj. 70th Brig. 

Our troops started the advance on time set. They had not the proper time 
to reorganize, with the result that the organizations were split up and confused. 
Our artillery fell short in many cases, causing losses to our troops. Enemy 
artillery very active, as well as M. G. Numerous losses in the regiment in 
Jvilled and wounded. Our troops now occupy Exermont. Truman, RI(^. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 55 

Fn.in TUO 140 Inf. 
•. At 1 kilometer nurtli of 02.3-78-9. Foret d'ArfiOune. ]/2(M)00. 

Pate. Sei)t. 2!). Hour, 12.80 p. in. Nt). 28. How sent — I>.v runnel-. 

To Ct-2, Sntli Division. 

Our troo])s now occujw lOxerniont. It w;is laken under a fierce artillery and 
n\. ir. fire. Our losses wei-e heavy in killed and woinided. Our artillery pive 
little su]ii)ort and on several occasions fired short as nuicli as 1 kilometer, eaus- 
iufj; losses to our troops. Weather very bed. IMuddy liround. Truman, IlIO. 

From RIO 14()th Inf. 

At trenches shown in ^' <'tih submitted. 

Date, Sept. 2!). Ilnui-, 4.:'.o p. m. .Xo. 24. How sent — r>.\ runner. 

To 0-2. ynth Div. 

Our troops started to fall hack in accordtince with orders received from the 
la-ijjade conunander to retire hack to th(> position, gradually, that was held last 
rdijit. Instead of doing as oi'dered — the oftlcers and nco's ordered — they started 
t(i break and run, it almost turning into a stampede. Men of all i-egiments. 
offii-ers and nco's, were headed to tlie rear. It being a critical moment, I gath- 
ered a few of my nco's and observers al)out me and stoi)ped al)out 300 at the 
point of the gun. We are oi'ganized now in a line of trenches as shown by draw- 
ing. Everything is quiet at present, with the exception of heavy shelling and 
machine-gun fire during tlie day. Full rei)oi-t will be made as soon as time can 
be found to do so. Truman. 

From RIO 140th Inf. 

■At 02.8-77.8, Foret d'Argonne. l/20(K)(i. 

Date, 9/30/18. Hour 9.1.") a. m. No. 2.'.. How sent— By nmner. 

To Adj. 70th Brig. 

The enemy is connng over in skirmish foi-mation. Have reached hedge this 
side of Montrebeau Woods. Unable to ascertain exact number. Our artillery 
and m. g. have opened fire. Our artiller.v falling short on our front and support 
line trenches. Barrage should be raised from 3 to 500 yard.s. RIO 140th Inf. 

From RIO 140. 

At 02.8-77.8, Foret d'Argonne, 1/200<X">. 

Date, Sept. 30. Hour, 9.15 a. m. No. 26. How sent — I5y runner. 

To G-2, 35th Div. 

F^nemy forming for an attack. Is coming over in wave formation. Have 
reached hedge this side of the Montrebeau Woods. I'nable to determine 
strength of enemy at this time. Our artillery and m. g. liave opened fire. Tru- 
man, RIO. 

From RIO 140th Inf. 

At 02.9-77.9, Foret d'Argonne. 1/20000. 

Date, Sept. 30/18. Hour, 4.30 p. m. No. 27. How sent— By runner. 

To Brigade Ad.i. 70 Brig. 

Enemy has been quiet during tlie day since 9 :15 a. m., except heavy artillery 
fire at intervaks during the day. Our troops are digging in and strengthening 
the line in every way possible, and we feel that we are able to hold the line in 
event the enemy should attack. Rations have been issued to the men in the 
lines and a good suppl.v of annaunition carried up. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO, 140 Inf. 

At 02.9-77.9. Foret d'Argomie. 1/20000. 

Date, Sei)t. 30/18. Hour, 4.30 p. m. No. 28. How sent — By runner. 

To G-2, 35th Division. 

Enemy did not attack. Evidently driven away by our Artillery and M. G. 
fire. Our troops are digging in as well as strengthening the line in every way 
possible, to hold it against an attack. W^e feel that the line can now be held 
in case he should attack. Rations have been issued to all troops. Also a plenti- 
ful supply of amnumition. A great deal of discomfort from the wet cold 
weather. Truman, RIO. 

From RIO, 140th Inf. 
At 06.2-72.9, Verdun A, 1/20000. 

.Date, Oct. 1. Hour, 1.45 p. m. No. 29. How sent — By runner. 
To G-2, 35th Div, 

The 140th Inf. was relieved in the line at 3 a. m. Regt. proceeded to march 
to camp at above map reference. An unusually heavy shelling took place while 



56 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DiyiSIGN DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

the relief was being made. Also about 1,000 gas shells were put over on our 
Regt. lines. This was followed by a barrage which lastetl until our Regt. was 
out of the area. The probably cause of the gas shelling and unusual barrage 
at the hour it happened was on account of the incoming troops making such a 
great amount of noise. Am sending to you a map and photos taken from a 
German captain killed by one of the battalion intelligence patrols. Tru- 
man, RIO. 

From C. O., 140th Inf. 

At 06.2-72.9, Verdun Am 1/20000. 

Date, Oct. 1, 1918. Hour, 4 p. m. No. 30. How sent — By runner. 

To Adj., 70th Brig. 

Location of regt. P. C. 06.2-72.9. Verdun A, 1/20. Truman, RIO. 

( Signed ) Deleplane. 



INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, ONE HUNDRED AND FORTIETH INFANTRY, FROM NOON SEP- 
TEMBER 29 TO SEPTEMBER 30, 1918. 

1. General impressions of the day. — Enemy activity growing much stronger. 
Violent artillery action by enmy. Also machine-gun activity to a great degree. 

2. Enemy front line. — Enemy line extends at present from 01.2-79.0 to 01.4- 
79-9 and east to 02.8-79-4. 

3. Enemy order of battle. — No additional identification. 

4. Enemy activity. — Infantry : Very active. Machine gun : Very active. 
Trench mortar : Nil. 

5. Enemy movement. — Visibility : Poor. 

6. Enemy aeronautics. — Enemy planes very atcive, continually flying over 
our lines with machine guns and directing artillery fire on our front lines. 

7. Miscellaneous. — During the entire day our troops were continually pelted 
with fire of our own Artillery as well as the fire of the enemy. The fire of 
our own guns was much more destructive to our troops than the fire of the 
Boche. That condition still exists to-day. Our Artillery laid down a heavy 
barrage on our front and rear lines at about 9. 1.5 a. m. to-day. Repeated 
messengers and runners have been sent tf> notify the Artillery that their range 
was short. I myself going to see the major in command of one battalion of 
Artillery of the 129th F. A. and asked him to see that the word was passed to 
the other commanders. I also showed him where our lines are now located. 
Our airplanes have been of little use to us in combating enemy planes. So far- 
as the good they have done in that respect we had just as well not had them. 
In the subje(-'t of reports will state that I have done the best that I possibly 
could under the circumstances. 

8. Our ou'u actitity. — The advance on Exermont was be.gun at 5.30 a. m.. 
Sept. 20th. with iwo battalions of the 140th Inf. in the line and one battalion in 
support. Tlie town of I'^xermont was taken at 9.15 a. m., and our troops passefl 
through the [own .about 300 yards beyond. They were compelled to retire on 
order from brigade connnander. which stated that tl\e 7(Hh Brigade should 
withdraw gradually to the line held the night previous. Tlie men, on the order 
to withdraw, l)egan to retire gradually, passed the placed designated, started 
on their way to (Miari»entr:!y. the orgnnizatinns being mixed, most of the offi- 
cers gone, and few noncommissioned officers left. Things began to look seriouS: 
and had it not been for the )ironij)t action and force used by the few officers 
who could iie gathered togetliei' and stop the rusli. it is liard to tell what 
would have liapjiened, as a fnll-fiedged stampede would have been on in a very 
few minutes tliat could not have been stopped. As soon as they caught up with 
the men in front of the rush and stopjied them we organized them in a line of 
trenches as sliown in sketch submitted to you last niglit. We now have the 
situation well in hand and can withstand most any kind of an attac-lv the enemy 
might put over, provided we can get the Artillery to put the barrage on the 
boche and not on oiu- own lines. I have sent five different messages to the 
Artillery this morning to lengthen their range, it being five separate occasions 
on which they have shelled our men. It is doing more to decrease the morale 
of our troops than if they knew the entire German Army was attacking them. 
The situation is simply this : There is not a telephone in any organization I 
know of. There are no signal rockets left, no fiares to shoot in the Very pistols. 
What signal lights were in the organization are either kKSt or broken, and have 
practically no way of communicating with anyone except by runner. Our 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 57 

losses lidve been extronioly heavy. 6iu- roEriment. the 140th Inf., on going into 
action on the 29th liad not to exceed 1,000 men. The other regiments of the 
division are in about the same shape as ours. We lost yesterday in officers 
killed and wounded: IMaj. Murray Davis, Capt. Kennedy, and Lieut. Compton, 
l)n. intelligence officer for the 1st Battalion, killed; wounded, Capt. Redmond, 
Lt. (Jardner, Lt. Wise, Lt. Spicer, Lt. Thorpe, Lt. Keefner. Nature of wounds 
not Ivuown. 

H. E. Tkuman, 
Caidain l.'iOth Inf., ficgimeutal Intelligence Officer. 



lExtract from letter of Mrs. F. M. Barns, of Burlington, Iowa, to Gov. Henry J. Allen, 

Jan. 18, 1919.] 

I have a boy who was a private in Company C, One hundred and thirty-ninth 
Infantry, in the Thirty-fiflh Division, and fought in that Argonne Forest four 
<lays and then was gassed and wounded and was in base hospital 9 for six 
weeks and now is at Bourges in the personnel department of the general records 
office. He told of the fighting without Artillery support and of his division be- 
ing cut to pieces there. * * * 



I Extract from letter of Cleo C. Hobbs, Battery E, One hundred and thirtieth Field Artil- 
lery, dated France, Dec. 26, published in the Trenton (Mo.) Republican.] 

We left the St. Mihiel front with just as small an amount of equipment as 
possible, for we had lost many horses in action and on account of the bitter 
exposure, hard \^ork, and poor food. So every man that was able carried all 
personal equipment on his back and hiked all the way. From 20 to 30 miles 
per night looks impossible, but we did it. * * * Well, we had 22 days of 
this kind of life before we went into action, without rest, on the Ar- 
gonne. * * * 

I was sure glad tliat I could back up Company D in this way, for I knevr 
they were fighting bravely without proper Artillery support, because it could 
not get into action on account of tlie mines, wire, and torn-up bridges. * * * 
We knew our Infantry were having a hard time of it. If we could only have 
gotten ammimition and blown up the Hun machine-gun nests, but we could not. 

* * * Soon a l)unch of Hun planes came over and bombed us and turned 
machine guns loose on us. * * * We slept at our peace that night, and still 
we had nothing to eat, but we made a cup of coffee apiece, and it made us feel 
better anyhow. We fired all day and night this time. 

* * * The next day "we got some rations of corned beef and hard-tack, 
and we ate a hearty meal, for we were almost starved. * * * 

That night they gassed us and aeroplanes bombed us. They knocked off 
several of the l)oys. We tired at them with rifles and machine .giuis ; so did 
they, and got some of gun crew. * * * That night we fired for about three 
hours of heavy fire, then jerked our gims and beat it. We didn't know where 
we were going. * * * W'e were sorry, for we still wanted to get at the Huns. 

Our clothes were torn and our socks worn in holes, so that they blistered our 
feet, and after such a drive we could hardly tote our packs. We traveled for 
several days and nights and finally stopped at a little town for four days' rest, 
and were called to the front. Again we traveled for days and nights. * * * 



(Statement of Thirty-flfth Division soldier, contained in letter of Osborne (Kans.) soldier 
"appearing in The Osborne Farmer, Feb. 6, 1919.] 

I have talked to a couple of wounded men here who were in the Thirty-fifth 
Division^ — not Kansas or Missouri men, but men who were in a replacement 
unit and put in the Thirty-fifth after the Thirty -fifth heavy casualty — ^and they 
say it was exactlv as Allen said and a damn sight worse. * * * 



[Extract from letter of Mr. Orlando Preston, Denver, Colo., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, 

Jan. 21, 1919.] 

My sou, First Lieut. Percy R. Preston, was attached to Company A, One hun- 
<lred and thirty-eighth Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division. * * * 



58 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

On the 26tli of September he. with many of the men of the Thirty-fifth 
Division, made tlie supreme sacritice in the Argonne Forest. Wliilst he was not 
a young man to complain, nevertlieless, by reading between tlie lines of liis 
correspondence, I drew my own conclusions as to the treatment of this division, 
who saw, I believe, more active fighting on the western front than any other 
unit. A few days ago a private, now located at the recuperation camp near 
Denver, (!roi)ped in to see me. He happened to be in the same platoon that 
my son led over the top on the 26th of September. He had nothing but praise 
for the Thirty-fifth Division, but bitterly complained that they were badly 
supported on account of the lack of Artillery, which was the cause of a large 
list of unnecessary casualties. He further complained bitterly to me of the 
way the boys were fed on the fighting line, and stated that it was a very 
difficult matter for men to go into action on empty stomachs. It seems to me 
that four or five months on the active firing line, with ver.v little food or rest, 
was rather rubbing it into the Thirt.v-fifth Division. * * * 

Naturally it brings to me a very bitter feeling for the loss of my son, who 
might have been spared to me, with many others, had they been supported by 
the Artillery. 



[Extract from letter of Mr. J. W. Thomas, Olathe, Kans., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Feb. 

1, 1919.] 

I am in full accord with you as to your statements about the things not done 
for the Thirty-fifth Division. I have met a good many of those l>oys who h:ive 
returned from France. They sul>stantiate your statements every time. Two 
of my fannly entered the battle line .June, 1917, and ended when the armistice 
was signed. They were in Argonne Woods battle. The first letter I received 
from one of my boys after that liattle he .said : " I am alive and untouched — 
only slightly gassed : but 50 per cent of our men and 70 per cent of our ofiicers 
tell wounded or dead because we had no Artillery or airplanes to protect us. 
We walked •li'aiglit into the caimon's nioutli and the machine-gun nests and cut 
the barbed wires with our .knives." That is the substances of all letters that I 
have seen or heard read. 



[Extract from letter of J. W. Tucker, CawkerCity, Kans., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Jan. 

31, 1919.] 

From other boys in the Argonne battle reports have come that Sutton was 
wounded and was in the hospital, but this was only hearsay and reports only. 
On the 13th the mother received official notice that the soldier had been severely 
wounded in action on September 27, 1918. Letters written to him by the 
mother and relatives last Septerriber and since, are coming back, returned to 
writer, with notation on corner of envelope: "Wounded September 2.S." 



[E.\tract from letter of Capt. C. L. Van Den Huork, St. Louis, Mo., lo Gov. Henry J. 

Allen, Jan. 31, 1919.] 

I have followed with no little concern your statenients and criticisms pertinent 
to the losses of the Thirty-fifth Division. 

I was there seven and one-half long months, and can vouch for all you say, but 
I will say. Governor, that .vour criticisms, if anything, are far too mild to do 
justice to the thing. 



[Extract from letter of Mr. L. W. Knotts, Yates Center, Kans., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, 

Feb. 7, 1919.] 
Our soldier son, Elias L., is a membei- of L Company, One hundred and 
thirt.v-seventh Infantry, Thirty-fifth Division, and his letter written a few 
days after the battle, which coi-roborates your views in regard to the lack 
of artillery support * * * 



[Prom letter of Dr. Joseph M. Gray, Grand Avenue Methodist Episcopal Church, Kansas 
City, Mo., to Rev. Frank Neff, Hltchinson, Kans., Jan. 31, ,1919.] 

I happen to know also, of the existence of a private letter not intended for 
Gov. Allen at all. but iu which, in the most natural and confidential way, (tov. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 59 

Alli'irs kiiowltulfrt' of tlio situation is fxiveii tlie most tlioi'ouiich indorsciiKMit by 
one of tlic lii.irlicst otiiccrs in coniniiind in tliat siunc action of tlic Tiiirty-liftii. 
Hesidos whicli tliei-e nre otluTs, and there is ii Ixxly of orticers ready when they 
seeure tlieir discliiirf;(> from tlie Army, to sulistantiate all tluit (Jov. Allen is 
sayinir. 



[Extract from letter of Edward L. Scott, lOlfi Walnut Street, Kansas City, Mo., to Gov. 
Henry J. Allen, Jan. 21, 1919.] 

Shortly after (he 1st of last October I received notice from tli(> War Depart- 
ment that my son. First I>i(Mif. Wiilijim E. Scott, ('omi)any K. One liundred 
and fortietli Infantry. 'I'hirty-tifth Division, hsid been r(>i)orted missing in action 
since Seiitemln'r .'!(>. This is the <mly information that I have been able to get 
from the \\'ar Department covering a ]H>rio(l of nearly four monlhs. The last 
letters we had from my son were dated Seitteniber 2ii and '24. two days before 
he went into the battle of tlie .\rgonne forest. 



(Extract from letter of .Toe Sinipich, Tliirtv-tiftli Division, appearing in New Franklin 
(Mo.) New.s, Jan. 24, 1919.] 

I was wounded September 2N ; fell by a small river. A machine-gun bullet 
broke my right leg just above the knee. By my side was my lieutenant, who 
was shot through the lung. We lay there for five days liefnre we were picke^l 
up, and both of tis suffered greatly. On tlie fifth day the (Jerman first-aid men 
found tis and took us to a dressing station. 



[From letter of Sergt. Frank Stapleton, Infantry. Thirty-fifth Division, to C. O. Trout- 
wine, Gallatin, Mo.] 

Saturday. September 2S. my regimetit held the front line. At iS :10 a. m. a 
German sniper shot me througii my riglit hand. At 11.20 I was hit in the neck 
and riglit shoulder. 1 tried to crawl back and in doing so I was hit in the 
back and side. Then I laid out on the battle field for 8(5 hours witliout any 
treatment. October 4 I had pneumonia and later on another oiieration. I 
was not exjiected to live from tlien on until latt' in .November, when I began 
to recover. 

I supposed you reail of tlie Argonne Forest. That was the place I was 
wounded after lighting continuously for three days and nights. Only G men 
out of 250 in Compauy K got out without being hit. 



[Extract from letter of W. E. Wallace, Moline, Eans., to Gov. Henry J. Allen, Feb. 2, 

1919.] 

I have two boys in Company 1, One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry, 
Thirty-fifth Division, that you have told about ; one of them is 21 years old 
to-day, and I think that they are two of the finest soldiers in the Army, and I 
have a letter one of them wrote me telling me about the battle and how far they 
were ahead of tlie Artillery. I know tltat llie statements that you make are 
true, although the Secretary of War denies tliem. I do not understand how tliis 
letter got l)y tlie censors. ;is it was wrtten before the war closed. But I liave 
it .just the same, and they were -i or (5 kilos ahead of .\rtillery for days at a 
time, and they faced machine-gun nests and had to fall back and reorganize 
three or four times and advance and go after them again without any artillery 
lirotection at all. 



[Extract from letter of Mr. W'. A. Richmond, Aurora Retreat, Wythe County, Vs., to Gov. 
Henry J. Allen, Jan. 14, 1919.] 

My boy was killed in tliis great sacrificial battle, as were tliousamls of other 
brave boys, and I feel that it is only .justice to them that liave laid down their 
lives for democracy fliat an investigation be made. 

We, here at home, were told that our boys would have the protection of 
powerful artillery and thousands of airi)lanes and were told the Infantry 



60 LOSSES OF THIKTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

would move bot'ore a protect iiiic bariinjfe; and then in this awful battle they 
were ordered out to face enemy artillery and machine guns without any pro- 
tection. 

First Lieut. Will P. Nye, Company M. One hundred and sixteenth Infantry. 
Twenty-ninth Division, wrote back that his men wei^ plunged into hell, and that 
he lost 39 in four minutes by artillery fire. 



[Extract from letter of Mrs. Leroy Baker, 311 West Third Street, Oklahoma City., Okla., 
to Gov. Henry J. Allen, under date of Feb. 6, 1919.] 

I am going to tell you of conditions equally as terrible existing in this same 
division which should be investigated. 

Those boys are yet sleeping in dugouts stationed at a little place styled Mud- 
ville, on account of the mud. and Millionaire Hill, on account of the rats and 
" cooties." 



[Statement of N. D. Welty, editor Bartlesvllle Examiner, Bartlesville, Okla., who served 
as Y. M. C. A. secretary with the Thirty-fifth Division in France, appearing in Okla- 
homa City Oklahoman Feb. 2, 1919.] 

Tlie first new.s we received was the same as you heard in this country wlien 
the Kansas and Missouri troops fought through the Argonne Forest. This 
was followed by rumors of the great catastrophe to the division, due to the 
lack of coordination between the Artillery and the Infantry, or the lack of Ai-- 
tillery support at a critical juncture in the operations, and also statements 
that the Infantry went ahead of its objective and sustained terrific losses in 
so doing. The losses were reported in Army circles at the time to have been 
between 50 and (iO per cent of all the troops of the division engaged. 

In talking \vith an officer of the Thirty-fifth Division after the armistice was 
declared, he told me the losses in the division were largely the result of the 
failure of proper Artillery support, but that written orders had been received 
to take certain objectives beyond those attributed to have been taken through 
excessive zeal. It was in the taking of these objectives that the heaviest losses 
of the division were .sustaineil. The officer stated that this order, sending 
Infantry ahead of its Artillery support, was evidently <lue to an error on the 
part of the high command. 



[Extract from letter of a. chaplain of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry Regi- 
ment, Thirty-fifth Division, to Rev. Wm. R. Weaver, concerning death of Sergt. Wm. 
Weaver, of same regiment, appearing in Wichita Beacon Feb. 7, 1919.J 

Our main position jutted out like a sore thumb and was easily open to at- 
tack. On Monday night f<tllowing our arrival in this sector the Germans 
planned a raid. They laid down a heavy bai'rnge and wi <'alled for a counter 
barrage, but received none. Our men stuck ,to their posts and managed to 
instill bi'avery into the new men. Your son went from post to post encour- 
aging his men. While making one of his visits a sh'41 struck immediately in 
front of him and killed him instantly and wounded six others. 

(Thereupon the coniniittee adjourned to meet to-niorrow, Tuesday, 
February 18, 1919, at 10.30 o'clock a. m.) 



Committee ox Rules, 
House of Representatives, 
Tuesday, February 18, 1919. 
The coniinittee met at 10.30 a. m,, Hon. Edward W. Pou (chair- 
man) presiding. 

FURTHER STATEMENT OF HON. HENRY J. ALLEN, GOVERNOR OF 
THE STATE OF KANSAS. 

Gov. Allen. Gentlemen, I will start in wdiere I left off yesterday. 
The first thinof wliich is current is a letter from Col. Ristine, the 



LOSSES OF THIKTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 61 

commanding officer of the One hundred and thirtv-ninth Infantry, 
from which I will read this extract : 

Some one ouslit to tell them about things over here; how we were stripped 
of blankets and luid summer underwear and no overcoats foi* the Argonue 
fight, during which wounded men almost froze to death. No ambuhmces for 
30 hours, and then only six to nine small ones to haul (5,^00 wounded men in 
six days. These ambulances frequently took as long as HC) hours to get to the 
field hospital and many dii'd on the way. We finally evacuated stretcher cases 
by the hundreds in ti'ucks. We were ordered to leave oui- kitchens behind and 
they sent us to the tiring line fresh beat, cabbage, egg plant, and toilet paper 
as food, and for a lung period after we came out of the tight they sent us 
bullv beaf in tins an<l other field i-afions. which we slioubl have had in the 
fight. 

Col. Ristine is mentioned in Gen. Traiib's general orders for special 
acts of bravery and was through the fight and in command of the 
Oiie hundred and thirty-ninth Infantry of the Thirty-fifth Division. 

Mr. Harrison. That is in a special report? 

Gov. Allen. No; that is a personal letter written by this colonel 
to a friend. 

Mr. Harrison. Would you mind telling us to whom it is written? 

Gov. Allen. The letter is written to Gen. Clark, of Missouri, and 
be says you may show this letter to Senator Reed and have it read in 
Congress if you wish. I have read the letter and the only thing that 
refers to that part of the Argonne battle with which I am dealing 
I have read to you just now. It has other matters in it. but they do 
not relate to the Argoime battle. 

I have a telegram here which I have just received from my secre- 
tary. He says that Pvt. O. H. Turner, Rattery E, One hundred and 
thirty-fifth Field Artillery (that is one of the divisions of field ar- 
tillery acting with the Thirty-sixth Division), says after first day 
little" assistance was rendered to the Infantry because they could not 
move their guns, this being on account of a shortage of horses. He 
says his battery lost 100 horses on the road and they went into action 
with only 52, 12 of \idiich were killed by the veterinarian on the first: 
day after they had been injured. He says the second barrage was to 
start 15 minutes to 5 on the evening of the 26th but actually took 
place at the same hour on the evening of September 27. 

The telegram also says that Pvt. R. D. Carter, Battery D, of this 
same Infantry, confirms above statement and says horses were weak 
and worn out and in some places they were taken from the supply 
trains and had no power to move the guns forward. Carter says 
any man in the regiment will confirm the facts. Then he says the 
following will give" information concerning the lack of support after 
tlie first dav and the lack of aeroplanes: Sergt. Theirry, Pvt. Butt- 
ram, Pvts. J. W. Yinancon. Frank Ryan, George T. Nicholson, all 
of the One hundred and thirty-seventh Infantry. N. D. Wells, of 
Fort Scott, Company G. same regiment, says he laid 30 hours after 
being wounded and" he says he believes some men died that could 
have been saved if they had had medical attention when they were 
wounded. 

I am not going to give you all of this, gentlemen, out of regard for 
your time and patience. ' It is such a dreary repetition of the same 
thing. So that with your permission I will just leave this for the 
record. 



62 LOSSES OF THmTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

The CiiAiR:jrAN. Wo will be glad to have you incorporate those 
statements in the record. 

Gov. Allen. Very well ; I will give them to the clerk, and I will 
run through the rest of these hurriedly. These are statements from 
letters written to me personally, or published in the newspapers 
since these men have come home, or written to friends, and in each 
case I have the original. 

Here is a letter from Harold L. Perkins. I thought I might give 
this to you because Perkins had some connection with the remount 
situation and knew about the horses and he was a man trained in 
veterinary matters. He says: 

I wish to state I was in tlie Argcuiiu' battle until the 26th day of September 
and I was in this i)attle until I was wounded and eoinpelled to ^o to the hospital. 
The support for the first four days from the Artillery was excellent, hut after 
that it was of no use to the Infantry. The explanation I would give as to this 
ileticiency was the deticieuey in the number of horses; also of the deplorable 
conditit)ns that oui' horsetlesh was in. Many were blinded or liad been gassed. 
A great prop(n'tion of those horses were horses that were supposed to liave been 
purchased by the American Army in France. They were not in condition to do 
the work put upon them and it was impossible for them to carry the heavy 
burdens, and they were unfit for the service expected of them. They could lae 
seen dropping by tlie wayside and they dropped along the road. During the long 
time I was connected with the battle, my ol)servation sliowed the (Jermans ab- 
solutely dominated the activities. 

Here is a letter from Capt. C. L. Vanderhark, of St. Louis, who 
belonged to another division, I think the Eighty-ninth Division. He 

says : 

I have followed with no little concern your statements and criticisms per- 
training to the losses of the Thirty-tifth Division in the Argonne battle. I was 
there seven and a half months and can vouch for all you say, and I will also say 
that your criticisms, if anything, are far too mild to do justice to this thing. I 
was in the Argonne battle. 

I thought you might be interested also in some envelopes I have 
here, to show the inexplicable condition of handling the mail. For 
a good many weeks my mail has been filled witli letters from motliers 
who wish to know why the letters they sent to their sons are being 
returned to them from the Central Post Office at Tours, with the 
French address of their sons noted upon the envelop — a thing I have 
not been able to explain. But I have here an envelop that was ad- 
dressed by his mother to Sergt. G. W. Gibson, of the One hundred 
and thirty-seventh Infantry, and which was returned with this nota- 
tion: "Wounded. Central Post Office, 11.20," and then the name of 
the clerk. This envelop was returned to the mother with that nota- 
tion. Here is another one 

Mr. Harrison. Was the word '' wounded" on the envelop'^ 

Gov. Allen. The word wounded was on the envelop, and it gives 
the post-office address of the lad ; that he is wounded at Barges, and 
theii the name of the clerk who makes the notation on the envelop 
and sends the letter back to the mother. 

Here is a letter by his father to Corp. Brown, of the Three hundred 
and fifty-third Infantry. It was returned to the father with this no- 
tation : " Sick in general hospital ; American Post Office 117. Re- 
turned from Tours." That hap])ens to be the number of the post 
office in the very town in which the lad was ill, and instead of deliv- 
ering the letter to him in that town they send it back to his parents 
with this notation upon it. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DUKING ARGONNE BATTLE. (:3 

Mr. RoDENBERG. Were the postal arrangements there in charge of 
the Americans? 

Gov. Alljen. Oh, yes. These letters came back to the parents from 
the Central Post Office at Tours. 

Mr. RoDEXBERG. Which is conducted by Americans? 

Gov. Allen, Which is conducted by the Army post office. 

Mr. Eodenberg. The Army post office? 

Gov. Allen. Yes. 

Mr. Foster. Do you know who is at the head of that in France ? 

Gov. Allen. I do not; no. 
• Mr. Siegel. It is Col. D. Howe. 

Mr. Foster. Do you laiow where he comes from ? 

Mr. Siegel. Yes; from Boston. 

Mr. Foster. What was he before he went in there? 

Mr. Siegel. He was a shoe manufacturer originally, and then later 
he went over with the Eighth Massachusetts Regiment from there. 
He was picked out to take charge, and for a while there was a big 
improvement over there, because he helped organize the postal regi- 
ment we suggested while over there. But since the armistice came 
things have gone to])sy-turvy. 

Mr. Foster. I had heard he was from Rhode Island 

Mr. Siegel. No ; he was from Boston. 

Mr. Foster (continuing). And that he was formerly a jeweler? 

Mr. Siegel. No; he was a shoe manufacturer. 

Gov, Allen. Here is a letter sent b}^ his mother to Pvt. Otto S. 
Mulligan. Company C. Tliirtieth Infantry, and she gets it back with 
this notation. She mailed the letter on September 16, It does not 
state here on what date the letter arrived in France, but it has this 
notation on tlie letter returned to her: •" Sick in hospital, September 
18, 1918. Central Post Office at Vosges,*' They kncAV where the man 
was, but instead of sending the letter to him, they sent it back to the 
mother, who immediately jmnped at the conclusion her boy was 
dead. 

Mr, Snell, Do you knoAv if tliey really did know where the boy 
was? 

Gov, Allen, They state he was sick at the hospital, 

Mr. RoDENBERG. Tlic fact was given and his location. 

Mr. Foster. Tlie fact of the matter was they had a man in charge 
who knew nothing about it. They took an incompetent official of 
the Post Office Department, and when he got back to the United 
States he never got a chance to return. That may account for the 
first improvement over there. ^H^ 

Gov, Allen, Here is another letter, which is illegible, but it has 
had the same treatment. They state, wounded in section so and so, 
but they have not even taken the pains to make the handAvriting 
upon tlie envelope, on which tliey send back the information to the 
mother, legible. 

Mr, Siegel. There are many more such instances which we could 
present to the committee if we were given the time. 

The Chairman. Of course it must be borne in mind (I simply say 
this by way of answer to the suggestion of our colleague, Mr. Siegel), 
I wish you did have more time, but as a matter of fact we have not 
the time and I do not think it is out of place to make this observa- 



64 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

tion : These hearings we have are simply preliminary ; this is not an 
investigating committee. All we do is to invite a hearing in order 
that what might be termed a prima facie case is made out on which 
to have the information to determine whether or not to recommend 
an investigation. 

Gov. Allen. I will just give one more instance of this kind, be- 
cause they are all alike, but this is the prize of them all. Here is a 
letter written by his mother to Pvt. Harry Hoover, of the American 
Expeditionary Forces, written to him on September 30. She gets back 
the letter from the Central Post Office with this very clear informa- 
tion: " Sick in Base Hospital No. 36, Ward D, October 23." They 
did not want tlie mother to have any doubt as to the condition of the 
boy. 

Then, of course*, I have here simply some letters touching condi- 
tions of the hospitals at Brest, St. Aignan, and those matters the 
Congressman spoke of this morning. 

Mr. lioDENBKRG. I liope you will incorporate all of those in the 
record. 

Gov. Allen. Yes; and unless you wish to ask me some questions, I 
think I have covered the field by turning over to the secretary of 
your committee yesterday all of this material, that I might save your 
time this morning. 

If there are any other questions 

Mr. Kelly. Did you come in contact with the Twenty-eighth Di- 
vision of the Pennsjdvania troops while you were over there ? 

Gov. Allen. Yes ; I came in contact with the Twenty-eighth Penn- 
sylvania troops and I saw a good many of them. They held in the 
opening of the Battle of Argonne Forest a position on our left. 

Mr. Kelly. Thev were near the Thirty-fifth? 

Gov. Allen. Yes ; the Thirty-fifth was the center and the Twenty- 
eighth was on our right and the Seventy-seventh on our left. 

Mr, Fess. Did you return before the armistice was signed ? 

Gov. Allen. No ; I came back about the 1st of December. 

Mr. Fess. I was told the other night by a group of officers that 
they had word the armistice would be signed at noon on the 11th, 
and they were ordered on the 9th to make an advance along a line 
20 miles wide to take up advance positions and one of the officers said 
46 of his men fell dead during that advance. 

Gov. Allen. Of course it is well known that they continued fight- 
ing right along up to the last moment, although the Germans were 
in retreat, and although nobody had any doubt after the time when 
the 72 hours had been given to the Germans that the armistice would 
be signed. But somebody seemed to be eager to get as near to Ger- 
many as possible. 

Mr. Fess. That is the point I want to know 

Gov. Allen. So that from the standpoint of military necessity 
all the men sacrificed in those last hours were needlessly sacrified. 

Mr. Fess. That is the point; he said 46 of his men dropped or were 
wounded, although the rumor was that the armistice would be signed 
on the 11th. 

Mr. Foster. Did the Germans make an attack during those last 
hours ? 

Gov. Allen. The Germans were retreating under fire and cover- 
ing their retreat, of course, in a very effective and deadly fashion. 



LOSSES or THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 65 

Mr. FosiT-:!?. But they had been retreating right along for some 
days before that? 

Gov. Allen. They had been retreating right along from the time 
they were driven out of Argonne Forest. 

Mr. Garrett. There were portions of the line, I suppose (they 
had a very long line there), where the Germans were attacking? 
I do not mean at that particular point, but at some point along the 
line, and it may have been necesesary to advance in order to protect 
that portion of the line. 

Gov. Allen. I think there was no portion of the line at this hour 
•where' the Germans were attacking any more than the character of 
attack necessary to cover their retreat. They were not trying to 
retake. 

Mr. Garreti\ On any part of the line? 

Gov. Allen. No. 

Mr. Fess. The comment to me was it was not a case of defense, 
but they had been ordered to take up advance positions when they 
knew the battle had been entirely decisive. 

Gov. Allen. They were ordered to advance. 

Mr. Garrett. I understand it was an advance, but what I meant 
was whether some other part of the line 50 or 100 miles away which 
was under attack made it necessary for the military authorities to 
press the advantage which they had there. 

Gov. Allen. The whole line was going forward. We held the 
sections already. We held the sections from Grandpre to Verdun; 
the French and British, farther west, were all hammering the Ger- 
mans at a lively rate. 

Mr. Garrett. All the allied armies were attacking? 

Gov. Allen. Yes ; they were going forward. 

Mr. Foster. And our Army was doing no more attacking that 
the French and British? 

Gov. Allen. The accusation is ours made a larger advance than 
the others. I do not know whether that is true. 

Mr. Foster. But the others were attacking? 

Gov. Allen. Yes; and the Germans were hitting back, and of 
course they had to keep the line of the allies intact in going forward. 



Committee on Rules, 
House or Representatives, 
Thursday, Fehimary 20, 1919. 

The committee met at 10 o'clock a. m., Hon. Edward W. Pou 
(chairman) presiding. 

The Chairman. Gen. Traub, a resolution introduced into the 
House of Representatives provides for the appointment of a com- 
mittee to investigate certain occurrences at the battle of the Argonne. 
(Jov. Allen, of Kansas, upon his return to America made some 
criticisms as to the things he had seen and heard. I am sorry we 
are not able to furnish you with a copy of Gov. Allen's statement 
made before this committee, but for the time being he has it in his 
possession, revising the transcript. As best I could I have sum- 
marized the general criticisms that were made, and furnished j'ou 
with a copy thereof. The committee will be glad to hear any state- 
ment you may desire to make with respect to those criticisms. 



66 LOSSES OF THIKTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING AEGONNE BATTLE. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. PETER E. TRAUB, COMMANDING GEN- 
ERAL FORTY-FIRST DIVISION, UNITED STATES ARMY. 

Gen. Traub. Tliank you, Mr. Pou: that is very generous, and I 
shall try to put before you gentlemen a statement of what the situa- 
tion was over there. 

As you know, at the time of the Battle of the Argonne, I was the 
commanding general of the Thirty-fifth Division, which was made 
up mainly of troops from Kansas and Missouri. And before I go 
any further I want to say right now that there never was a finer 
body of men anywhere furnished by any country, and there was not 
a finer body of men from America that went to France and fought 
on that western front than those same troops that I had the honor 
to command from Kansas and Missouri. They were a wonderful 
lot of men and a wonderful lot of soldiers who asked for nothing 
more than to know what we wanted them to do and how we wanted 
it done. Their spirit was right there to do anything that was de- 
manded of them, and they did it and they did it well. 

The main criticism, as I understand it, is that the losses in the 
Thirty-fifth Division were unnecessarily high. Now. gentlemen, in 
my opinion, they were marvelously low, and I can not understand 
why they were so low. 

Remember, tliat for five days and nights, Ave fought continually in 
battle against the very best that the Bodies had, because they knew 
the importance of holding the American troops where they were, or 
throwing them back for a loss. For five days and nights we fought 
there, subjected to a hellish fire of all descriptions. Yet, at the end of 
that time we had penetrated the powerful Boche lines to a depth of 
12| kilometers. We had taken over 1,000 prisoners, officers and men, 
and we captured 24 pieces of artillery, a number of which we worked 
with our own hands and fired the Boche ammunition against them- 
selves. We took machine-gun nests and captured 85 machine guns, 
100 antitank guns, and a large quantity of materiel. 

This attack, 5 kilometers in width, was over on open, exposed coun- 
try; it was not in the Argonne Forest, it was to the right of it. My 
left flank was the Eiver Aire, to my west. Beyond that is the Ar- 
gonne Forest, at a distance of probably half a kilometer. There is 
where the batteries of the Boche were located, up in the timber, on 
the crest, where they had a most wonderful and perfect observation 
over everything my division was doing. 

For five days and nights, gentlemen, we kept at it, and we accom- 
plished the results that were accommplished with a division that had 
never been in battle before, and we suffered losses. The figures given 
me at the time, and they were the best that could be obtaianed, showed 
that there were approximately 500 killed and about 4,500 wounded, 
that had passed through our tirage. The figures may be less than 
that, as far as the wounded were concerned; in fact, I think there 
were about 4,350 wounded, or something like that. 

The great majority of those reported wounded were slightly 
wounded, slightly gassed, ill, or exhausted. The slightly wounded 
equaled all the other casualties put together — that is, the killed, the 
died of wounds, the severely wounded, and those whose diagnosis had 
not been definitely determined upon by the doctors. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 67 

In connection with that snpposed unnecessarily great loss, I just 
want to call your attention to one little thing in the Civil War to 
give you a means of comparison. The Argonnc battle has been made 
an unusual case. Take an unusual case in the Civil War- 
When Gen. Grant attacked the Confederate works at Cold Harbor 
he lost 10,000 men within about 10 minutes, and he accomplished 
nothing. We fought five days and nights, constant fighting, with a 
loss, as I say, of about 500 killed and 4,?>50 wounded, the great ma- 
jority of whom were slightly Mounded and who afterwards by the. 
hundreds came back and rejoined the colors. We penetrated to a 
depth of 12-i kilometers, and accomplished the other details I have 
already given you. So much for the unnecessarily great losses. 

The American soldier is at his very best when he is fighting in 
the open. Outside of the Philippines and the Sulu Archipelago, 
where I saw service, he has not had any experience in forest fighting. 

But we were in the open. I will tell you it was a wonderful fight. 
If you could have been there, from now on you would be taking off 
your hats and cheering the American soldier for the way he con- 
ducted himself in battle. 

We had individual trenches: we would dig in to save ourselves 
from this horrible fire they were concentrating upon the troops. 
But in the daytime wdien there was not an attack on, you would 
look over the field of battle, and you would not see anything, as 
far as men were concerned, except with a glass;, you might see them 
'trickling here and there, but the moment a man got in sight any- 
wdiere the Boche never hesitated to waste hundreds of shells on a 
single individual. He knew his business, and he did it well. 

There has been some criticism about the wounded. Every com- 
mander in the world, after the success of the operation is assured — ■ 
and that always, of course, nuist receive first consideration — but 
after that, every connnander's very first care is for his wounded 
men, and I assure you that in the A. E. F. the wounded and the sick 
absolutely received the first and highest consideration, and the 
greatest care that was at all possible under the difficult circum- 
stances. 

We have been criticized for the wounded lying out on the ground 
anywhere, I think it is said, from 12 to 24 or 48 hours without any 
care, and wdthout any attention. The wounded never could be 
moved except at night, gentlemen. During the daytime the best 
that could be done was to look after them under the very best pos- 
sible circumstances, in the woods, or wherever we were. 

Talk about woods ! We did have little patches of timber, the 
most important being the Montrebeau Woods. I probably did a lot 
of unusual things as a major general. You usually picture a major 
general well back in his P. C, where he has a sort of piano, and 
when he wants to do anything he simply touches a button and the 
thing is done. Well, it was different in the Battle of the Argonne. 
Our instructions were from our/commander in chief of the Amer- 
ican Expeditionary Forces that the general in command should be 
where his presence is deemed most necessary to get the maximum 
effort and the maximum results out of his troops. And that was 
done. 

101727— 19— PT 2 4 



68 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONXE BATTLE. 

When the time cunie, and whenever I deemed it necessary, I was 
always up in the front lines with my soldiers, absolntely going 
through what they went through, subjected to the sauie hellish fire, 
subjected to the same gassing. It made no difference: that is what 
we were there for — to do the very best we could in our fight for 
the cause. So that led me constantly into my front lines, and on 
the morning of September 29 I myself went up forward to size up 
the situation. This, gentlemen, all bears on the question of bringing 
.out the wounded. I went up to the front lines to size up the situa- 
tion and I got up to these very same Montrebeau Woods that I 
spoke of. The Boche saw me stringing across this open space. 

I myself had personally taken charge of my reserve, which con- 
sisted of the Engineer regiment, in order to uuike dead sure if any- 
thing happened at the fi'ont I would have a force always in hand 
for any emergency; and all six of those couipanies were wonderfid 
companies, under Col. Clark, of the P^ngineers. I posted them and 
then went forward a kilometer farther to size up the situation, which 
I did, and gave my orders and instructions, after making my de- 
cision, and had sent all of my staff in different directions to get 
what I wanted done. P^ven my orderly sergeant went back Avith a 
message. The writing of that message required me to make six 
different changes of place because of the shell firing that was going 
on. We had a Boche plane overhead at a height of anywhere from 
600 to 1,000 feet, and they spotted me and my officers and kept 
circling around and sprinkling machine-gun bullets upon us all the 
time and by wireless directing the fire of the batteries of the 
Argonne Hills at those places where T was, and it required six 
changes of place before I could write a six-line message simply 
because the staff insisted upon my moving when the Boche got the 
exact location. 

I sent my sergeant back, who had remained for further instruc- 
tions, and then I Avanted to get back to my P. C, 2 kilometers to the 
rear. 

I had my gas mask on and my field glasses over my gas mask, wore 
a mackintosh, and carried my trench stick. I started back to my 
advanced P. C. and left the Montrebeau Woods. The chap passing 
overhead again whirled, and every time he whirled he gave me a 
big dose of machine-gun bullets. I seemed to bear a charmed life; 
everything fell at my feet. But it was soft ground and, they stuck. 
If it had been hard ground they would have ricocheted, and would 
have gotten me a hundred times. The chap overhead directed the 
fire of the Argonne batteries at me. I simply want to show you what 
one individual in that whole field of battle got, and then you will 
see the utter impossibility during the daytime of removing the 
wounded to the triage, which was 3 kilometers in the rear of these 
Montrebeau Woods. If one individual got what I got you can im- 
agine what our stretcher bearers would have gotten — two stretcher 
bearers for each wounded man. You would have lost not only the 
wounded man but the two stretcher bearers. You laiow the Boche 
never respects anything like a litter or anything like a Reef Cross 
flag or anything of that kind. In the matter of bringing in the 
wounded we were up against an enemy who respected no rules of 
civilized warfare. You, of course, know that was true with respect 
to the enemy we were up against. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 69 

T started back for tho advanced P. C. and tlie first thing tliese 
batteries in the Ar<>onne Hills connnenced to bracket on nie, as I 
moved to the rear. The Boche is a \ery regular individual. We 
could always comit on his regularity. lie was stupid; he did the 
same thing at the same time every day, and wherever we had him in 
a sector we would take the necessary precautions. So that com- 
menced, and they sent a shell hei-e. if) yards to my right, and they 
sent a shell here. 15 y >r<!s to my left; then the next shell 15 yards on 
my I'ight, and the next 15 yards to my left. Then 1 said if I do 
not look out the next one will laud on me. That is what we mean by 
l)i-ack'eting. At first they send one on this side, on the right side, and 
then they .send one on the left side, and this cha]) in the air sent 
signals all the time, and I had to look out for the high-explosive 
shells. 

As soon as they conmienced bracketing I sized up the situation. 
Yon have to do some quick thinking under those conditions; even a 
major genera] has to think once in a while. I at once zigzagged, and 
I had not gotten more than 10 yarils away when a shell came down 
where I had been. Then they commenced again to try to bracket me 
on the new zigzagging, this cha]) in the air at the same time sprin- 
kling me with machine-gun bullets. They sent a shell 15 yards to the 
left, and then they sent one 15 yards to the right, and then they sent 
another 15 yards to the left, and then another 15 yards to the right. 
I said. " Old spoit, get busy.'' I zigzagged to the left, and I had no 
jiiore than done that when a high explosive shell came down. 

I made one mistake. The Boche was not as stupid as I thought he 
was, or they may have missed the count, bevause they did the bracket- 
ing only once that time, and the third time caught me unprepared. 
The shell landed within 2^ feet of me, to my left rear, and out of 
the 300 shells they wasted on me, that was the only dud, and it never 
exploded. That is the reason I am here talking to you right now. 

That thing continued for 2 kilometers. When I got into the 
Baulny Ravine they threw gas shells at me. That is where I got 
gassed. It was ])retty tough work to climb up a muddy slope with 
a gas mask on and those people pestering you with shells. There 
was not a thing in sight, except some of my Engineers in individual 
rifle pits. I had stationed this Phigineer outfit there and they were 
in their individual trenches to the right and left, and as that dud 
struck they were Avatching my progress — they did not know I was 
the conmianding general — and when that thing struck and they saw 
me walking on afterwards all those men got up out of the trenches 
and commenced to yell and to cheer. 

When I reached my P. C. the Boche bombarded it. I went over 
those Montrel)eau Woods that morning, and I am sure I exaggerate 
greatly when I sa}^ there were "200 wounded thei-e. As a matter of 
fact, I never saAv more than half a dozen myself, but I have no doubt 
there were more than that there. Although I went all over that 
place pretty thoroughly, I could not see very much on either side of 
my line of progress, but I will put it at that figure and say there 
were 200 wounded there. 

You can see from what I say, gentlemen, that those wounded men 
had to stay there. The}- had their comrades with them, and my 
orders were that during the daytime, wherever ])ossible, they were 



70 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

to move the wounded up to the southern edge of the Avoods. Of 
course, they were being taken care of bj' their own men, and as soon 
as darkness came we went up there and every one of them was 
brought out. There were also some w ounded at a place to the right, 
Chaudron farm, and that place being a farm and naturally being 
assumed by the Boche to be a P. C. of some kind, the Bochc would 
blaze away at that place, and one or two of the sheels struck in there 
where we had some wounded. One of the sad results in a battle is 
that that happens all the time. So much for the wounded, as far as 
their lying exposed is concerned. They had to stay where they Avere 
during the daytime, because to have-brought them back would have 
meant the death not only of the wounded but also of the men who 
were carrying them. 

NoAv, there is no man who, from a medical viewpoint, has done 
finer work in the American Expeditionary Force than my division 
surgeon. Col. Turck. He was a marvel, and. although gassed, he 
stayed right on his job. 

We established near Cheppy, near my P. C. this triage. The triage 
is the place whei'e ihej sort out, so to speak, the different cases. They 
will say " This num has so and so ; he should go to this place." We 
soon found we could not have a triage at Cheppy, because the 
Boche would shell it. So the point was to get the wounded man back 
as quickly as possible, and not try to determine where he should go, 
where he should be sent for the proper treatment, but to get him to 
the rear, to a place of safety, and there establish a triage, and that is 
what we did at a place called Neuvilly. That was simply plain, 
common sense. 

In order to get the wounded back to Neuvilly we had to use every- 
thing. You must realize that there was only one main road, and 
that road served both the Army and the corps, and at times the 
division, especially the division sick and wounded. You can imagine 
the congestion Avith a main road of that kind, and you may rest 
assured that the Boche left no stone unturned to get at that road. 

He had been in possession of that place for four years. He had 
the Frenchman's goat. The Frenchman Avould not tackle that job; 
they tried it on seA'eral occasions, but they were badly beaten with 
great losses. So the place my division had to take — you ask the 
Frenchmen what they think about the place, and they will tell you 
it could not be taken, because they could not take it. Through 
that place where my P. C. had been established, in five days and 
nights 7,000 wounded passed — wounded, sick, gassed, and exhausted 
men— all cases handled by Col. Turck. 

There is no medical department in the world which could have had 
at that place a sufficient number of ambulances. There were not 
enough ambulances in the corps to haAe serA'ed the one point, be- 
cause we got the Avounded from the division on my right and on my 
left; we handled 2,500 wounded men from these adjoining di\asions. 
When you get a strain like that put upon one single point, the idea 
is to get those fellows to the rear as quickly as possible. 

So, by my direction, that division surgeon impressed everything 
absolutely. It did not make any difference what it Avas, it was put to 
use. A French truck Avas coming by; the wounded were put in it. 
An ammunition truck was coming by ; the wounded were put in that ; 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 71 

a ration truck or anything that came along was used to put the 
wounded in. Why ? Because we were in a place where the wounded 
were first collected, and we had to get them back to the rear, and we 
sent them back to Neuvilly, about 5 kilometers to the rear, where we 
established our triage from which our wounded, gassed, etc., were 
sent to the different places where the different kinds of illnesses and 
wounds had to be treated. 

No organization in the world can handle all the unforeseen problems 
that come up in a battle. If you want to look forward to handling 
everything that arises you Avould have to have an organization ten 
times the size of the organization we have now back of the lines to 
handle for a few days what takes place in front. So it is utterly im- 
possible. 

The best that could possibly have been done was done. Men who 
from gassing should have been on the sick list stayed there and did 
their duty, when, at any moment they might have dropped over like 
that, dead from cardiac dilation. Those are the ch:inces that I and 
my division surgeons took; those are the chances we had to take. But 
that is what we were expected to do, and that is what those men did. 
and they did it fully, thoroughly, and w^ell. 

Another of the main things that has been talked about has been 
the artillery. I will give you a little idea of the Battle of the 
Argonne, and then you will understand better my remarks with ref- 
erence to the artillery. 

Mr. Campbell. I want to ask you some questions about each of 
these matters. Would you prefer going ahead with your statement 
and then having a review of it? 

Gen. Tkaub. No ; I would prefer that you ask me any questions 
whenever you want to. 

Mr. Campbell. I want to do exactly as you would prefer. If you 
would rather go on now and take up the artillery I will wait and 
submit some questions on the subject of the wounded later, when you 
conchidc. 

Gen. Tkaub. I would prefer to have you ask your questions right 
now. 

Mr. Campbell. The matter of getting the wounded back has been 
talked about a great deal in this connection. You say they were 
brought back at night? 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. The men who were wounded in the daytime would 
be brought back at night? 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. The statement has been made that many of the 
Avounded were on the field from 36 to 48 hours ? 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. That they were without their blankets, w^ithout 
necessary cover ; that these had been ordered for each man ; that these 
were not there, had not been provided. What have you to say about 
the failure in that particular? 

Gen. Traub. Mr. Campbell, when we go into a battle we drop all 
unnecessary paraphanalia that impedes a man in his fighting. The 
blankets are always considered a part of that unnecessary parapha- 
nalia. So we take the packs off and leave the men, the fighters, 



72 LOSSES or thirty-fifth division during ARGONNK KATTr.E. 

simply with the amnuinition, the grenades, and whatever constitutes 
the fightino; equipment, and these packs are deposited where the men 
can get them, or where they can be sent up to the men. So, of course, 
a man who is fighting has not got his bhmkets with him. has not got 
his extra pair of echoes: he has not got what makes up his kit which he 
carries when you see him on march or on parade. 

Mr. Campbell. Concede that. Why could not these men havo been 
provided with these comforts and blankets at night? 

Gen. Traub. They were, wherever possible. 

Mr. Campbell. The charge is that they were not. 

Gen. Traub. Who makes that charge? 

Mr. Campbell. Men who say they know ; Gov. Allen, who was 
there. 

Gen. Traub. He was not there. 

Mr. Campbell. With the Y. M. C. A. 

Gen. Traub. He was not there. 

Mr. Campbell. Was not with the Thirty-fifth Division? 

Gen. Traub. No, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. That is a very pointed denial of Gov. Allen's claim 
that he was there. 

Gen. Traub. I will explain that statement, Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. Allen, secretary of the Y. M. C. A. attached to the Thirty-fifth 
Division, was not there during the fight, because I myself, and with 
Mr. Allen's consent, had sent Mr. Allen and all his 22 Y. M. C. A. 
helpers, back to the rear before the St. Mihiel fight of September 12, 
with instructions to Mr. Allen that at the first opportunity when I 
could use his services he would be up there with me. 

Now, Mr. Allen came up to the place where we advanced — I have 
forgotten Avhat the name of the place is — and he came to see me, and 
I told him he might establish a storehouse. He came to this par- 
ticular place, which was, I sliould judge, about 5 or 6 kilometers back 
of the lines. Back there, what he came in contact with I do not 
know ; but right up where these things were taking place. Mr. Allen 
was not there, nor was there a single Y. M. C. A. worker. 

Mr. Campbell. They had been sent back after that conference be- 
tween yourself and Mr. Allen? 

Gen. Traub. Yes. 

Mr. Campbell. Wliy were they sent back? 

Gen. Traub. They were sent back for this reason. Mr. Campbell. 
There is nobody wlio has appreciated the work of the Y. M. C. A., 
especially under Mr. Allen wdth my division, more than I, and he 
knows it; and when Mr. Allen left "me he got a letter he was proud 
of and I was glad to give it to him. 

But he and his workers were sent back for this reason : When we 
were going into the St. Mihiel salient fight it was of the utmost im- 
portance that there be absolutely no leak in information, that the 
strictest secrecy be observed. As a division commander, for the 
good of the cause, I took no chances whatever. 

So I called Mr. Allen before me and I said in a private conversa- 
tion between us : " Mr. Allen, the cause demands the strictest of se- 
crecy, and that there shall be absolutely no leak, and it is my decision 
that you and your Y. M. C. A. workers quit the division for the 
present and go back and establish your base at such and such a 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 73 

point." He thought that was back too far, and I allowed him to 
come up closer, but I said, " The point is that I do not want these men 
with the diA'ision, so that there shall be no chance of their finding 
out anything and then go back and talk about it and give things 
away." You know how men are prone to talk. They have been up 
at the front and they have seen the bo}s, and they will say that 
such and such a thing is going to be pulled off. 

Mr. Campbell. What Avas the date of this conversation with Mr. 
Allen ? 

Gen. Traub. I have no records here, of course, and I can not tell 
you the exact date. The St. Mihiel light was about the 12th of Sep- 
tember, and we left the Yosges on the 2d of Se[>tember, so I should 
say I will not be very far wrong if 1 say it was about the 6th or 7th 
of September. 

Mr. Campbell. That was two or three weeks before the Argonne 
fight began? 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Campbell. Had vou any reason to believe there would l)e a 
leak through the Y. M. C. A. ? ^ 

Gen. Traub. Yes, Mr. Campbell, I did. I will tell you why. This 
is the reason : While we were in the Vosges we had to pull off a 
number of coups cle mains against the enemy. A coup de main has 
to be prepared with the utmost secrecy. AYe had a great many boche 
sympathizers in the Yosges. which was in Alsace. There were a lot 
of them favorable to the German cause, and they had means of com- 
municating information to the other side, and we were constantly 
afraid that anything w^e might undertake against the enemy might 
get to him before we delivered the stroke we had planned against 
him. 

Now, then, on the morning of the day when one of the coup de main 
was to be pulled oil' — which was successful — I was addressing the 
troops and telling them what I wanted them to do, and how I wanted 
it done, discussing the whole matter with them, all the officers and 
men, just with the officers and men alone together, which I always did 
whenever Ave pulled off any stunt. That day they came to me and 
said, "General, they are talking about this coup de main out here." 
I said, " Where ? " One of the men said, " I just came up from 
below, and somebody said you are going to pull it off to-night." 
T said. '' Good God " — pardon me — " hoAV can that be possible, after 
all these plans had been made and all the arrangement had been 
made." They said. " This is the way it Avas." I think there was a 
Y. M. C. A. man Avho had been talking in an offhand way. He had 
been off getting supplies, and he had been talking to the people back 
there. He did not mean anything by it. He is just as good an 
American citizen as I am. But going back there they would say 
to him. "What is the neAvs up forwarcl; how is everything going? " 
And he Avould say. " They are going to pull off a stunt." 

Mr. RoDENBERG. HoAV did the Y. M. C. A. man get in possession 
of the facts? 

Gen. Tratjb. He Avas serving Avith the battalion. 

Mr. Campbell. We Avere told by Gen. March that orders with re- 
spect to what was intended to be done were not even communicated 
to me holding as high rank as brigadier general before the battle. 



74 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Gen. Traub. That is so. 

Mr. Campbell. That the whole thing was a profound secret to 
eveiybody except those in high command. y 

Gen. Traub. Just what episode are you referring toy 

Mr. Campbell. I am wondering how these matters could be of 
rumor and so come as matters of information that eveil a Y. M. C. A. 
secretary would know about them 6 kilometers in the rear? 

Gen. Traub. That is very simple of explanation. A battle is a 
different proposition. A battle which you are pulling off, which 
extends along a 50-kilometer front is a different proposition. Every- 
thing is planned by higher authority, by Gen. Pershmg and his staff, 
that is all prepared by the higher command. Then it comes to me. 
I am called for consultation, and I am shown exactly what is to 
be done. Then I go to work and make my plans of battle, and cover 
my front, which will be anywhere from 2 to 5 kilometers. When I 
have determined upon my plan of battle, what to do, then I get my 
brigadiers together.' Usually I got not only the brigadiers, but all 
the officers together. But a coup de main is an entirely different 
proposition. 

Mr. Campbell. Explain what you mean by a coup de main? 

Gen. Traub. That is a raid made on the enemy line to take pris- 
oners. We want to know what the Boche is doing, and we want to 
know whether he has made any clianges opposite us, changes in divi- 
sions, or wdiether he has changed his position. It is very important 
for us to know that, because if he takes out a third-class division and 
puts in a first-class division opposite us, we expect t'o l)e pounded 
there. 

So, when we have gone on for three or four diiys or a week with- 
out any information we project a coup de main, or a raid to get 
prisoners, and then the prisoners will always give the thing away. 
That has very seldom been known to fail. 

A coup de main, you may imagine, is made against very well-organ- 
ized works, things which the enemy has been preparing for years. 
So we start with our airplane service and we get maps and pictures 
of the whole thing. We send out scouts and patrols for weeks to 
determine the exact lay of the land. Then when we have all the 
]nformation we prepare the plan for the coup de main. Then we 
select the troops we are going to use and we send them back some- 
times 5 kilometers to the rear. We rehearse the thing for weeks. 
We lay out our airplane pictures on the ground Avith tape and every- 
thing of that sort and we trace out the whole enemy position. AVe 
dig a trench to a depth of about 6 inches so that the men will be 
able to laiow absolutely in the dark where the positions are. We 
pull the coup de main off in the dark. We lay out all these plans 
so that the men will be able to practically see -and know just what 
they are doing and where they are going in the dark, and we go 
through this thing in great detail so that they may be successful. 

Now, you can see when we do a thing of that kind we hedge the 
thing around in every possible way with the utmost secrecy. In this 
I>articular case I refer to we did not send them far back, did not 
send them very far to the rear simply because the Boche sympathizers 
w^ere back there. We could not afford to have the rehearsal taking- 
place back there because they would know something was up. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 75 

Mr. Caisipbell. You refer to the Boche sympivthi/ers. Do \ou 
mean those men were within our lines? 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CA:MrBELL. Soldiers? 

Gen. Travb. Xo, sir; Alsace civilians. In Alsaco those people 
were not disturbed; they were living there. They had probably 
friends and relatives along there on the other side. They could not 
depopulate Alsace, and there were people back tliere we were con- 
stantly afraid of, sometimes even officials, and there we had to be 
most careful. So these things would take place as near tlie front 
lines as possible so that nobody would sec them. Elvery precaution 
luid to be taken. Had they known what was going on, and what: 
was going to be pulled oil', they would signal it to the other side, 
and not a single one of oui- men would get back alive, and that is 
what we were guarding against. 

Now then, gentlemen, it is simply a question of those men doing a 
lot of talking that might be picked up back of the lines by somebody 
listening, and that somebody might be an enemy sympathizer, and 
he might get the information across the lines and not a single one of 
those things must take place. 

Mr. RoDENBERG. You would always exercise great precautions in 
reference to your conferences? 

Gen. Traub. Absoluteh^ 

Mr. RoDENBERG. I do not see how there "would be any civilian who 
( ould get that information, first hand. 

Gen. Traub. You miss my point. A Y. M. C. A. man working 
with a battalion could easily find out and did know what was going 
on. 

Mr. EoDENBERG. It ccrtaiuly would not be discussed in his 
presence. 

Gen. Traub. Xo; but all these men — you take 500 soldiers, and 
naturally the}^ talk amongst themselves, when they are out buying 
a plug of tobacco, or anything of that kind. One fellow might say, 
"Well, are you all fixed for to-morrow night"? or something like 
that. That is absolutely natural. We will assume the Y. M. C. A. 
worker does know. He has to go way back to the town for supplies, 
and when he is back there, in a perfectly innocent way he says, 
" Well, we are going to pull off a stunt to-morrow night." When he 
is in the town getting supplies somebody might overhear what he 
said. It so happened that they did not, because this coup de main 
was successful. But it is taking a chance, gentlemen, and we never 
ought to take a chance against the Boche. 

Mr. Campbell. But the Y. M. C. A. was there serving the wounded 
who were brought in from the battle, were they not ? 

Gen. Traub. Xo, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. We have been contributing on the theory that the 
Y. M. C. A. and the Red Cross were to render first aid and give all 
such help as that at the time it was most needed, when the stress was 
on, when the organization of the Army could not have prepared, as 
you stated, for an eventuality, and that we were furnishing this 
extra organization. You say that it is not true, that the place where 
they could be of service was not at the battle of the Argonne ? 



76 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIYISIOX DUPJNG ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Gen. Traub. The division of labor amonirst those different helpful 
organizations was that the Red Cross would look after the h()S]ntals, 
the sick, and the wounded, attending to their wants, etc.. and that 
the Y. M. C. A. would attend to the wants of the others in every way. 
The Y. M. C. A. time and again heli)ed the sick and the wounded; 
they gave them everything they had, but it was not the prinuiry part 
of their functions. If it came their way, such as men going to the 
front line, they would throw open their hot chocolate booths and 
when they came back they woidd giv^e them the same thing, but the 
primary function of the Y. M. C. A. was not to help immediately the 
sick and the wounded up forward. When you got back to the hos- 
pitals, of course, they had their help. 

Mr. Campbell. In any event, you say the Y. M. C. A. had been 
sent back two or three weeks before the Battle of the Argonne and 
were not within 5 or 6 kilometers of the battle when it was on? 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. We had some very graphic descriptions and infor- 
mation with regard to those things, and I regret very much that Gov. 
Allen has taken his statement with him and that it is not before us. 
His description of the wounded on the field and the statements that 
they had been there for from 24 to 36 hours, and some of them as long 
as 48 hours, without aid of any kind, made a good deal of an im- 
}>ression on me, and I think on others who hearcl him, and I think it 
has called for an explanation from those in command. 

Gen. Tr^vub, Let me tell you, Mr. Campbell. Of course, as I tell 
you, that was the final, official action ; they were sent back. Now, at 
this place, 5 or 6 kilometers in the rear, Mr. Allen came to me and I 
told liim to establish there his depot of supplies. In the course of 
that battle, lasting five or six days, it is very possible that they did 
come up, I could not see that. I did not know whether any of 
them did come forward or not, but officially they had no business 
with the troops, and it is very possible that Mr. Allen or some of his 
Y . M. C. A workers were up there and saw those things. 

The Chairman. He stated that he himself had seen wounded men 
who had been killed from airplane fire, where the airplane would 
swoop down so low that the aviators would take deliberate aim and 
kill the wounded men on the ground. He stated he had seen that, as 
I remember, several times. 

Gen. Tkaub. If Mr. Allen said that, Mr. Allen saw it; because I 
know Mr. Allen, and there is no doubt about that. 

Mr. Gakrett. The point he was making in connection with that 
was, if I remember correctlj^, that it. Avas possible by reason of the 
fact that we did not have sufficient airplanes to protect the men 
against the incoming of the enemy airplanes; that they were able 
to come down and fire upon the wounded men as they lay upon the 
ground, because of the fact that we did not have sufficient airplanes 
to protect our men against raids of that sort. That was the impres- 
sion I got. 

jMr. RoDENBEUG. That the enemy was supreme in the air? 

Gen. Traub. Of course you realize what a battle front is. A battle 
front is a terrific proposition, and you can not absolutely have planes 
to protect every part of your battle front at all times. You take an 
individual plane, such as this one Mr. Allen speaks of, and, of 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DUKING ARGONNE BATTLE. 77 

course, it can get throngli your lines. It gets up so high you can not 
see it; and then, ahnost before you know it, there is an enemy air- 
plane down near the ground attacking your wounded men. There is 
no power on (iod's earth that can give protection against an indi- 
vidual plane; hut as noon as an individual plane appears, and if there 
is not anything that goes out from our own side, we telephone back 
and say there is a plane there and ask them to have somebody come 
out and drive it away. Of course, in the course of time, if they 
have a ])lane available, they come out and go against this fellow and 
bring him downor dri\o him otf. 

The Chairman. (lov. Allen made this specific criticism. He 
^tated that the (lernian phmes came and went practically at will and 
without molestation. 

Mr. RoDEXBERG. That they dominated the air — were absolutely 
supreme in that battle. 

Mr. Campbell. I fear I have disturbed, by interposing my ques- 
tions, the line the general had outlined to pursue. I had intended to 
review the condition of the wounded, the artillery, and the air- 
planes after you had made your statement. General. 

Mr. Fess. How long did the condition continue which you quite 
graphically described, when the airplanes were circling about trying 
to spot you? Did we have any protection against that plane? 

Gen. Traub. No; that plane was up there; and afterwards, when 
we got the word back about this plane, our planes came out, but then 
the chap had disappeared — probably left because he spotted our 
planes coming. I should say he was out there about half an hour, 
but he did not do much damage. They were trying to get me. 

Mr. Fess. He was doing what you say he was trying to do, trying 
to get you, and at the same time he was signaling to the artillery? 

Gen. Traub. That is what they do. 

Mr. Campbell. Speaking of the airplanes, if we are on that sub- 
ject, if there had been a sufficient number of airplanes at the battle 
of the Argonne, which had been looked forward to, I take it, by those 
in command as one of the great battles that would be fought on the 
western front by the American soldiers 

Gen. Traub (interposing). Yes, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. If we had had a sufficient number of airplanes j'^ou 
would not have been subjected to the dangers you were subjected to 
in the performance of your duties, and the wounded men whom Gov. 
Allen described as having been shot by machine gun fire from the air- 
planes that were flying so low that the wounded men could use their 
revolvers to protect themselves — that would not have happened if we 
had had a sufficient number of airplanes at that point? 

Gen. Traub. I do not know about that. It is almost impossible 
to get complete protection. 

Mr. Campbell. But the Germans controlled the air. We appro- 
priated a billion and a third of dollars so that we might control 
the air. 

Gen. Traub. I do not think one plane controls the air. They had 
their planes elsewhere. Here w\as this one plane that came there. 

Mr. Campbell. Did the Germans have only one plane at the battle 
of the Argonne ? 



78 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE, 

Gen. Traub. Oh, no. I am talking about this particular incident., 

Mr. Campbell. I am speaking in general, with this particular in- 
cident in view. 

Gen. Traub. To tell you the trtuh, I did not see many German 
planes. 

Mr. RoDENBERG. In your opinion as the commanding officer of a, 
division, did we have sufficient airplane protection ? 

Gen. Traub. The only thing I can answer for is the Thirty-fifth 
Division. You realize that a division commander has no control over 
the airplane work. One plane is assigned to him for observation to 
•rej)oi-t, and the rest are controlled by higher authority. There was 
nothing doing in the Thirty-fifth Division sector because, as I told 
you, everybody was in the shell holes ; that was broad daylight, and 
then one plane was overhead. While we were in that sector and 
under those circumstances other points on the front might require a 
hundred planes and they might be battling with immense Boche 
fleets. But of that, I laiow nothing at all. 

The only thing I say is that after we signaled back about this, 
plane being overhead, directing the fire of the artillery and sprinkling 
machine gun bullets, as soon as we got that back, and they could get 
a plane out, a plane came overhead and went back of the Germap, 
lines to see what that one plane was doing. This one plane was going, 
back and forth all the time, and you can not contend that there was 
a lack of air protection on our side simply because you had one Boche 
plane in the air doing this thing. 

Mr. Campbell. What the Boche planes were doing in that instance, 
they were doing in the case of the Avounded man who lay on the 
ground, perppering them, and at the same time indicating to the artil- 
lery wliere they should fire a shell to hit the wounded on the ground?^ 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. If we had had a sufficient number of airplanes over 
that sector, the Boche could not have directed that fire and peppered 
those wounded men in that division, could they? 

Gen. Traub. Mr. Campbell, it is a question of only a few minutes.; 
before a Boche plane comes around, circles around, fires, and scoots. 

Mr. Campbell. But it was descrilied here that they came with de- 
liberation and circled around, just as you described what happened in 
your particular incident, where the machine circled around appar- 
ently at leisure and kept peppering you as it saw fit, and with delib- 
eration gave the signals to the artillery, signaling whether they 
should fire to the right or to the left, and they were doing the same 
thing as was described to us in regard to the wounded men. 

My question is if we had had a sufficient number of airplanes to 
have kept the Boche planes out of the way there, we would not 
have suffered in the loss of wounded men as we did, and we could have 
taken them off the field ? 

Gen. Traub. If we had had a sufficient number of airplanes to do 
that t)ver there in my sector, there might have been other sectors that, 
would have suffered in the same way. 

Mr. Campbell. Was there a more important sector than this, dur- 
ing the six clays from the 26th of September until the 1st of October, 
during the battle of the Argonne. 

Gen. Traub. They were all equally important. Probably my sec- 
tor was the most exposed. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 79 

Mr. Campheix. A\'as tlierc :i more intcMisc .sector on tlio western 
front durinc: any battle than Avhat was known as the battk' of the Ar- 
gonne. from the 'ifith of September to the 1st of October? 

Gen. TuAim. Xo: that was the most imj^ortant thing the Americaji 
Army tackled. 

Mr. Campijell. And it had been looked forward to as one of the 
most important thin<>s you would have to tackle for months? 

Gen. Traub. I do not know about that. I was not in touch with 
Gen. I*ershing about that. 

Mr. KoDEXBEKO. Genei'al. I would like to have an ex])ression from 
you as to your opinion, as a military man, as to whether you had ade- 
quate airplane protection under the circumstances? 

Gen. Traub. As a military man, and as the commander there, I 
should say that at times we did and at times we did not, in my par- 
ticular diA'ision, undoubtedly depending upon the rest of the battle 
front, in the opinion of the higher conunand. That is my o])inion 
about this thing. At times we did, and at times we did not. 
• The Chairman. Do you think the criticism can be properly made 
and sustained that the Germans dominated the air at all times and 
came and went at will, practically without molestation? 

(iren. Trai'h. Xo, sir. At times whole squadrons of our battle 
planes Avould be going toward the Boche. It all depended upon 
where the higher conunand deemed the superiority of the air 

Mr. RoDENBEKG ( intei'posing) . What Avas the length of the battle 
front, approximately ? 

Gen. Traub. I should say about 50 kilometers. 
\ Mr. Rodenberg. That is about hoAv many miles? 
' Gen. Traub. About 35 miles. 

Mr. Harrison. TIow many airplanes did we have availal)le for 
action ? 

Gen. Traub. I do not know. Those things are not connnunicated 
to division commanders. 

Mr. Harrison. Gen. March stated there, were 120. 

Gen. Traub. If Gen. March stated that, he knows. We do not 
know those things. What I concentrate on is my front, and the chap 
to my right and to my left, as to what they expect me to do. I pay 
tio attention to anything else. 

'•_Mr. Harrison. When you called for airplanes, they were forth- 
coming? 

(ren. Traub. Yes, sir. It may not have been immediately, as I told 
3'ou. In a light like that, you get them down. They are shot down. 
A man can not be in the air forever. At the end of two hours those 
chaps are like that, and at the end of 30 minutes they are like that. 
An airman is more human than anybody else. You have got to give 
him a chance. 

Mr. Harrison. You found no palpable negligence in tlu> furnish- 
ing of airplanes when you reciuested them? 

Gen. Traub. X'^o, sir. 

Mr. P>,ss. Would 122 air])lanes be a sufficient number!' 

Gen. Traub. I am not an aA'iation expert. I would not be able to 
answer that ({uestion, and I really do not know. 

Mr. Gariu:tt. Do you happen to know the number of killed and 
wounded of the enemy, in order to compare their losses with our 
losses ? 



80 LOSSES or THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONXE BATTLE. 

(Ten. Traub. No. sir ; I do not. 

Mr. Garrett, I mean in your immediate front. 

Gen. Traub. Xo, sir; I do not. All I know is that I was up against 
thr^e first-class boche divisions with my one division, and we pene- 
trated their lines to a depth of 12^ kilometers and held about 10| 
kilometers for good. 

Mr. EoDEN'BERG. PTow mauv men were there in your divisions? 

Gen. Traub. ]My division had about 24.000 men. I have no records 
here. 

The Chairman. "With your permission, General, I believe in order 
to summarize tliis matter 1 will ask you a few questions in order to 
bring out some matters. 

As I understand it. Gov. Allen officially Wiis in the rear during this 
battle? ' . 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. And he was there by his consent? 

'Gen. Traub. Yes. sir. 

The Chairman. And. of course, in accordance with your com- 
mand? 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. The criticism has been made that there was a 
shortage of horses, that those in use were mostly old and broken 
down, that after a horse would work for a day or two the rule was 
that he would fall down, usually fall dead. What have you to say 
in respect to the shortage of horses? 

Gen. Traub. I have this to say, Mr. Chairman. We did not have 
a full complement of animals. It was impossible to have a full com- 
plement of animals that went with 41 divisions. The animals which 
lasted best of all wei-e the older animals. It was the youngsters that 
dropped, if any dropped at all. 

We have always had the greatest trouble with our men in looking 
after stock properly. I say that about a division that was made 
up of Kansas and Missouri men. and there is nobody who knows 
more about horses than they do, and yet we had to pound, and pound, 
and pound, and by force of example, by frequent writing, by lecture, 
by expostulation, by every means possible, try to get them to take 
proi)er care of the horses, and yet we had the greatest difficulty in 
having the stock properly looked after. The fact is that they never 
died by hmidreds. We had a shortage of stock due to hard work. 

We came out of the Yosges and we had to travel by night and 
rest by day. and it was the liardest kind of work for 10 days to get 
to this forest, where we had to lie until the Argonne stunt was pulled 
off. You could not show yourself in the daytime. Everything had 
to be done in the dark. After that stunt was pulled off we had 
to move by night again, in oi'der to have secrecy to our new place, 
and lie tliere again all day long. It was hard work under those 
trying conditions, and after the battle it was exactly the same way. 
We had to come l)ack by night. 

We were naturally short of animals. The whole American Ex- 
peditionary Force was short of animals. A horse was almost worth 
his weight in gold in November. We had no way of replacing them. 
They finally made arrangements to get stock, to buy stock from the 
French and the Spanish and the English. An Army without trans- 
portation is almost down and out. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 81 

We were short of transportation and short of animals of course. 
The last animals we "ot were purchased in the south of France. 
Every care in the world was taken of them. They would come up 
with the Mallain certificate test. We had the mange, but not very 
badly. In other divisions they had the mange very badly, and it 
was very hard on the stock. In the first place, the stock could not 
be put over fast .enough to supi)ly all of the 41 divisions. Then 
after Ave got them it was hard work — and your stock peters out. 

The Chairman. This criticism was also made, that American 
soldiers were killed by our own barrage, that they either Avent for- 
ward too ra[)i(lly or were k^l in such a way that oui- own l)arrage 
killed our own men. 

Mr. Fp:ss. That is. after the first four hours. 

Gen. Tkafb. (Jentlemen, a fight, especially one started in the 
moi-ning is usually started with a very heavy bai'rage, wherever the 
enemy occupies a strong defensive ]i<)sition. Now. we had an im- 
mense quantity of Artillery. We attacked in a fog; we had these 
works of the (xermans which the (xermans had been preparing for 
years. 

I want to give you a picture of this thing. We had the Vauquois 
Hill, which was a very serious proposition. The boche had craters 
50 feet deep all across the middle ridge. In the rear they had very 
strong woods known as the Nightingale Woods. On both fianks 
they had extremely sti'ong positions, everything fixed up with wire 
and man traps and every conceivable sort of defensive device which 
they had been able to construct during four years. That is the thing 
we were going to shove flesh and blood up against to take from tliose 
devils along a front, to start with, of over 3 kilometers. 

This will go back to the subject of looking after the wounded. In 
forming my plan of battle, had I butted straight forward, then you 
could very well have me here under investigation, because that Avould 
have meant the death of thousands of our men, if I had not executed 
the plan according to the form devised. My plan was to attack in 
column of brigades, each regiment iri column of battalions, and to 
outflank absolutely on both sides this tough proposition of the Vau- 
quois Hill. In order to do that we had to squelch the Vauquois Hill, 
and squelch the strong defense on both sides in the rear. That was 
planned for the artillery, and they did it, and they did it Avonder- 
fully well. 

Mr. Campbell. What day was that? 

Gen. Traub. This Avas the beginning of the battle. They actually 
squelched the whole business. We had American manned and French 
manned tanks. Everything was prepared, everything was arranged, 
and the signal was given, and then hell broke loose. Those battalions 
on both sides advanced in phalanx and it was a marAelous thing. 
They had orders to absolutely disregard this Vauquois Hill and 
Nightingale Woods on their right and left, so it became very impor- 
tant to kill off the boche in those two places. So I formed a mop- 
ping-up battalion, attached to the three battalions on the left, and 
as these troops swung forward under the protection of a barrage, 
two companies of this mopping-up battalion, as soon as they got 
opposite the Vauquois Hill, these troops were SAveeping up here 
[illustrating], and as soon as they got opposite the tAvo companies 



82 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

turned down and hooked up there, and they had it out hand to hand 
with the boche, with the result that in almost every case the boche 
came out and were taken. Then the next two companies of the mop- 
ping-up battalion, as soon as they got opposite the Nightingale 
Woods, swept in, and it was the same hand to hand business. 

So when I came along to renew the attack, which was temporarily 
stalled, the situation had been solved. We had taken in three hours 
what the French had been up against for four straight years, that the 
Boche by every means in their power had tried to render impreg- 
nable, and at the end of three hours the whole business was in our 
hands, with very small losses — ridiculously small. 

Mr. Campbell. That was very fine. If you could have brought 
up your artillery to have followed that up, all the criticism which 
has been made with respect to the want of artillery probably would 
not have been made? 

Gen. Traub. Yes. 

Mr. Campbell. Explain why the artillery was not brought up 
to follow up that splendid victory there? 

Gen. Traub. You realize we had divisions on the right and left, 
that the whole front, as far as supplies were concerned, had to be 
divided ; that is, if there was a road you had to be very careful that 
nothing else got on that road. If that road was assigned to one 
division, nothing else could cross it, because it was a continuous thing, 
back and forth. 

On the left flank, along the valley of the Aire, we had a main road 
devoted to the Army artillery, carrying up the Army supplies and 
the corps artillery, and the engineers had to be continually building 
this road. The Boche had put it in an impassable condition. The 
only thing left open to us was to go across the country. My artillerv 
brigadier at once commenced to make his arrangements for going 
around the right of Vauquois Hill, by working like a dog in getting 
the ground fairly well fixed up, and on the right-hand side a bat- 
talion of artiller}^ was sent over that day and that night, but as far 
as the troops were concerned, my artillery was able to reach beyond 
my troops. Thei'e never was a time in the Argonne battle that 
the whole bunch was not within touch and within reach of all the 
corps and all the Army artillery. They were pounding miles bej^ond 
all the time; wdierever we could locate anything of the Boche, by our 
airplanes, we were pounding constantly. 

So, of course, as the attack progressed what we wanted to do was 
to put our artillery forward. The orders were given and our artillery 
worked like dogs to get aci'oss the ravine. You realize this whole 
place was filled with man traps, and with wires, and it was extremely 
dangerous to touch anything. We had to prepare very carefully to 
get over that ground with our artillery. We finally reached this ra- 
vine. We got down there. 

The boche Argonne batteries, with their telescopes, could see every- 
thing that was taking place. The}' commenced to pound things 
with their artillery, and we were pounding back as well as we could. 
We tried to get the artillery across and worked all night long trying 
to get it over there. 

I went to the front about noon of that day to put more ginger 
into the attack. 

Mr. Campbell. What day was that? 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLi:. 83 

Gen. Tkaub. That Avas the 2Gth. 

Mr. Camphklj.. The first day ^ 

Gen. TiJArn. The first day of the battle. I eanie back and had to 
pass thronirh the Avlioh" thinir, where they were shelling, and they had 
to hunt cover. You can not get men out there under those circum- 
stances, with high explosive shells and gas being fired at them in 
this ravine. 

They could not get the thing forward. The thing was stuck in 
the nuid. The engineers were trying to get them forward, but they 
did not get them forward until early the next morning, so that the 
next morning Ave had a battalion of Tos and they were helping me, 
and I ahvays had the corps artillery, and I had my own heavy ar- 
tillery helping, too. But you can see, when you talk about the lack 
of artillery, it is not so. 

Mr. Campbell'. An officer who was in charge of a squad of men — 
I do not knoAv how large — sent back b}- courier, because there was 
no other Avay of signaling, and asked that an order be given to raise 
the barrage, that the artillery was killing his men and destroying 
the morale of his fighters. Have vou anv information in regard 
to that ? 

Gen. Traub. Yes; I was there and was in that same barrage m}^- 
self as diA'ision conimander. 

Mr. Campbell. What was the reason the artillery fell so short at 
that particular point? 

Gen. Traub. The boche Avas counter attacking us. That Avas on 
the 29th of September, on the Baulny Ridge. I myself had taken 
charge of all the troops in that immediate vicinity to repel this 
counter attack, and posted them, and was right there, and sent word 
back to the artillery. The lines Avere laid doAvn in accordance with 
the information given. Our artillery fired about a thousand meters 
short. There were about, I should say. half a dozen shells from our 
side that fell on the Baulny Ridge where our men were. We at 
once had the range lengthened. I afterAvard spoke to my artillery 
brigadier about it. From our side — but I will say not necessarily 
from the American artillery — half a dozen shells exploded in our 
lines. 

Mr. Campbell. How far Avere the French from you at that time ? 

Gen. Traub. It was French artillery. 

Mr. Campbell. That you had purchased from the French ? 

Gen. Traub. No; it Avas a French battery that was assigned to our 
Artillery to assist us in our sector. We had lots of artillery. It Avas 
simply a case of horrible circumstances. 

Mr. Campbell. The question was to get it up to where you 
needed it ? 

Gen. Traub. Especially over the horrible little road called the 
Bienville. There was this SAvampy place, and we were subjected to 
this fire, and you could not go through the woods because the Boche 
had all these man traps there. 

The Chairman. Were you wounded yourself, or gassed, during 
this engagement? 

Gen. Traub. I have been gassed about five times, three times moder- 
ately severely, once as a brigadier general, and the rest of the times as 
a major general, while I was up with my own troops. 

101727— 19— PT 2 5 



84 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

The CHAiRTvrAN. Was that during the Battle of the Argonne? 

Gen. Traitb. Yes; I was gassed twice during the battle. They 
tried to make me quit, but that was when my services were needed. 

The Chairman. The next criticism is that it is charged that the 
American Infantry was compelled to attack artillery positions with 
infantry weapons. It is charged that it should have been material 
against material, and it is charged here that the infantry were 
compelled to attack strong artillery positions with their' infantry 
arms. What have you to say in regard to that? 

Gen. Traub. We have what are called forward observation posts 
that are always established by the artillery. It does not make any 
difference where the Infantry may have reached, the artilleryman 
ahvaj^s sends up his forward observation post with a fine telescope to 
determine where the enemy's batteries are. 

You realize, gentlemen, we do not always attack with a barrage in 
front of our troops that explodes a shell every 5 yards. If you do 
that you are simply shooting up the country. The point is that that 
artillery fire is artillery support and this is what support means. 
You find out where the enemy's artillery is. You find out where the 
enemy has his support, where the enemy is next going to locate and 
make an attack against your troops. You find out where his strong 
points are, and that is done by means of the observation squadrons 
in the air, and by means of forward observation posts in the artillery. 
The artillery had it right at the start all the time. 

NoAV, a general, like myself, in command, is always in touch with 
the situation, and I always try to be. These reports come in, the 
observation leports from the artillery, and they will go to my 
artillery brigadier. He comes to me and he says. '' General, here is 
what I get." Then it is up to me to size up the situation, because I 
know what the points are, or am supposed to know everything along 
that line of battle in order to give proper orders, and where we got 
reports, in every case, in any way, shape, or manner, either the air- 
plane service, from my own service, or from the artillery service, 
wherever I got definiae information that the artillery was located, we 
always soaked them absolutely, and the support was there. That is 
artillery support — when we go to knock out the enemy's batteries. 
ITp in the Argonne Hills we knew the Boche batteries were there, 
although in the art of camouflage the Boche had no superior. There 
is where we tried to soak the Boche with our artillery. 

It was on another sector. I ought not to have done it. But I got 
the authority of the commander in chief to fire outside of my own 
sector, where I knew the enemy was. 

We frequently get reports, which, if acted upon, would make us 
kill our own troops. For instance, we hear sometimes from an air- 
plane that there are enemy batteries at such a place firing on our men. 
In a case of that kind a division commander has the mighty serious 
responsibility of doing or not doing a certain thing, namely, to try to 
demolish those batteries. If I ever open up with our guns on a po- 
sition that I am not dead-sure is an enemy position, I am going to 
destroy my own outfit — then, where is the responsibility ? So I have 
to be mighty careful. 

I get the information from all possible sources, and I have to size 
it up and do it quick, because time flies, and there I sit, with all these 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISIOX DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 85 

dilTerei.it things cominij: in. tiTino- to determiiie what to do in giving 
ni}' orders to my artillery brigadier. 

Never once, gentlemen, did a report come in that asked for artillery 
support or told us that the Boche were anywhere where they had to be 
liit that I did not give that order and did not get the support every 
time. 

Mr. Campbell. During the entire five days and nights during the 
Battle of the Argonne there was not a time when there was m)t all 
the artillery support that was asked for? 

(uMi. TitAUR. The Army moved forward. There was only the one 
])articular time when I could not get the artillery across this ravine. 

Mr. Campbell. Why was it necessary for the infantrymen to attack 
artillery with infantry arms? We had many letters read here from 
conniianding officers in regard to that. Why was it necessary to do 
that, if they had plenty of artillery support? 

Gen. Traub. Now, as I have told you, we might have been able 
definitely to locate the ])lace where the Artillery was. but i fso we 
could not open with artillery and knock it out if the Infantry 

Mr. Campbell (interposing). The Infantry did know where it 
was and went after it and got it. 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. Why was it that the Artillery could not go after it? 

(xen. Traub. Yon say the Infantry would know, of course, if we 
got back word about the Infantry we would know, but we had to be 
eareful about the Infantry, and sometimes when information would 
get back through a runner we had to be very careful, as it might 
change. The Infantry was given orders to attack. If you took the 
Artillery in front that is what it should do. But the Infantry was 
given arms to attack the machine-gun nests; and we had our trench 
mortars, and we had our .ST-nnn guns, and we had our rifie gi'enades, 
and we had all those things, and were trained in their use. 

Now, then, the Infantry got up against a proposition of that kind. 
We were supposed to have weapons to handle a particular situation, 
of course, but the machine guns can not knock out enemy artillery. 
You must absolutely leave that to the artillery in the rear, quite 
naturally, as a rule. You have to locate these batteries, and it is a 
pretty difficult thing in the French timber where they usually were, 
or behind a hill where they were, where there was not direct fire, 
quite a difficult thing to locate those batteries. 

Mr. Campbell. Would not airplanes have been able to help you 
materially? 

Gen. Traub. No. Those things were easily camouflaged so that 
they never discovered our battery, for instance. They can tell by a 
soimd-ranging apparatus, but if the thing is under cover a flash 
at night usually gives information, or thev can^even protect a flash, 
sometimes, from being seen. But an airplane could not fly over the 
woods and locate the guns in the woods. Wliat they attempted to 
work out, and did work out, was a plan to leave absolutely undis- 
turbed the trees overhead, by means of wire netting in the branches 
and an airplane flying overhead a thousand times could never see 
anything. 

The Chairman. The next criticism is 

Mr. Fess (interposing). Did yon have to depend entirely upon 
runners to communicate between infantry and artillery? 



86 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING AEGONNE BATTLE. 

Gen, Traub. Oli, no ; we had wire service. 

Mr. Fess. Some one spoke the other day of the fact that the wire 
service was not effective. 

Gen. Traub. Oh, the artillery always had its wire service, but, as 
you can imagine, under the horrible circumstances existing, and with 
the shelling, everything would go out at times. 

Mr. RoDENBERG. Would be put out of commission once in a while? 

Gen. Tratjb. Certainly. You realize that over that field things 
were tearing loose. If they would locate anything they would send 
It m. But if they fired 300 shells at one jjoint you may imagine how 
things were tearing loose all over that field. 

The Chairman. Criticism is made that infantry was made to at- 
tack artillery, but criticism was not made of not getting artillery. 

Gen. Traub. Oh, they got 24 pieces of artillery, and some of them 
mighty big pieces, with all the dumps of ammunition and other 
things. Everything, as I told you before, was turned against the 
Boche. 

Mr. Campbell. That was done by the infantry ? 

Gen. Traub, Yes, sir ; the only thing to do it. 

The Chairman. Gen. Traub, the criticism has been made that cer- 
tain high officers were removed from the Thirty-fifth Division shortly 
before the battle of the Argonne, and that those men were replaced 
by other men. The criticism has also been made that these men who 
were removed, or transferred, had been with the Thirty-fifth Divi- 
sion a long time and that they were j^robably better informed than 
the men who took their places. 

Gen. Traub. Well, sir 

Mr. Rodenberg (interposing). Two generals are specially men- 
tioned. 

The Chairman. Yes; one was Gen. Martin, and the other Gen. Mc- 
Clure. What do you care to say about that, if anything? 

Gen. Traub. Mr. Pou, I am the man that made that recommenda- 
tion. Now, both those men are friends of mine. That is, I flatter 
myself that Gen. Martin is a friend of mine, because we always got 
along beautifully together. He was my brigadier. Gen. McClure is 
a very warm personal friend of mine. I have known him for 35 
years. We were cadets together, and served together, and everything. 
So that you can see that there was only one thing that prompted me, 
and that was my very best judgment, for the success of our arms, that 
caused me to recommend relieving my two brigadiers. 

Now, gentlemen of the connnittee, it is important to note this; that 
my recommendation was made a couple of weeks before the Argonne 
battle. At the same time it is most important to recollect that I not 
only recommended but I actually did relieve three Regular Army 
colonels of my division. So that what I actually did do was to 
recommend the relief of my two brigadier generals, and three col- 
onels of the Regular Army. And the only thing, positively, that 
actuated me in doing what I did was my very best judgment, having 
in mind only the success of the cause. 

There was no man in France that had a better opportunity than I 
to know what a brigadier general should be in battle, because for 10 
months I had commanded a combat brigade in France, and I knew 
exactly what the requirements were. In addition to that, I had from 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING AEGONNE BATTLE. 87 

six Aveoks to two months' observation to back my jndjiment while T 
was holding 35 kilometers of front in the Vosges. On the strength 
of everything, and, as I say. having in mind the end to be obtained, 
I made my recommendation. 

I would not relieve the brigadiers: 1 recommended iHat they be 
relieved. My judgment is on pai)er. That Avas forwarded to general 
headquarters and received the approval of my corps commander in 
his own estimate of those same officers. That was acted upon by 
general headquarters, and the telegram for their relief did not reach 
me until, I think, two days* before the battle. I am not dead sure 
about that, gentlemen of the committee, but it was two days, I 
think, before the battle. 

Mr. RoDEXBEKG. Of course, that Avas the first intimation they had? 

Gen. Traub. That was the first intimation they had ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Harrison. You know that (Jen. Martin has been made 
adjutant general of the State of Kansas by Gov. Allen, do you not? 

Gen. Traub. I am very glad to hear it, because I have no doubt 
that Gen, Martin will make a fine adjutant general. I esteem him 
very highly indeed. 

The Chairman. You were in a position where you could not, of 
course, consider your personal relationship, and where you were 
forced to base j^our recommendation upon your sense of clutj'? 

Gen. Traub. Absolutely. 

The Chairisl\n. Now, Gen. Traub, criticism has been made that 
there was a shortage of stretchers: that overcoats were used in place 
of stretchers. And I think that Gov. Allen stated that he saw very 
few stretchers during his observations on the battlefields. 

Gen. Traub. Well, sir 

The Chairman. We would like to invite any comment you may 
<:'are to make on that. 

Gen. Traub. There is no question about it; it is true. You could 
not get enough stretchers in the whole American Expeditionary 
Force to handle 7,000 wounded men at one time in one place. We 
had to make use of every possible means. We carried them in 
blankets ; we carried them in overcoats ; we carried them in our arms ; 
we carried them in any way to get them to the point desired and to 
give them treatment. This was not a case like our maneuvers, where 
you fall a man out and sav*, " You lie there until I go and get a 
stretcher and we will carry you out." We looked out for our 
wounded and did everything in our power to give them the very 
best care, and I say they got absolutely the very first consideration. 

Mr. Rodenberg. How long before the Battle of the Argonne Forest 
was fought had it been planned? 

Gen. Traub. Well, sir, you will have to ask Gen. Pershing about 
that. 

Mr. EoDENBERG. I Understand that Gen. March said it had been 
planned for five months. 

Mr. Foster. I understood him to say that battles were planned. 

Mr. Rodenberg. I understood him to say that this battle was 
planned. 

Gen. Traub. Well, I have no idea about that. 

Mr. Rodenberg. The reason I asked w\as, if it had been planned 
that far in advance, they ought to have been able to make adequate 
provision for stretchers. 



88 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Gen. Traub. Pardon me, but you could not plan a battle that far 
in advance. You do not know Avhat the situation is going- to be four 
or five months later. You ma}^ have an idea that tliis, that, or the 
other is what you will do, but as for planning a battle four or five 
months in advance, that can not be done with any definiteness. 

Mr. EoDEXBERG. If casualties, as you say, are unusuall}" small, it 
seems that they might have had enough stretchers to take care of the 
wounded in anticipation of a great battle. 

Gen. Traub, I tell you we had 7,000 .wounded from our own and 
acijoining divisions, and how are you going to get stretchers enough 
for them? 

Mr. RoDENBERG. Well, I do not know. 

Gen. Traub. Well, that is it. You can not do it. In a great bat- 
tle you can not provide for every contingenc.y. Take the gas cases. 
Here is a man with his eyes bulging and he is told " Stay thereand do 
not move." That is the way we treated our men. Sometimes we 
had to let them walk back, but it was taking chances with those men 
we could not litter back at the time. They simply had to remain un- 
less we had a road there, or stmiebody said, '" Get on my back and I 
will take you back so that you will not have to walk and expose your- 
self to dilatation of the heart and death." You can not provide for 
those things. Sometimes 200 men will be gassed in two minutes. 
What are you going to do about it? How are you going to get them 
back? It may take hours to get them back. If that takes place in 
broad daylight with the enemy able to shoot you up, they will lie 
there until you can get them back, which will be at night. That is 
battle. Nothing can be planned about a thing of that kind. 

The Chairman. Was there any shortage of stretchers in the rear, 
in the place where stretchers should have been ? 

Gen. Traub. According to Col. Turck he made use of everything 
available. Serious cases were always stretchered and taken out. 
There was an immense number that did not have to be stretchered. 
There was an immense number that did not have to have that, as I 
have told you, they were slightly wounded. But we wouldn't take 
any chances with a slightly wounded man ; he would go back as if seri- 
ously wounded, so that we could look after him promptly and prop- 
erly. 

The Chairman. Criticism has also been made that American sol- 
diers went into this battle with their summer underclothes on; that 
tliey were not provided with heavy winter underclothing, as w\as 
proper, as had been suggested should have been done at that period 
of the year, and under that severe climate. AVe will be glad to have 
you make any comment you desire on that statement. 

Gen. Traub. Do you realize that when we left the Vosges it was 
the 2d of September, with the most beautiful climate in the world? 
You could not get the men to wear ^winter underclothing; they did 
not want it. At the same time as soon as August came my G-1 — and 
there isn't a better G-1 than W. E. Gibson 

ISIr. RoDENBERG (interposing). What do you mean by " G-1 "? 

Gen. Traub. He is the man Avho looks after administration and 
supplies, of the General Staff Corps, (t-1 is the one that has ad- 
ministration and supplies; G-2 is the one that gives you all the infor- 
mation about the enemy ; G-3 is the operations sections, that puts the 
Avhole business into play against the enemy. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 89 

Now, under (J-1 you liiive all this stail' corps you have in the Army. 
You have the Adjutant's office, the Ordnance, and the pay and the 
Jud<ye Advocate, and that is all administration and supply. That is 
the new stall' arrangement Ave adopted in France about a year ago. 

Now, then, what was I talking about? 

Mr. RoDENBEUG. Suuuuer clothing complaints. 

Gen. Traub. Oh, yes. We had our reciuisitions in iuuuediately. 
But, as I say, we had a beautiful time, beautiful weather, and you 
can not go to work for ;>(),()()() men and as soon as you come out to 
commence to march, you can not go to work and get 30,000 suits of 
underclothing inside of a (hiy or inside of a week. Those are in im- 
mense storehouses nuniy mil(\s to the rear. You send in your requi- 
sition and they go to work and have the stutf pi'epared and started, 
and by the time the stulf comes up to your railliead you are gone, 
you are gone some place else. Then it is changed and goes forward 
to the next railhead and Avhen it arrives there we are gone again, and 
so on to the next railhead. The things were sent forward in accord- 
ance with our requisition, and the people back behind were doing 
their darndest to help us, but how could such a situation be reme- 
died? I want to say that the service of supplies was marvelously 
run; everything Avas finely run; but. good Lord, Ave coukl not control 
the Boche ! AVe could not control conditions. We could not control 
our enemy. The result Avas that Ave did our best and yet Ave would 
get started and be shunted otf somewhere else. Here is a sensitive 
place, and there is a sensitive point, and we would keep going on, 
and the supplies Avould keep coming on after us. We Avould arrive 
at a railhead and the supplies Avere coming along behind us. then we 
W'ould go on to another railhead, and they w^ould still be behind us, 
and then on to another railhead; and so Ave Avent through the battle 
of the Argonne. 

But I never heard of any suffering on account of lack of under- 
clothes. The men were supposed to haA^e a change of underclothing 
in their packs. It is true that those packs Avere left behind Avhen Ave 
went into battle, but Ave got those things up to the men afterwards. 
Of course, some men Avere without suitable underclothing; we hadn't 
got through the sununer yet. I believe the autumn solstice is the 
22d of September, and Ave had a beautiful climate, and, of course, 
they Avere in their summer underclothing. All of us Avere. Over- 
coats were requisitioned in August so as to have them. That is the 
way it worked. 

Mr. Campbell. You had on summer underclothing yourself? 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. You say there Avere supplies brought up m suin- 
cient quantities, does that' include supplies of food? 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. Noav, Gen. Traub. complaint has been made that 
men went Avithout sufficient food. 

Gen. Traub. Well, sir? 

Mr. Campbell. I had a letter only yesterday from a sergeant who 
was in the Argonne fight Avho says he "went eight days Avithout a bit« 
of anything Avarm to eat. 

Gen. Traub. Well? 

Mr. Campbeel Durina' that time. 



90 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISIOX DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Gen. Traub. Well? 

Mr. Campbell. "Would that indicate that there had been sufficient 
food brouojht up? And I think he said that at the same time the 
French, wherever they fought, brouoht up their kitchens and had 
them there to feed the men. 

Gen. Traub. Yes? 

Mr. Campbell. And he went on to djescribe that they took a (rer- 
man trench, and that they found warm' food there. 

Gen. Traub. Yes. 

Mr. Campbell. Brought up right against our lines for their men. 

Gen. Traltb. Yes. 

Mr. Campbell. Why wasn't that done for our men? 

Gen. Traub. You see we were attacking and advancing, and the 
boche was retreating, and he was retreating on supplies while we 
were leaving ours. Before we went into that battle every man car- 
ried two days' emergency rations on his person. We told them. " You 
may not get anything for two days, look out for your supplicvS for 
two days." We could< not get it up, because those roads vvere packed 
and jammed w^ith Artillery and with everything going up and 
wounded going back, and everything of the kind. So we told them^ 
" You can not be furnished with any food for two days." If they 
got to a place where they could do' any cooking at night that was 
done. But you can imagine what a serious thing it was, as we were 
out there exposed in the open. If you light a fire you are going to 
get a shell. In the day time ^ 

Mr. Campbell (interposing). Didn't you have small kitchens that 
could be brought up? 

(tcu. Traub. We had what we called rolling kitchens, and we had 
various places 

Mr. Campbell (interposing). Couldn't they have been brought up 
at night ? 

Gen. Traub. They were. 

Mr. Campbell. Well, that is the complaint, that they w^ere not. 

Gen. Traub. Well, all of them were not, on account of these roads. 
Good Lord, for the moment it was the last thing we thought of bring- 
ing in on account of supplies being needed; the first thing being am- 
munition, then food, and the first thing back was the wounded, be- 
cause we had but the one road. And, as I have told you, the boche 
raised Cain with that road. They blew a crater into that road that 
took us 48 hours to do anything with, and we had^ to go to work and 
build a new road around it, and we had to bridge the tiling, and it 
was 10 days afterwards that that was finished. Those were the condi- 
tions that we were up against. So that you can see that the bringing 
up of rolling kitchens is a difficult proposition. Of course, it is a 
pretty serious thing not to have these things with troops, but it is a 
thing in battle that troops must get along without if their presence is 
going to bring shell fire upon them. There was no question that after 
this second day along at some points of the line that could not be 
reached and that had to be held there was a shortage of food. But I 
had my G-1 and all his assistants constantly out among the troops 
to find out the situation, and my G-1 reported to me officially that 
while the men did not always have all they wanted to eat, they always 
had something to eat. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURlN(i AKGONNE BATTLE. 91 

The CiiAiRMAX. Now, Gen. Tniub, that is in direct contravention 
of the charge made, the si)ecific charge beinjj; that each man shouki 
have been provided with an individual kit. whereas as a matter of 
fact, only one man in fonr was provided with a kit, but that the kit 
he was supplied Avith was supposed to be sufficient for four men ; 
and that the result of that arrangement or distribution was that 
wdien this fourth man who had the kit that was sufficient to feed 
four men, Avhen he dropped out, or was killed or wounded, or after 
he opened it he himself mi<>ht have thrown it away; that by reason 
of this manner of ])r()vidin<>- fond there was great suffering among 
the soldiers for want of food. What connnent have you to make? 

Gen. Traub. If that happened they violated orders. Every man 
had to carry on his person two days' rations. And we, had to de- 
pend upon the lieutenants and the captains to do their work, their 
duty, and see that these instructions were complied with. Those 
were the orders. If they did not go and break open the jiackages 
and give each man his food for two days, then those orders were not 
carried out and those officers failed in their duty. 

Mr. Campbell. The complaint was that packages were put up, I 
think cans of billy beef, for four men, and one man Ayould take a 
can, and probably be separated from his buddies at mealtime, or 
at any time when they could eat, and would open it and eat what he 
wanted of the billy beef and throw the rest away, and the others 
would have nothing, and that tjiat was the only food supplied for 
the men. 

Gen. Traub. Well, sir, these were the orders, and in order to com- 
ply with the orders, of course, they had to open up and each man 
has a mess kit and he is supposed to put that in his mess kit. As a 
rule we had bacon and hard bread. There is one thing that I have 
alwaj^s been contending for, and evidently they did get to eat some- 
thing of the kind, namely, tins that contained a day's ration, so that 
these tins could be given to men, and he would find in them every- 
thing he needed for his day's ration, too, so that there would be a 
reserve ration that the soldiers would carry into battle and have 
with them all the time. 

The Chairman. I want to ask you in the concluding questions I 
have to submit two or three general questions. 

Gen. Traub. All right. 

Mr. Garrett. Gen. Traub, from your knowledge of military his- 
tory, I take it there never was a long battle fought where the men 
did not suffer for food? 

Gen. Traub. There is no doubt about that. 

Mr. Garrett. There was nothing unusual about the condition tb.at 
existed there? 

Gen. Traub. Oh, no. 

Mr. Garrett. And nothing occurred that was aAoidable, if I un- 
derstand you correctly, in so far as physical conditions would possi- 
bly admit of being done. 

(len. Traub. In a general way, everything in the world tlu'.t v-'ns 
humanly possible was done, and the great thing that everybody did. 
from Gen. Pershing down to the lowest man in the ranks, the oih> 
great thing we all had to do, was the accomi)lishment of our mission: 
our country had sent us over there to Avin the war. and we did it, 
ofentlemen of the committee. 



92 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISIOI^^ DURING ARGONNE BATTLB. 

The Chairman. Xow, Gen. Traub, you Avere tlie conrniander of the 
Thirty-fifth? 

Gen. TRAuii. Yes, sir. 

The Chairman. You did the job. and your division lias yron a 
victory whicli must take its phice Avith tlie great victories of history. 
It has deveh:)ped in this hearing that you were on the batth^field 
there, on constantly, here and yonder, wherever you thought your 
presence uiiglit help. I want to ask you if any of these criticisms 
ever came to your ears while you were in P'rance? Did you hear it 
from the men? Did you hear any of this talk among the otKcers or 
the men of your division? That is, that there was a fatal shortage 
of airplanes, that the men did not have food, that they did not have 
winter undeiclothing. that men Avere needlessly sacrificed in going up 
against artillery, and all these things discussed during this hearing? 

Gen. Traub. No, sir; practically never at all. Of course at times 
(he chap who was exposed to this sprinkling of machine-gun bullets 
might look around and exclaiui, '' By gosh, where are our airplanes? "' 
Somebody might say, " AVhy don't they send some here to protect 
ns? " And then the airplanes Avould circulate around and do a little 
more sprinkling, and some fellow vrould look around on the other 
side, and then there would be a little more sprinkling, and some 
fellow u light say, "They have the supremacy of the air and we are 
doing nothing, and our outfit is not worth a whoop." When that 
occurred that fellow Avas getting a little bit nervous, AAdiich.Avas not 
a bit unnatural under the circumstances. 

Mv. Campbell. Gen. Traub, didn't the American soldier have a 
perfect right, Avhen he knew his country had appropriated hundreds 
of millions of dollars for airplanes, to expect that he would have 
protection therefrom ? At the battle of the Argone, did he not have 
the right to expect that his Government that had sent him over there, 
Avhich Government had been freely and fully furnished Avith money 
by the people of the country at home. Avould protect him Avith a fleet 
of airplanes? 

(ren. Traub. AVouldn't he have a perfect right to tliink Avhat? 

Mr. Ca:mi>bell. That he had a perfect riglit to expe t that he 
Avould be protected in that battle by airplanes'? 

Gen. Traub. One man? 

Mr, Campbell. All of the men engaged in tbat battle. 

Gen. Trai^b. I did not think that. 

Mr. Campbell. You had a perfect right to think that. You Avere 
not responsible for there not being a sufficient fleet of airplanes. 

Gen. Traub. That is your point of vicAv. My point of vieAv is I 
did not have a right to expect it. You may think that I did, but. 
good Lord, if you may realize Avhat a battle is Avhere a million men 
are engaged on both sides and then think that because one devil is 
shooting at me I have the right to expect protection because my 
country back home is doing everything in God's world to protect 
us and I haven't got an individual airplane there to driA'e that fellow 
aAvay I Avill find fault with my country, you are wrong. 

ISIr. CAMPBELL. It Avould uot and need not reduce itself to that. 

Gen. Traub. That is because it is the view of the individual; that 
is the case with the individual. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTfT DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 93 

Mr. (\\MPr?ELL. There ou^ht to have been airplanes to ])r()toct the 
oompanies, the bri<;a(le.s, and the Army. Tliere should have been ait- 
planes for the battle of the Arg:onne. 

Gen. Trai B. Yes, sir; bnt 

Mr. Campbf.ll. Even civilians would know that an airplane cir- 
f'linc: around over them for half an hour should have been driven 
away by other proteetinij airplanes. 

Gen. Trai^b. As soon as we ^rot word bark and as soon as they 
could make the necessary distributions 

Mr. Campbell (interposina). It was tlieir business to be there, 
was it not ? 

(Jen. Traib. AA'hy, no. How can you make it your business to be 
everywhere a Boclie appears^ You can not do it. You nuist wait 
until he makes an appearance and get to him. 

Mr. Campbell. AVliy Avait for him? Why not be on the job first? 
We Avere appropriatinir lar<re sums of money for airplanes that our 
Army mi^ht have them when and Mhere needed. 

(len. Traib. Undoubtedly. 

Mr. CA:\rPBELL. Those api)ro])iiations were not made with which 
to buy swamps over in Ohio or in other States in the country. We 
were appropriating- money to haAe airplanes to protect our soldiers 
at the battle of the Argonne and at other places. 

Gen. Traub. Well, Mr. Campbell, when you talk about Ohio and 
these swamps and other places you have got me. because I don't 
know about that. 

Mr. Campbell. And to see that everything was over there? 

Gen. Traub. Absolutely. 

Mr. Campbell. That is where the airplanes should have been. 

The Chairman. There is just one criticism 1 was about to overlook, 
and which I think ought to be called to your attention. 

Gen. Traub. All right, sir. 

The Chairman. It was suggested. I believe by Gov. Allen, that 
men were needlessly sacrificed because the American attack continued 
up to the very minute when the armistice went into effect, whereas 
it was generally known that the armistice would probably be signed 
and had been agreed to; that our men were so bloodthirsty, or their 
commanders were so bloodthirsty, that the attack Avas continued up 
to the very minute of the signing of the armistice. And gentlemen 
have graphically and dramatically thrown up their hands here and 
said that ever since, I believe, the 28th of September every Amer- 
ican soldier Avho lost his life was practically murdered. What com- 
ment haA^e you to make on that? 

Gen. Traub. Is that Avhat they sa}^ Mr. Pou ? 

The Chairman. That is Avhat they say. 

Gen. Traub. All from the 28th of September to the attacking 
of 

The Chairman (interposing) . Perhaps I gave the Avrong date. I 
will say during the few days immediately preceding the signing of 
the armistice. 

Mr. Campbell. A few days preceding the 11th of November. 

Mr. Garrett. The specific language in the letter was about the 28th 
(if October. 



94 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING AEGONNE BATTLE. 

The Chairman. I meant the 28th of October when I said the 28th 
of September. I beg your pardon, gentlemen. 

Gen. TpkAub. Well, sir, I do not know anj^thing about that, but it • 
did not a]oply to the Thirty-fifth Division, of which I was in com- 
mand. The Thirty-fifth Division up to the 2d of November w^as 
east of Fresnes-en-Woevre. We were occupying a 24-meter front, 
holding against the Boche. From Fort-de-Vaux, where I got my 
final gassing 

The Chairman (interposing). Where was that? 

Gen. Traub. At Fresnes-en-Woeyre we occupied a 24-meter front, 
and on the 2d of November we were pulled out. We made a sort 
of concentric march, and they did not know whether the armistice 
was going to be -signed or not by the Bodies. And if they did not 
sign it we were going to be constituted into the Third Army, of 
which the Thirty-fifth Division was to be one of six divisions, I 
think, and with a lot of French troops were to go over and hit the 
Bodies where there would have been no question about the prob- 
ability of a disaster to the Boche arms. But that other I do not 
know anything about. 

Mr. RoDENBERG. Then that you could not take for granted? 

Gen. Traub. No, sir. I do not know anything about what the 
chairman asked me. We were reorganizing and getting into shape 
for this great offensive against the enemy. That is all I knew. 

Mr. Garrett. I did not understand whether Gov. Allen was in- 
tending to make the charge upon his personal responsibility, but I 
rather got the impression he was not. 

Mr. Campbell. He read a letter. 

Mr. Garrett. Yes; he read a letter, I believe from an officer, in 
which the officer stated that they knew on the 9th of November or 
that they heard on the 9tli of November, that the armistice was to 
be signed, and probably what Gov. Allen meant was that he drew 
the conclusion that the officer was of opinion that all lives sacrificed 
after that time were uselessly lost. 

In that connection, inasmuch as we are proceeding on a good many 
newspaper reports, I think it is not improper to refer to an article 
which appeared in this morning's papers, contained in an Associated 
Press dispatch, as I understood it, in which the German commis- 
sioner, Erzberger, in a speech before the general legislative body on 
yesterday, said that on the night of the 10th he received instructions 
from the general high command asking for nine modifications, but 
that if he should fail to get those modifications to sign anyway. 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Garrett. I would naturally assume that if he himself did not 
know, if the German commission seeking the terms of the armistice 
did not themselves Imow on the night of the 10th that they were 
going to sign, it would be impossible for anybody else to have known 
on the 9th that they were going to be signed. 

The Chairman. That would seem to be the inevitable conclusion. 

Now, Gen. Traub, I believe we have about covered the criticisms 
that have been made. Do you care to submit any further remarks 
of your own? 

Gen. Traub. Well, I will tell you, Mr. Pou, that being over there 
and seeing the wonderful work that has been done by our wonderful 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISIOlv: DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 95 

men, the men that the country sent over to accomplish its mission, I 
can not fail to let you gentlemen realize that, as you must already 
know, it was a most stujxMidous task, and a task for wdiich our coun- 
try was not prepared. Everything in the world was done to shove 
the men over. That was the main thing, to get the men over there to 
suj)p()rt those British and French armies in the wonderful work 
they were doing, to brace them up, and then when go got over there 
in sufticient strength, to just go to it and accomplish the i)ui'})ose. 

The way that work has been handled by Gen. Pershing and his 
staff will be the marvel of civilized nations during all future time. 
The way he has done his work, the farsightedness, the breadth of 
view, the scope of his plans, and everything is something that will 
bear the stud}- of all men, more especially of fighters, for a great 
many years to come. He has done his work in a most marvelous 
manner. It is not for me, a junior office to either praise or criticize 
a senior, but when I consider the magnitiule of the undertaking, his 
great responsibilities, the way he prepared for the training of officers 
and men, with millions being shoved over to him practically un- 
trained in great part, and who had to be prepared for battle amidst 
unusual surroundings and to compete witli extraordinary condi- 
tions, against veterans; that in order to do that he had to have this 
wonderful staff, and had to inaugurate those wonderfid schools and 
everything had to be thought out, and everything had to be looked 
forward to and prepared for on an immense scale; when I look 
back upon all those things accomplished it would seem impossible 
if it had not been done. He did not prepare to handle a few hun- 
dred thousand men, but four or five million men, and that accounts 
for the great scale upon which everything that was done had to be 
done over there in the A. E. F. 

Gentlemen of the committee, do you know what in my opinion 
the American public ought to be doing, after the work that has been 
accomplished in France? In my humble opinion it ought to be 
singing pagans of praise to the great American soldier and the won- 
derful work that he did over there under the circumstances in bring- 
ing the Boche power to the dust. And I tell you, gentlemen of the 
committee, the American soldier is responsible for <:he result. 

Mr. Cantrill. Yes; they ought to be doing that instead of hav- 
ing this committee here now listening to a lot of civilians criticiz- 
ing the military forces of the Nation. 

Mr. Harrison. Gen. Traub, you mentioned Col. Clark. What Col. 
Clark was that? 

Gen. Traub. Indeed, I did, and I think his initials are P. C. Clark, 
^^ ho managed my regiment of engineers. 

There is another thing, Mr. Pou, and I happen to notice where 
here something was said about the engineers even having to fight. 
Of course, ever3'thing that goes to make up a division, a compact 
unit, is for the division commander to handle in accordance with 
the circumstances of the case. He does employ them, and must em- 
})loy them, the various units, for the best interest of the cause. 

Xow, as to many of these criticisms, take the subject of food, and 
take the subject of hot food; take the subject of care of the wounded; 
take any and every subject, and a man in my position considers them 
all, and I want to sav that is one of the reasons why the Engineers 



96 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

fought. They fought in order that those who had not had tlie bene- 
fit or advantages of position, of food, of rest, of everytlnng of that 
kind, might get the benefits thereof. 

So I myself, on the morning of the •29th, took that regiment of 
Engineers of ndne and put them in position, and after an examina- 
tion of everything I pulled back those advanced outfits and brought 
them back in the rear of my. Engineers, who then held the line for 36 
to 48 hours, so that these other outfits might have the advantage of 
getting back to the rear ^and getting food, and getting rest, and get- 
ting fitted up Avith supplies and everything. That is why, gentle- 
men of the conunittee, the Engineers fought. 

And let me tell you this, that Kansas and ISIissouri has got reason 
to be proud of its' men. That is why those Engineers fought, and 
you may bet your sweet life that they \yeve worthy representatives 
of the American Army. 

When the Boche counterattacked I was right there in advance 
with Col. Clark at his P. C, P. C. is post of command. That is 
where he was supposed to be. I was there with him, in a thing that 
we call a p\]\ box, a little concrete affair that the Boches had built. 
We were in there. Here were our lines back here, where we could 
look along that front and everything else that was in possession of 
the enemy. There is where we made our observations. 

And that is where I got a most remarkable message: a message 
which shows how things coming from the front, from people who 
are excited but trying to do their darndest for the cause maj' see 
things in a different way. as men do sometimes in the stress of battle 
and the heat of circumstances. I got a remarkable note in writing 
from a captain, a machine-gun officer, which stated : '" On our left 
flank the Infantry is withdrawing. Hurry up reserves or tlie only 
two remaining machine guns in the Avhole division will be lost." 
Think of it, the only two machine guns left in the whole division ! 
Well, now, here I was repelling the counterattack of a whole Boche 
regiment, and from different directions. Here I was in advance of 
my line, in battle, in a P. C. with the commanding officer, and I said 
" What do you know about that ? " He said, '• I know nothing." I 
inquired, "Does anybody know anything about it?" He said, 
" Nothing." We had no telephone lines that ran parallel to the front. 
The point was, the left flank was a ticklish position, because the divi- 
sion on our left was not driving the Boche, so that my left flank was 
exposed more or less, and it became very necessary to go and find 
out. 

Now, then, what I did was to go there myself with my sergeant, 
and I walked along that line of battle until I got to my left flank. 
And what did I find? Why, gentlemen, there wasn't any more 
danger there than there is in this room so far as that left flank and 
the loss of those machine guns was concerned. They were pepper- 
ing, of course, as they pepper all along the line. I said, " How in 
the devil did this thing happen ? " Nobody had any explanation to 
make. I went farther to the rear and saw" my echeloned machine 
guns there, and also the antiaircraft guns, and they did not know 
anything about it. 

Now, what was the matter? That officer was a reliable and trust- 
worthy man, but he just thought that that thing was so and he sent 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 97 

the message, and T, the division commander, myself went over there 
and verified that it was not so. That shows you how things happen 
in battle. On the other hand, suppose, for instance, after getting 
that report I had gotten flabergasted ; suppose when I got that mes- 
sage I had ordered the Artillery to turn loose over on my left, w^iat 
would have happened? There is where I assumed responsibility. I 
didn't do it. Before I took action T went over in person to verify. 
Then if the thing had been so I had a means of communication and 
could bring down whatever fire I wanted. 

(Tcntlemen of the committee, I recite that simply to show you how 
a thing like that can happen when a man gets nervous. It must be 
that way sometimes, and we must take all those things into account. 
If we did not various consequences might result. 

For five days and nights, gentlemen, let me tell you I got .scarcely 
a wink of sleep. I scarcely ate anything. You talk about men going 
hungry. What do you think their major general had? If got a 
piece of bread with a little jam on it and a cup of coffee that is all 
I got for five days and nights. My aid de camps would bring things 
and say, " General, for God's sake eat." I would reply. " I don't 
want it." I smoked cigarettes all the time. I never washed my 
hands and face for five days and nights. I could not spare the time, 
because I wanted to do the right thing by my country, and to do that 
wanted to be on my job all of the time. I was there with my men, 
where I needed to be and where I wanted to be and that is what the 
major general in command had to do. I do not want to toot my ow^n 
horn, but I want to show you that when men talk alxMit these things 
just to remember their major general. He lived on a piece of bread 
and a little jam and a cup of coffee and smoked cigarettes for five 
days and nights almost constantly. That is what I did. 

Now, that is what most officers did. (lood Lord, do you suppose 
we slept in feather beds? Do you suppose that the officers of high 
rank had a dandy time of it? Not on your sweet life. They were 
all there right with the men, working with them, and suffering with 
them. Gentlemen of the conmiittee. I went over as brigadier of the 
Twenty-sixth Division, and stayed with them 10 months in France. 
I then was promoted to the Thirty-fifth Division, which Avas made 
up of Central States troops, and uoav I bring home the Forty-first 
Division, which is made up of Eocky JSIountain and Pacific coast 
troops, so that there is no general officer in the A. E. F. or anywhere 
else who has had the experience with American soldiers from all over 
our fair land, no other general who has had more experience than 1 
have had in France, and I tell you that they are wonderful. They 
are marvelous. Never once in inspecting my troops, either in battle, 
in the front line, in sector, or in the rear, or anywhere else— in the 
hospital, or wherever I have gone to look after them — have I failed 
to be impressed by the wonderful American soldier. 

I have never had them march by me in any review or inspection, 
whenever I have tried to be Avith them and w^as with them and tried 
to size them up to see exactly Avhat the officers had been doing with 
the different outfits, after my critici.sms, suggestions, and recom- 
mendations, and everything of that kind— gentlemen, I never once 
saw those wonderful men with their " eye.s right '' toward me. and 
they looked me in the eye, every man down that rank after rank for 



98 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

30,000 of men, and each individual looked me in eye and said, " Gen- 
eral," practically by his expression, " here we are, and Ave are with 
you and for the counti^y," that I did not feel my eyes well up and 
take an added pride in being one of such an Army and a citizen of 
such a country. [Applause.] 

There never was a time, gentlemen of the committee, that I saw 
those men that tears were not in my eyes, and they frequently fell 
down my cheeks, as I realized what the spirit of America is and the 
wonderful boys called over there to uphold their country's cause. 
[Applause.] 

Mr. Campbell. Gen. Traub, I want you to know that, so far as 
criticisms have been made, they have not attacked the officers or the 

men in France of our Army, but 

Gen. Traub (interposing). No. 

Mr. Campbell (continuing). Every man's heart swells witli pride 
to think of these soldiers and what they have accomplished, and he 
wants them to have the best protection and the best conditions that 
the means of his country can provide. And the criticisms that have 
been made have been made because those officers and men were not 
supjolied with the munitions of war that they were entitled to — food, 
clothing, airplanes, tanks. Artillery support, guns, ammunition of 
all kinds, everything needful for ofi'ensive and defensive fighting. 

Gen. Traub. I can assure you that the criticism is not well f ounded. 

Mr. Harrison. There is the criticism of the removal of those two 
officers. Gen. Martin and Gen. McClure. 

Mr. Campbell. I think the inquiry was : Wh}^ they were removed. 

Gen. Traub. You have gotten that. 

Mr. Cantrell. As a matter of fact, in all of these criticisms, there 
has been no criticism by any military man or by any military au- 
thority who knew anything about military affairs. The criticisms 
have come from civilians, Avho were not on the ground and did not 
know anything about military affairs ; and, in my opinion, they were 
not in a position to criticize. 

Mr. Campbell. That is hardly a proper designation of the criti- 
cism made by officers whose letters and official reports were read to 
the committee on day before yesterday. 

Mr. Cantrell. I meant the men who had appeared before the 
committee. 

Mr. Campbell. Those letters were written by officers that were 
read before the committee. 

Gen. Traub. Do you mean to say that you have official reports 
from officers in the battle? 

Mr. Campbell. Yes. 

Gen. Traub. I am surprised, I must say, because they never came 
before me. It seems impossible. 

Mr. Cantrell. They are not here. 

Gen. Traub. They have not come through the War Department, 
and I do not see how they could be here. 

Mr. Foster. They were copies of official reports, sent to his wife, 
by a man named Truman, I think. 

Mr. Campbell. He made a report every 5 or 10 minutes, and copies 
of that were sent to his wife. 

Gen. Traub. That is a very grave error on Capt. Truman's part. 
That is the gravest violation of A. E. F. regulations. Think of an 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 99 

officer seiulin^- throui:;!! the mail c-oiiiiiiiinications that might give aid 
and comfort to the enemy. 

Mr. Campbell. These were sent after the armistice was sijincKl. 

Mr. Foster. Of what took phxce during the battle. 

Mr. Harrison. And the most of these things have come to Gov, 
Allen since he made his speech to the Legislature of Kansas. 

Gen. Trai B. My, what a grave violation of the A. E. F. regula- 
tions. 

But I will tell you, gentlemen of the committee, you will get many 
more of them after the A. E. F. comes marching home. There is 
many a man who has had his individual experiences, who will go to 
work and make the world center about them; experiences which are 
to him the most important things in the world, the individual expe- 
riences he has had. When lie comes back he will say, " You bet your 
life, I will never forget that first night we had there. It was one of 
the most awful things 1 ever experienced, was that night. T had to 
drink water that was not fit for a dog to drink. T did not have any- 
thing but crackers and cheese and a few otiicr things, and 1 lay on 
the wet ground. I will never forget it !'' And anybod}' who listeas 
to that fellow Avill say, " That man had a terrible amount of suffer- 
ing, and there must have been others like that." He then says. " My 
God, there must have been a horrible state of affairs.'' You will get 
that all along. 

You must remember that a man who means well will oftentiiiies 
make a good deal of thest' things, and that it nuiy grow with age. 
You know we Americans have a terrible habit of shooting off oui- 
mouths. We do it all the time. AVe had it all the time over there. 
A man likes to get things off his chest, and in getting them off he is 
not going to belittle the part he took. 

The Chairman. But we must not forget that you Avent over there 
and w^on the war very much sooner than anybody dreamed was pos- 
sible; much sooner, probably, than anybody on this committee ever 
expected. 

Gen. Traub. Oh, yes; much sooner than you had a right to expect. 
Tt has been a marvelous piece of work, marvelously well done by all 
concerned, I assure you. 

Mr. Harrison. When was the first time you knew that speeches 
w-ere being made over here criticizing the Battle of the Argonne ? 

Gen. Traub. Criticizing what ? 

Mr. Harrison. Criticizing the Battle of the Argonne. 

Gen. Traub. I think about a month ago some papers came to 
France that had Mr. Campbell's or Mr. x\llen"s statements in them. 
I think that was the first I knew aljout it. 

Mr. Harrison. It did not make vou feel very good, being over 
there? 

Gen. Traub. Well, you know I do not like to say anything to hurt 
Mr. Campbell's feelings, nothing whatever. 

Mr. Campbell. Do not regard mv feelings at all. (lO ahead. 

Gen. Traub. Well, I do. ' " 

Mr. Campbell. I offered the resolution on the criticisms that had 
been made by Gov. Allen and friends and relative of the boys of the 
Thirty-fifth Division. 

Gen. Traub. Yes. Now, let me tell you 

101727— 19— PT 2 6 



100 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Mr. Campbell (interposing). And I want to say that I have no 
apologies to uuike. I have given you an opportunity to tell the com- 
mittee some very interesting things, and I am very glad, indeed, to 
hear your side of it. P2very Member of Congress had thousands of 
constitutenrs in the Army,' many of them in France, and is most 
deeply interested in their welfare and in the welfare of every num in 
the American Army, from private to general. And you have been 
given an opportunity to relate some very interesting experiences and 
to present your view of the situation. 

Gen. Traub. You certainly have given me that opportunity, and 
YOU have treated me fair and square. 

And let lue tell you one thing. For myself I do not care. Every- 
thing that I have'done is absolutely open to examination and criti- 
cism. But I tell you one thing. Mr. Campbell, it must make the 
poor motliers and fathers and the families of the dead and wounded 
and the sick feel pretty badly to think that there is a possibility 
that the suffering their dear ones underwent was needless. That 
Avas the only thing that struck me over in France, and the only thing 
T think over here 

Mr. Campbell (interposing). May I call attention in that connec- 
tion to the fact that the criticism did not attach to the officers or the 
men, but to the fact that they Avere not supplied with the necessary 
])rotection and munitions and other things needful. 

(len. Traub. But they were, Mr. Campbell. 

Mr. Campbell. When the emergency arose we were called upon to 
authorize the calling of these I'oys from their firesides to the Army 
and then to vote billions of dollars that they might be supplied wnth 
everything necessary in the dangerous work in which they were 
called upon to engage. And we want to be very sure that they were 
provided with everything possible and necessary. 

Gen. Tkaub. Everything in God's world that was possil)le was 
done, as I have told you, and as you Can see from my picturing it is 
true. When you get T.OOO men dumped upon a little bit of a place, 
no bigger than this room to handle them, and the only place that 
they could be liandled and the wounded ntan drifts where he can be 
taken care of. That was the situation we were up against. Every- 
thing was open country and the Argonne guns were shooting every- 
thing and everything iflying upon yon. The point Avas to get these 
poor, suffering" fellows back quickly where they could receive the 
necessary help and assistance : and Avhen Col. Tur.-k comes back, and 
he was iny diAision surgeon and handled the situation, I want you 
to get hini to talk and tell you what they did and where they handled 
our poor wounded youngsters and our sick and cAerything. and you 
Avill see that the impossible Avas absolutely accomplished. 

Mr. Campbell. Gen. Ti'aub, I can not help saying, in conclusion, 
if you had had sufficient artillery, sufficient animals to haA^e brought 
up your artillery, to have made it equal on the second, third, fourth, 
and' fifth days to Avhat it Avas on the first day. and you had had suffi- 
cient airplanes to have kept the slrv clear of the boche, there Avould 
be a different situation to-day? 

Gen. Traub. Mr. Campbell. I believe that I have ansAvered all 
that, haven't 1. Does anybody Avant to ask further questions? 

^fi'. P'osTER. I think. General, von have ansAvered about that. 



LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURIXG ARGONNE BATTLE. 101 

(ieii. Traib. 1 think 1 have hut if yon want iiic to fjo over that 
again I will he very glad to do it, to show you that there ha\e heeii. 
unforunately, mistakes made as far as the information i- con erned 
that you all have l)een su])plied with. 

Mr. CAN'noLi>. A man (onvinced against his will i> ol' the sanie 
opinion still. 

(len. Tkai'h. I ran tell hy ^iv. CamphelTs face thai he is fair and 
square, and a straightforward American. But. of course, he can he 
misled, the same as other men. 1 have heen misled when in the h.ittle 
line, thinking the information I got was all right when it was not. 
AVe are all liahle to be misled. 

Mr. Campbell. If 1 am misled as to the artillery — and artiluMN is 
of no use without horses — T have been misled by one of your men. 

•^xen. Tkaih. ^'ou are mistaken when you say that artillery is no 
good without horses, (iootl (xod, we only used thein to get it in 
place. 

Mr. C'AMrr.KLL. Of course, hut if youi- artillery is not where you 
want it you can not move it without horses. 

(ien. Traib. "We do it with men. 

Mr. C"A:>irBKLL. It i> pretty hard to make the nuMi'do ihe work of 
horses. 

(Jen. Tkatb. Men will do any work to v-in \ictorv onht the IJoches. 
Good Lord. 1 put my own shouldei's to the wheel and h;dped to 
move the artillerv. 

Mr. CATirpBELL. Wouldn't it \\c\\v been better if you had liad 
horses ? 

Gen. Traib. Mi-. Campbell, we had horses there, biit-^^ — 

Mr. ("AiiPBELL (interposing). 1 think it was stated tls^kyou v. ere 
about 55 per cent short of horses. ^ 

Gen. Traub. At the start that is a mistake. It is not true. 

Mr. Campbell. Well, that is the report made by a man in charge 
of your animals. 

(ien. Traui^. Oh, no. 

Mr. Campbell. In the Thirty-fifth Di\isioiL 

Gen. Traib. That is not true. 

Mr. Campbell. Well, we have had that information. 

Gen. Traub. We vrere short l.'.OO animals out of jibout ().400. and 
after the battle was over we got to about — oh I think about the 
middle of October, we were then short about 2.500 animals out of 
some 6.371. 

Mr. (\\MPBELL. T have forgotten the i-eport made on the shortage 
of animals, and I regret that we have not here the stenographic 
transcript of Gov. Allen's testimcmv. 

Gen. Trafb. Well. I will tell you, and you can see Avhat ihe 
.V. E. F. was up against, ]Mr. Campbell. With -tl combat divisions 
and 6,000 plugs, or we will pay 6.500 animals to a division; if you 
multiply that, and that is not considering any other service in I'rance 
where hundreds of thousands of animals were needed: ajid aftei- you 
get the animals to a strange country, and amidst all these rotten 
conditions of living and caring for stock; and you get rafts of 
green men, such as our men were, to look after stock, and stock tlint 
needed the most careful and delicate handling, what might you 
expect ? You are bound to have losses, and lots of them : and then 
came the casualties besides. 



102 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

Mr. Campbell. What about the fact that is charged that we pur- 
chased horses that Avere used in the Argonne fighting: that is, tluit 
had been used by the French until they were worn out, and .manv of 
them sick, and numy of them that had been gassed, and simply 
could not move the artillery, and di-op^ied dead in their tracks? 

Gen. Tkaub. I know absolutely nothing about it, but I do not believe 
it is true. You will never get an Anu^rican otHcer to buy a head horse 
from a Frenchman for a live horse; and don't you forget that. Such 
a thing is not true, and I do not care who the officer is, I know he 
never did a foul thing like that. There is no doubt about that. 
Wliy, those men over there were just as good as you or I, and had the 
best interests of their country at heart. 

Mr. C'A:\rpBEix. Of course. 
• Gen. Tkaib. Do you suppose they were going out to do things like 
that in cold blood ? . 

Mr. Ga:mi'bkll. It was stated that you were going anywhere you 
could get a horse — English, Spanish, and French — and buying any- 
thing you could get. 

Gen. Traub. Not until proper inspection had been made, always. 

Mr. Roi)E>;uERG. Would you have time for an inspection of the 
horses ? 

Gen. Tkaub. Certainly. 

Mr. RonEXBKiJO. I would imagine that in tlie circumstance-^ i)er- 
haj3s you woidd have to take any horse you could get. 

Gen. TiiAUB. We had oui- service in tlie rear to do that — that were 
not fighting — they were back in the rear where those animals, thou- 
sands of animals, were being sent in every day, and they shoved 
them to the front to be used. We got the pick of selected stock ; of 
the thousands sent in there would lie, possibly, only 50 selected. 

Mr. EooEXBEKG. I wouldn't think it would be a matter of criticism 
if some did drop dead in their tracks, that you might have to take 
them. 

(xen. TiiAUB. Certainly : but they were not purchased that Avay. 
We had dozens of remount stations all tlirough France, where these 
animals went in and where they underwent acceptance and training 
and were sent up to us at the front. Gentlemen, we had a marvelous 
service for that. This thing you speak of is not true. 

Mr. Ca:mpbell. I am not charging that it is true, but am telling 
you about the official reports. You must realize that such reports 
are very disquieting, and must be sifted and a satisfactory explana- 
tion, if possible, made. 

Gen. Tralb. My dear sir, you will get anything. You must not 
be surprised at anything that comes up before you gentlemen. You 
will get everything. And I will tell you that the best intentioned 
chaps in the world will hear something, and, by the 9-horn spoons, 
he gets to repeating those things, and then he gets to seeing them, 
and then he gets to thinking he heard it from that chap, as if it was 
an official report or somebody makes a report based upon that infor- 
uiiition. and that is the way it goes. 

Mr. Ca>ii'1!ell. I do not recall at the moment the name of the 
officer making this repoi't, but it was some official whose duty it was 
to inspect the animals, and the inspections showed a shortage in the 
aniu'nls in the Thirtv-fifth Division. 



LOSSES OF THIRTV-FIFTH DIVISION DURING AEGONNE BATTLE. 103 

(Jen. Tkauh. Yes: of course, as 1 have told you, it is bound to be 
that way in the work that we were doin<>:, marching all night long 

under those liorrible conditions, when the boche 

Mr. Camim'.kll (interposing). But this was before the battle. 

(Jen. TuAi H. Of course, before (lie battle, but after September 2, 
when we left the Vosges. The battle did not connnence until SeiUem- 
ber 26, but we were continuing to go a long time, and we had that 
San Miliiel salient to fight. It was raining all the time and you may 
bet your sweet life that our stock suffered. When you think of keep- 
ing in the wet. muddy woods all day long so that you might not be 
ol)served and the battle given away, of course, stock is going to die 
and cause losses. My head \eterinarian. I think a man named Davis, 
but I can not give y(m liis first name because I am not clear about it, 
will tell yon that all the aninuils that were received were received in 
good condition. They came as 1 say with this mallein certificate 
against glanders, then they were given these vari(ms things to prepare 
them against the various maladies prevalent in that country. His re- 
port always showed the stock was in good shape. And in this comiec- 
tion T would say that the care of animals was one difficulty with the 
American soldier, and I would say even in the case of men from 
Kansas and Missonri in some cases, men who know about stock, I 
say, if there is in one shortcoming it was to do just what was right 
to take care of stock. We had great difficulty in that connection. 
Xow, tlien, all over the A. E. F., especially where they did not have 
men from Kansas and Missou.ri, we had to train the whole A. E. F. 
into an understanding of the immense value of caring for stock, be- 
cause the nmment your stock is down and out you are on your back 
as far as transportation is concerned. 

The CiiAiR^EAN. Are there any further questions anyone desires 
to ask Gen. Traub? If not, we are very much obliged to you. 

(ien. Traijb. Let me tell you one thing; I happen to think about 
rl)is now. and there is one thing I Avant to mention. 

Mr. (\\:\rpHKT>T, (interposing). (len. Traub, T am called to the 
})hone: will you excuse me for a moment? 

(Jen. Trauh. (L'ertainly. I had overlooked this thing for the mo- 
ment, and things will fleet from one's mind, but there comes back 
lo me something now that I want to tell, and in Mr. Campbell's 
]ii-esen(e as he brought up this thing. 

Mr. RoDENBERG. He will be back in a minute. 

Mr. Foster. There have been mentioned here reports from the 
Argonne battle from day to day by Capt. Truman, I believe. 

(Jen. Traih. Yes; Capt. Trunum. 

Mr. Foster. That is made ui) as a sort of historv of the regiment, 
is it? 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. I knoAv nothing about it, gentlemen. l)ut 
I would say — but Mr. Campbell has come back now and I did not 
want to make a certain statement until he got back. 

Mr, Campbell. I thank you, as I will be glad to hear it. 

Gen. Traub. I had just prefaced my remark, Mr. Campbell, by 
certain statements to this effect; it just happens to come to my 
mind, and is an important fact that I would like to record, and it 
is this: You know I have just a sort of sneaking idea that Mr. 
Allen, the present governor, did come up to my P. C. at Cheppy. 



104 LOSSES OF THIRTY-FIFTH DIVISION DURING ARGONNE BATTLE. 

There were so nuiny people coniiiio; there from all over th'e French 
and American Army corps, this corps of the Army and adjoining 
divisions, and just flooded the place. It seems to me now that Mr. 
Allen came up there to Cheppy, and if Mr. Allen came up there to 
Cheppy he saw this triage, where those thousands of wounded came 
through, and undoubtedly came in contact with the Avounded. And 
I have just a sneaking idea that he did come there, so I would like 
to have this inserted in the record because my impression was that 
he did not come forward farther than that back place. 

Mr. Campbell. Go\'. Allen spoke frequently of triage during his 
testimony and graphically described tht' men he saw lying on the 
ground, headless, armless, legless, and described others that had been 
prote;'ting themselves with their revolvers, and one man I think had 
to turn over a time or two to get a rifle or a gun from a dead nian 
who had been killed by an airplane, and had protected himself. 

Gen. Traub. Of course, those things sound horrible ; and you take 
an individual case like that and it is horrible. But it Avas not in 
contrast with everybody there, because Ave Avere all exposed. It was 
battle. You could not pick out a situation to suit yourself; the 
Boche determined that. 

Mr. Campbell. Of course. I understand that it Avas war and that 
war is hell. 

Gen. Traub. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Campbell. But Ave want to knoAv if there were unnecessarily 
severe conditions connected with the inferno. 

The Chairmak. And you were exposed yourself right there, as I 
understand. General ? 

Gen. Traub. You bet your sweet life I Avas right there. On my 
front, and over the field. Ask Col. Clark about his major general 
when he comes here. Ask Davis about his major general. Ask all 
those people who served with me. But, gentlemen, that is nothing. 
Good Lord, that is what we were there for. My life is no more 
precious- 



Mr. Campbell (interposing). Gen. Traub, we have heard nothing 
but commendation of you. 

Gen. Traub. My life is no more precious to me than the life of any 
private soldier is precious to him. That is the way I considered the 
situation, and both of us and all of us were in the service of our 
country. I am proud of those men. I am proud of those men who 
proved themselves certainly the equal of any men in the world, equal 
in spirit, equal in enthusiasm, equal in pluck, and equal in everything 
else that goes to make a good soldier. That is my estimate of the 
A mericanprivate soldier ; and take it from me, gentlemen of the com- 
mittee, he is all that. 

The Chairman. Gen. Traub, we thank you for your appearance 
here and appreciate the very interesting and illuminating statemeit 
which you have made to this committee. = 

Gen. Traub. I thank you, gentlemen, very sincerely for this op- 
portunity to appear before you and to give credit, even in my weak 
way, but in some measure at least, for the great work done by tiie 
American soldier. 

(And at 12 o'clock and 50 minutes p. m. the committee adjourned ) 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS A !!::»!!!;;!:<<! 



020 935 555 3 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

lllllllllllliillllllllllllilllillllll 



020 935 555 3 



